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SF-2026-000754UnverifiedDeep State & Intel Agencies

1950s CIA Memo to Psychological Strategy Board Subject: Flying Saucers

This declassified CIA document, hosted in the CIA Reading Room (DOC_0000015338), is a compilation of 1952 memoranda, draft National Security Council directives, and analytical papers produced chiefly by the CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence concerning 'unidentified flying objects' (flying saucers). A cover memorandum from Director of Central Intelligence Walter B. Smith to the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board transmits a proposal to the NSC concluding that problems connected with unidentified flying objects have implications for psychological warfare as well as intelligence and operations, and requests board discussion of possible offensive or defensive utilization of these phenomena for psychological warfare purposes. The study notes that since 1947 there had been roughly 1,500 official sighting reports, with 20% carried by the Air Force as unexplained (288 unexplained of those received since the start of the year). It describes the small administrative unit at the Air Technical Intelligence Center (ATIC), Wright Field, headed by Air Force Reserve Captain E.J. Ruppelt with two lieutenants and two secretaries, that collated and analyzed the flood of reports (Project Blue Book). CIA reviewers consulted an Air Force Special Projects representative, Wright Field project staff, Soviet press and broadcast indices, and MIT consultants (Project Lincoln). The papers frame UFOs as a national-security problem: operational needs to improve identification of 'phantoms' so that in the event of attack enemy rockets or aircraft could be positively identified; intelligence needs to understand the nature, controllability, and predictability of the phenomena; and concern about the silence of the Soviet press on the subject. Draft directives propose a centrally administered research program under the Research and Development Board pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947, with requirements set by the Secretary of Defense, DCI, and PSB. A detailed technical appendix analyzes weather balloons (radiosonde, rawin, rawinsonde, pibal) and large USAF/US Navy plastic upper-air research balloons as explanations for many 'Flyobrpts,' describing ATIAA-5's balloon-tracking data efforts and the resulting rise in balloon-attributed cases.

cia.govIncident 1952Discovered Jul 4, 20261.3 MBdocument
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Description

CIA Office of Scientific Intelligence memoranda and draft directives from 1952 assessing the national-security and psychological-warfare implications of unidentified flying objects, including a memo from DCI Walter B. Smith to the Psychological Strategy Board and a review of the Air Force's ATIC/Project Blue Book inquiry.

Claims

  • Problems connected with unidentified flying objects have implications for psychological warfare as well as for intelligence and operations.

    70%
  • Since 1947 there had been about 1,500 official sighting reports, of which the Air Force carried 20% as unexplained; 288 unexplained since the start of the year.

    65%
  • The Air Force UFO inquiry was handled by a small ATIC section at Wright Field headed by Captain E.J. Ruppelt with two lieutenants and two secretaries.

    80%
  • A centrally administered research program under the Research and Development Board should be established pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947.

    70%
  • Many sighting reports ('Flyobrpts') are attributable to weather balloons and large plastic upper-air research balloons.

    75%
  • The Soviet press has been silent on the subject of flying saucers, which may itself be significant.

    60%

Events

  1. DCI memo to Psychological Strategy Board on flying saucers

    Walter B. Smith transmits proposal to NSC concluding UFOs have psychological warfare implications and requests board discussion.

  2. CIA Office of Scientific Intelligence UFO inquiry

    CIA reviews of the UFO problem, consulting Air Force Special Projects, ATIC/Wright Field staff, Soviet press indices, and MIT consultants.

  3. Jun 30, 1952

    ATIC balloon analysis (Flyobrpts)

    ATIAA-5 compiled balloon launch data files; balloon-attributed cases rose from 15 in June to 303 in August.

Dates mentioned

194719521952-07

Keywords

Entities

Extracted text (OCR)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25.D.C. 4, /

wey
cr
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Fa

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR —

LEO DIT 10: Director, Psychological Strategy Board

SUsJ=CT: ___._ Flying Saucers: >. -

1. Jan today tranenittings to tne. ational Security. - ana

Council a proposal: (742A) in which it is concluded that the.

me

problexs comnected witht -unicentific d-flying- objects apoear_ to cette be

me

have imlications for osycholozic cal 3 fariere as well as ror
intellisence and operations.

2. The background-for tais v 3 presented in some -=2 >
Geta in-tss7 es a ee ceo

3. I surgest thet se discuss at an early board meeting ~
the possivle offensive or defensive utilizetion of these ~~~

a=

phencssena for osycholozical warfare purposes.

Walter. B. Snith
Enclostres Director
ft.

Joel. i041

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wees

Dini tish Dike pail: his on

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Gon heshisthea dua,

satan’ 3X deg) a: toate butiauas 2

TAY

ty tal di

soups vinstecatne Ebi esha ul jt stellate Sidsnbab al see

very}

OFFICE OF TH

LELORADTY 10: Director, Psychologi

SUSJ=ECTs Flying Saucers

1. Ian today transis ting:
Council a proposel (7A2 A) in >
problens connected with unicen

E DIRECTOR

cal” Strategy Board

to the National Security
ich it is concluded that the
icd- “flying -oojects annear to

es
have implications for osycholozical ¥ farfare ; as well as ior

intelligence and overations.-

detail in me Be oe

ve discus

gs at an early board meeting

ve utinization of these...

zee het
offensive -or cefensi
oc

Enclos2re

ical warfare purposés. —

Walter B, Snith—-.
Director

y

emt.


Sar LEM ie FES

P203LEi is
_ ; . . ,
- fat fh a 7 thas

ans any wl Fox
It is ths purpoce of this atudy to doternins vwhat* “eozcern “es ci, af. -

AOS SLO Do
ory,—te-resierst in the problen of *umidontifiod ‘fying odjects," and to recormand, |

«

. SIE mh. ef nd Moay
4f£ such imteress is found, steps that stould be taken. to improme-€Is*s-imellisoaco

5. Of ra PA
ciolston om eccouseForated Syatlonnl socurttys .

ail


PACTS BEARING CT OR PUNT

1. Sinse 1547, thers havy toon edout 150) officisl reports of sightings
77

plus an enormous voliuxs of lottors, phone galls a and pross. S roportae - During this -

duly alona, official razorts totaled 250. OP the. 1500, Air Force carries 20%

ari ty
es unextleinss ent of those roceived since the first sof this. yoar » 288 uspxnleinsd, -
WENN \ | See
2. Ths ecministrative unit now handling Be Me Foreo inguiry on thase aa a

pasnonena 19 a small esotion heeded by an Air Force. Revere cantata, Fe Je nagpelt,

.

stod ty tyro lMowtenants and tro cscrotariog at Air Technica) Intelligence

Comber, Fright Meld. . rag tats scl group chat ‘the snicng eet

et

Girectiva fo +

saucers coms for collath: oa end enalyatag wo

the flood of razerts ca flying
xolusizely to the
_ EEN a

f'Se" Rossare’s end emalyais eS this tins 1s lini itod alrast oxol ~
-- . . - - rar rear rare

. nee ore
e ‘ 2 Gus tle - =
tsa : 3s
2
. r]
neta, ite mee - tN Da wm tts = ~
- . . mo st oe we .
Pa . -
.
. ied - —_ - Cowen ney te . ¥ sags: : 6? fe .
SSaR 1 he ws) aver OL 28S Vbypo FE tn foul Bile AM Ss te Uta TL ee
° » .
. a’ : .
: aes a+ . ” we ae
el, . we ’ mys Hoa tte a - ty oar ny

1. Sinss 1947, thara have toon about 160) official ronorts of sightings
ms

plus an onorsous volizs of letters, phons calls and prass.report3se During thio

uly alons, official rozorts totaled 250. Of tho 1600, Air Porce carries 20%
=

. . . .
. a)

es unexcleins’ and of those roceived sinca the Nrst of this yoar, 288 unsxnlaizci. ~
TryN ‘ ’ . : “vy

2. Ths accinistrative unit now handling the Air Force inguiry on these oF

posnomema 19 a email ssetion headed by an Air_force Reserve Captaing Fe Je Ruzpelt, = == >
assisted ty tro Motenants anid tro sscratarios at Air foohnical InteliUigonss -

Cexter, Erighs Mleld. I% is fron this eel). Group Shak tha controling soldestiooa

cirsetiva to the ertire Air Forea origioated and at 13 to tis exall “group thas eS

S23 £1094 of roseréa ca flying sescers coms for collation and cnslyaias wer as

Se Rossares end emilycis e+ this tims is Mini sod almost onclustvely: tothe

Ty { “ —

ee eS od oe
. . “eo
. ~ ae
.
nee -- ~+e
eo “9 Beetle. ~~ ~
wiva 3
. - ry
4 . .
Lek tet Mme Fhe Da ee cet ee ant OF
=e ee -. eee tla Ube} ny ary we i Pa ON eee o
et *; *. - tet - wee . faye Y e.°s 3 + ae fc ares
.
are Hes - O2- 22ST SS Tele LONE Tits Ave eocray Ne eee
SS9D Lg a e yeep cee ee OL Soa eee og eee SPU Od, a ry i
. s
- . — . - - .
hd , Slohu YY ‘ ta tee ce : mar Fy ak 3
.
. * - + . wry, .

sons
ys al i


smn 0

rh.

SF TTT ENTE Bearer ms

Sno these ran OST tox entered into its inquiry fully were 4nat 16 ws

“oorins auto u field alzoacy cnarged with ; -artoganintip, ozo in sich objootivaty

nog been overzlace

a by nyzovous esnsetioaal writers, ard o29 ia which there aro

pressures for extravacom® oxplonstions 09 wall as for oversinplizicatioa. ney

SHeASICS

consulted with o porresontative of Air Force Syeetal Beoject @ grovns disosssed <n9

proulea sith those in charge of tna Air Foros Projo as “rignt flelds revioced--

e consideradie wel:

trocdeast 4ndices}

ase of imolligoncs ropertss” chezaa ¢ ths soviet. prég3 aad

ana conferred with shree of ou concultants £ at Lt, < ali Leaders

an Ghody eolemtizie folds.

“She present pad) Beale inguiry a% ATIC, whioh thus far has bova able only

45 use the once Matery nopreacs oxerdaing of on Anetdors carofully to cateraics =~

matter ft can 00 ex

xplainod or Fhathor is rust be put f into % ang Suaopleicsd

ee trp Mee GOR9 aored a porte ostly valid procoduro dud, one that ofPored ort

ial
”,
‘€

pening vp o axzplazations regarding the pature of these phonemes,

wast sg ah RIT tela us, £6 vould prone, bs found on the rargins or just

ts sAera of cur peasant knocledge in tbs Molis of etmesteries,

colergsesidal plecgazaa, Yaking into account the posse y”
- etl de in bes fagver ta oonaidore A cystomatlo _
yea ccupaptabi dd 02895 askd ¢ cgukedphaba a venereLy Qrxerreneraa
. ee a oe ee

Ler ef fronty aud involving a variety o?

ay calae vad Dee's ees oom

wae

“ye

Mae beth Lar

acer eae lad tae

ated eR Oe

me

Se ahd

Amer é

0 ape ete 0 an er
i

AGG woves were

pressuros for oxtravacomt oxplenstions 63 soll as for oversinglificatiors They

SHirf yO5

consulted with a representative of Air Force Sreatal Evagects groups discussed tno

provlea wits those in charges

of tha Air Foros Project ar Brent flold; roviorsd

p consiceradie wolums of imtelligoncs popertss caaexed t tas Soviet srés3 and

trocdeast gndicos; and conte

gy tnoir sotentixvio Siolds.

che presen’ pxpil seals tnguiry at ATIGg which. thos far ras boa able caly

rred with thrse of our consultants at Lilt, ol esters

neni .

4s yas the once hiatery Approacry- exerising cach gueidoms carofully to caveraics _

suecar Jb can do ex sploined

or vhother it wast ve pt i into tng “asoplesacd”

a rp FES 8 aglaored & pore fovly valid procodure dub, 029 that offered wit

eal so gah uIT bolas,

“Ae feces dn Gpenlas vp oxplonatious regarding the rature of those phonoce,

“ya, 2b would probably be found ‘on the rargins oF juce —

~PF3 ‘gant tnozledge in tbs felis ef atweamhorics,

oicisissdabiecoma, VAng » ito awossk tbo porstOty —
tote ce et eden ta footve ta ponaliere. _A cystonatlo
—— o layed geaphts £4.2:888 Godkd Corteapleds a teneralay om Pinner
, oo va eda nnter of fronts oud involving a wriety of —- -
oo aacst, .

J


.; sha ty gas é
a poi. ca OL

-~+t0d flying objocts” is a ratiozel sacurity
problon of concorn to oporations e3 well eo to intollizonco.
2. Operational problems are of primary inoortance end should ba atteoksd at

once. Thoy inoluce: ° .

j ra
t

@, Teking imediate steps to inprors identiPiecatioa of Ppaantax3” £0
that in tho evens of on attack, instant and positive idombification of orerny rockats .

or plang could bo mde.

fo phesaczena by U3 psychological warfare plansers ond what, i? any, defeases ekould
i. be planned in articlsation of Soviet atteazts to utiliza than.
3 5. Intelligence problems iketeds,

& Enseledge_of ths exact mature of theso phozamoma especially as oe

regerds:

.

(1) TRother azy ere ouscaptibio to_control, ana can be thus — oe

usilicsi fer_olthor milltary or. psyonolosioal offenss or dafense.

a oR ADO INC aii aR Mion s ot ae Naa

Fie
roy
a]
ph
a
on
a
t
t?]
bd
a}

caolozicsl operations, ==

¥
wv

ts eetaht

”

‘5... be The present level of Russian knowledga regarding these phencmonae -

fan eo
+ 0 inne Dethentrdey O°":

Pe Fvraiclys Sorict

tot intontions and sacabilitios to uthlizo these pheneomra,

aah

49 the detetzost of US egezet a tw te Bs

&
” Sy intorests.

ce TY

Le tain toes Bad acta TE agit!

(2) Thetter any are pesdictable and can thus be tolen advantase of 9 > 70 =

oncae They inoluia: : . ;

@. Taking inmediate steps to improve identification of "piantars? £0

that in tho evens of on attaok, instant end positive identification of oneny rockate

or plans could ta mda.

be Daterxination of what if any. utilization should be mde of these

phenanssza by US psycholosical 2 warfare planners and what, if any, detoates ¢ epould .--- -

be planned in anticisa tion of Sovist attsazta to utilise those

<y

inslods, —

Se Intellizgerse probdlens insind

& Ensrlodse of tha exact miturs of theso phecamona ossecially as ——

.

{2) Thoths

wiilicsi? for oithor rilltery or psyoholosioal offense or defense, -—  —.

(2) \hotbor any ere predictable and can thus be taken advantace of

i
rt
i
g

me geet

aioe Poe eo ee

. a Teese * : .
* fee - - ee ha

“es sho roasoas for stlerca din the Soviot-Prass rogarding "Flying suacers”,
. . a

$+ Intollisonse ressonsibilitios in this fold as rosards both eellootion

bo cisoharcod with raxiniva offootivoress oaly after much

er Ssiuallets ea


tan
‘the

ora
lire

eA

ae eens pe om

PREC
te bb OK omg H+

rey

bw

caer "6

PAF

fae

eases:

pw Toe aN e ss Seta x ryt

eee

same?

" Midway

dual copartcontal responsibilitioas,

fee toes eb

a4 19 of sven duportanoos ac to movit cosiizance ond action by tha Yatioszal
Seourity Coursile

6, Additional work, diffuring in character end onsnasio fron tat procantly

. e

uncer ray Will ds requirod to nsat tha specifio woeds in this field of bota

operations end imvelligensee

FRCS. Ppt TIIESs .
L5rths
Ono of the tro Seesbeie courses of eotion : sat terathe below 49 Fropozeds | 078 |

requires BSC section, and the other requires action by Secretary of Defenses a

proseritss that a centrally 6a a-inistered Fassarcy | program under RDS to

9 with Soo, 214 (a), Estiow) Sscurity Ast of 1947,

bd =

this procren having for ita rosoore? odjectives requirerents to te specified

by the Soerotary. of Dafessss tha Director of Comtral Tutel1igonee, en} Dix reater

¥s) oholomteal Strate=y Boarde

he 06 . ee :
“8% upon fesuance ef thig MEG directive, CIA cxorcice ito

“# weviding coordinated intelliconce roquireseats and

es tee -
"Smee. FOTO gf f-a se
, e pore to RDS,

: : ete -
ad af ene get .
* . % .
5 -

ls . ~ . d, ae Pe.
we h pit ttere of Phe Soe ng cat!
aa na se ot unjor th ero ng
=} ds Onto) it is roc rods

eiswdt,

pei in sig

PEAT GA 8 ee

Saab

Sahiba!

6, Additions) work, iffering in character ené oaghasia fron that presently
ucéer rey will de requirod to msst the specifio zoods in this field of both

operations end intelligense.

FRCS? DIDATIZTSs .

“5 xf, . . | 7 Le

*

Ono of tha tao Seashore courses of aotica sat ceratie velow is Fropozeds | one
recuires ESC ection, oni the other requires action by Sesratary of Defenses

2.» FSC cetions unior this oocrse, £<% is recomondads ae

oy
he

erent “see yoy tole .
an ed caked tia dash ty

ia wate hapa

ory

1
ry

a

ROR

Petes

dds decked,

Radi (3 nee Sdorden! Ab caine toe reo de (nat Dit Fd add
. . *

wy

rh

ec, That the DoT croseat to the HSC a draft ESC Gizective (283 A) which

proserites that a centrally sdcdcistered ressarch prezmom usder RDS to 2 lt

it , aM (a), Eavienal Sscurity: Act of 1947, 7

osteblicned, in ascordance vita S30

«

this pro-ren having for ita rosoorea odjactives reqnircces ats to to specified — oo

7 tho Socrotary of Dsfasse; tha Director of Contral . Tatatligeneey end Director .
“+ Theat upoa Lesuance of thig Hs¢ direétiyo, CIA axercics ito
5 werene beam iy treviding coordinated sueaiitganes roqulrozonte end

i _ ct aS Top sb feteess rattoay unior this comes, tt te rococenteds
| “+ SS Lee LOT cus-ost to ‘oorptary of Defensa along lines of t
“oN * Mat coorelsasel Focoure:: sYogren weeld bo mutable to Ci, ond
Seen ott iy Sel tsturtobon by Bs Ponca, Seat cocrdicstea imollizoace

“oO do peovited be O7
%) PeovLind by CIA Yadora ths

cingy is ctartode


Asha doled 6 tend

PER ye eer

voor ape mbbent eteare

mypet deities

ai i} i

ae

DRAFT

SUBJECT: Unidontified Plyiag obscctce

£

2. Tha Natiozal Security Couns!) has rocoguized ag a natioml ooourlty

probiea | our prosent linited cavavilities in making prosgs positive visual er

rochonical idanificatioa of flying objocts. Tho problem is racosrized loo as -

ons which bears directly upon beth offonsive and dofonsive carabilities of the

‘exzsda forees; as on9-of concern to. oprations ss well as to. intellizo gence: end a3.

-

ose Eaving possible imslications far pzyekolozical warferes

2 As ths asturs of tho problea is such that a centrally ada isterea

inguiry rather thom a diviced effart cMers ths dest promise of prosvess, ths

irooter, Eosoarsh ani Darelosceus Hoard is oharzei with the responsibility cf -

yrosran oF yocsarch ‘whiok meets the spsoificetions of

Sacretary of Dafsnsa ami-as repards operational reguirermsts: of the Direeter
of Sentral Intellisense, as ragerds the intelligorce © yeguircnents ani of Director, -

atesy bear2, es records psychological warfere implications,


eet appre ts

ame oe

se ee a oe

exexy rockets cr planas, tke solution of intallisence problems ere of afMNclext

DEAT. Torre

; eneney DCI
TO 2 foervtary of Tofenss
SULJCCTs Imtslligence intevoss daa study of unidextified flying obssctse
Le Recontly CIA's 6ffice of feiertific Ictol Lizozce rade an inguiry isto
tho possible invalligence inptieations of thia subject. a i) eous1aisa that whila

tho operatiozal problon of insrovenent in identification of "phantoss® nas of

first priority tecause of tha reed to make instant and rositive Saombification of

importancs to justify vigorous support by this Apeacy of an organized attack o2

_. tha problea, ;

2e In our ing quiry_ three of our men conaulted with a reprosentat ‘ive ‘of air ..

Fores Sposlal Projects grou; disstssed the problen with those ‘in charge of the

Aly Fores Frogact at Wright fielas 3 rovscwed | a ‘considerable yolum of intellizonse -

Fo; arts) ohecke?d the Soviet. ress $s and broadcast ‘indices; end conferred with ¥: Ares

a

*f cur coasultarts et La?, All leaders in their solowiNe ficlds.

*e he presext small scale inguiry at ATIC, wich thug far hes been able

+ Be wee *

A EP mos ; . Coe ee a et
" VN een be esplainad op whether £3 rust bs out Into the

am
~e.

-« e = ‘ -
We Smaetswens 3 portocsiy valid Procedure iS one tat

7 ry ” +
: Rael ag ht as ee

zardine ¢ tha matures of thanan OO

0 statbeant

WY Heiter a

tener ,

_ the problos, —

le Recontly CIA's Office of Sciertific Intel Ligoxse rade an inquiry into
tho possiblo imellizence implications of this subjzot. Ta conoluded that while
the operatiozal problonm of improverent in identification of "phantons” ras of

first priority tecause of tha reed to rake instant and positive identification of =~

erexy rockets cr planss, tha solution of intalliconce problors era of sufMctent ~~

importance to justify vigorous support by this Agoncy of an organized attack oa
2e In out inguiry three of our men conaulted with a representative of Air
Fores Spooial Projects greus; diserssed tha problen with those in charze of the -

Air Fores Project at ‘right fielé; raviewed a considerable volun of intellizgonce

«<

re,orts; onecked the Soviet press and broadcess indicas; exd conferred with three
*f cur concultarta et I?; ell lscders in their solemtiNe ficlés. ~~

Se he precect erall sosle inquiry at ATIC, vhich thes for hes been able

+ Be weg t

we mn Ye explaingd or whether it rust bs nut inte the

aoe ae
ae

eS F weasel topes.
on a rrfoctly_valia

. a a ee ee soe
. ee a rrr a en

“USS premtag {5 omni
*3 Fozardins tha nstura of thace

“ tultanty as rpg ~ ao

% would Probably bo found on tho

= ay

fez. oat \
che

“9 froaworg of our pre

eT

cont Lnoaledse in tho fleldo .


cet des 2 art tenor sh fant fabantdaa

* se
a han nt me Shab Erne

roa
tae Saba ease. p aie

; rel
cage binasbems Fie
ha! '

ry

4

c Ll. et ~vraol phonorona, taking into aocourts
the possibility that nucioar vaste products right also te a fector to consider.

A cystemtic attack on tho aseyos umaxvlained euses would contemplate a coatrally
cocrdainabtor prograa involving projocts on a munbor of fronts an] involving a

verioty of tochnigues not now usdode

«

4, As the strictly US militery operations problea of ingrovad identification

et hom aad ateocd is clovely tiod to a uumbor of Iintolifgeacs quactions, it would

be advanvegous to CIA, as wil-as to the interests of tha intelligence. conponamta

of Department of Dofenss,-if intelliconcs research rog:irements covld ‘be Anoludsd -

-

in any organized inquiry into too eubdjoct.

~

Be At this tine ca kno Pe 1Stle of the exact nahure of thess phenanem

that additional rasearch would te necessary before it could be said vhotker erjpre
sesceptibel tos atrol-end tan thus testilized for either military o> psychological

cffozse or defonss, or whether amy-are prodictable, | ani can thus ba takbon edvanteze
of in xilitery or psyenolosical opsrations,

6» It rer bo found thet on avpropriate center Yor cach rosearca vould bs

48 a croup ouch as Protest Liesoln which is nov working for Papartrent of Defense

es :follens of aie dofozso,

Ye AN thta tine we are unable to find any basta in our informtioa for

aid wwe:

fe serset Intectious or capabilitivs to utilise thece phe nomena

a a han ete . 7 ¢

& . ‘ ad 7 8
* tyr dotrtrent, ths Sortot Procs hag.

baon silent oa tho cubdscot —= thloh ig >

paancisch penstnm ee Pe
‘

o

sees Saad ee
i

84 Oe datrtrent, The Sorist Procs bas

f 4.4

o

worioty of tochnigques not nov wdade
4, As the etrictly US militery operations problen of improved Ldantification

et nom and etrosd is clovaly tiod to a number of intelligences qaactions, 4% would |

bs sdrantegous to CIA, as wail as to the interests of tbo iuto11igonoe corporaata

of Department of Dofanss, if-intelligones research rog-irerents oovld ba inoludsd

aaard

tog 2

in any organized inquiry into too subjects

Se Abt this tira wa know so little of the oxact nature of thesa phenom |

that additional rassarch a ould to nocessary perars it could ba eaid whether anjbre

sesceptibel to control and can this bditilized for oitbor military or psychological
cffoase or cefonse, or ghether_emr are prodictablo, and can thes bo takon fivanteze

of in rilitery or psyeholosical onsration3s.

6. It rar bdo fond that on epprogriate center Yor cach research would be -

ta a group ouch as Projass hirsoln which is now working for Papartrs

ont of Defense

ee crovlens of aie deofozso, |

Yo AN thie tine we are unable to find any basis in chr Snformiioa fer.

a . t
woo Tee fe fered tn

testious or capabdllitivs to utilize thors pho nomena

beon silont on tho curscos -— thioh ig

ba ttoely Brotoetieg co emg cee ee Ce
Sativa = and wo er o-not yot ablo to appraise the prosont level

tialotes of Cost. OO
ue O* Soviet celentists rogarding those nhenomona,

ve ould hy percolated if this agoney could partletrate in ary plans ——-*=—

Vurllegs . ~ .


ye /

; sé

| ire Strong has discusced with you soca of the goneral foatures of this — ae 2.
= — pa Pet k- perry t xo 2) .
can

| problom, and now I should lixo/to'describe ‘briefly how the Mr Forcs has
AN

ed

er pot

mee sR oe oe ‘tg
popssin STATUS OF THE THUIRY

”

organized its study of reports on unidentified flying objects and outlins —__
its methods,

The administrative unit now handling the Air Force, inquiry. on these

phenomena i (oe unidentified Flying Objects a AKT _
Section of the Aroraft. Propulsion Branch of the TAD) _
Technical Analysis Divisioa of Air Technical oe EpPoee)
~ * Tpipeatigence comer, “Hright Fists) es Ore
eee Sect. _| oe
Re

ae

[rmsg}. sca: soction is headad by-an-Air-Foros Reserve Captain, Ee Je Ruppelt.—_
3 , at Aw Pee fitere cel be li; ree eto | Conk, [ept
assisved by tio liewrerants end two secretaries, It is fran this sald group i

eee

that the comroling collection directive to ths entire Air Force originated |

“ Shyneg FA LOPS
end it is to this exall group that the flood of reports on unidentisivd- flying ~

Tee Wee ee)

PeojISA ccomes Lor contac on and ‘enalysise —_

The strengsth avd position of this central adnini strative group clearly

ec?

indicates a low level of support, and, presumably, cerious reservations .in tho

Ph i se U

a» Aly F ‘ores soparding he value of extensive inquiry into the eubjoct, Paradoxioall =~

(e’

oa! = — = = SN TT IE Bs
Ss = = -


thie contral offert at ATIC is rainteinod on 4 rinical basis while there is - -

concurrontly ordored a worldsido reporting syston end an intercoption pregran

which ray expond hundreds of man hours ard thousanis of dollars.

The usthods used by Air Force are now fn the process of chango but the

ROLE eye Li i AAP) Os Ot ae aL
’

conclusions and oxplamations given to the publio ore based on the process I en

going %o dascribes . ee
Rassarch and analysis at this tim fs limited aluost. exelusively te.ths 7

case history rethod. Reports, which ero limited in thelr coverage to tea

broad elemata of inforratios, ere roceived fron the fields. mainly through ~~ mores

3 the Aireintellizonce reporvins system, though also to a Limited extent from

4 . 7 ee .

] the other sorvicss az fron the Demrtrant of States

3 those reports) ec to tha Unidentified Objects Section rhere each ors

4 aré 7 , .
; 43, exarined separately to determine vhethor it is explairable as “nisinterprsats
2 Leal . : « e

Adons of a knosa objet", of whether At must bo clagsed as “unexplained.” and

Lespisind td utibben

Licidiod i eked hae Se bad

*

gudjaot +o further investigations

[mm this sorting process, the reports ere first exarined in the light of

: j esteblis=ed azd readily available fact/isuch as known balloon traoks or alrcraf*
d 4 flights| The reports ray then be reforred to an Air Force Base or to ths Orfice
7 26


usr ie h

of Spocial Investigation for cirsct imtorrosation of tho reporter, Alco, in

sors cases ths reports are reforred to tochzical or cclontific cpoclalists

’

for interprotatloz, It should bo borna in rind that this is 012 oa an

individm? case basis,

Thora has been no systexstio or oxtonsive use of othsr ctandard mothods of

- proceseine data, It is true that thers havo boon a for attompts to oxanines

s0ms of the breader quoations tat have hoon raised by thoso reports. ATIC hag,

.

for oxemple, Isboriously goce through tho accwuntlation of “unexplained” US reper.

ons vy ons, to plot then on A mip, _Thosa plots shew a hizh incidence of

reported casas naar_ateamio instal letions and Strategie Air Comard beses buS

thie nishS be excected bacauss af the greater mimbor of alort observers in such oi?

«

places, Actuslly, a mmber of accepted resoareh tochatquos that should be used =

in any effort to gain a soind understanding of those phonomom, havo not mon

eorployod.

There fa, of courss,| coza|doubt rogarding the oxtont and kind of effort

requirsd for the fistuses, The Alr Force has not yot fount amy great cause for

concern, Castain Bussels somrbod that, ay the prevlom soom3s to be of more

r am. se ee .* stone Sas 1
+ = : - .- MM
ad Pon =

coicern to owrntions than to intellicnnea, 1t nisht anoropriatoly bo novad ous

of intollicgezes to som operational command, | (iithin tho last two vmeka, he


Hideowa ig

aoa f

easly Mobic SU UPS, Draka,

epee

i ‘ nT * . Saco
a aennl eth coda jearnkird a tee tle ike Eb cacains cabad as 0

PE eT SPT Ae a

ssaddicdstule

O .

Ys

a

. o®

mF

-
\has tricg, wisussossfwily, to had the baby to Air Defonse cacy

- . ? wes. " roe
Tere are ML ae fap Om BOI nfl. 4 wag s

OF the oscontial” processas that right bo used if Adr Forca considered
tho inguiry worth a S212 blown offort, py could list the follozing:

42 tt a a “he Jes A “sy a ye . at Age» Yeree ——

ad

b Pocsench ebjoctizes crould bo defired in detail an rolntion to tho | ¢
A = cs —

questicomire, iT Fr guostions. askod. in tho proseat colloction diroctive are

Se

adzitied to bo imoquate even for tho linitod caseehistory appreachs Further,

-= -.. Coterrination of tho lings of recgarch oad sealyois' ths that ckould: be folloxeds

PAs th: “5 ben rea: ao ct orre ration of oreas of sost era fitablo
= le oo
23% .

to ostevlisu catezgorics. of. tas objects reported by shape, size, odlor, ote, or

to shoz ouch things ns ELostent, loasest and | avoraso duration of sightings of

wn A pps a. Le gen hog 2.4: 73 Lod fet Fb dee, Ay a ae duns

ot toe

a
*}
(>
Sse
g
pa
re)
joe
Ce)
ts
rt)
'’
«>
u
i.)

—s,
up conssined e-einst mating crosseze7nrisons, Shere
a
oe

sere op gest tal COCR CPR EOE Ba oy Cel FS sete. _
have bean =o studios, for exemolo, that would: oonparo cortein woathor conditions

. (with tho spocaratco of cortein colora of lights. | | ae

if . 2 . : +) .


in taal nica

i ihe a las deca hed. OPN OPT CER TOP ING MUTRORTON TENT iabec tl Lbuta ia

vine.

can be rade fren material nov. available, _

There ere a nunder of standard analytical processes that might be used if
Ays prabeoa chant geo

A
LFirce) considered &
a

detail the research objectives to be used in- relation to the questionnaire.

worth a full blown effort, It might define in

After tho arsas of most profitable resesron had been determined, a logical nox

step would te to isolate the inportant.elonents in each problem area,
Q& UUvifer
A third step would be to set up means by which to make many useful cross - bee

Finally
comparisons. Feesth, trend studies as well as area studies could be mde. = &=©=—

j Finally, there might bé “an Objective study_on the attributes of available data,

-.. >-

In‘surmary, the -linited central adalnistrative support given to the project
by Air Forces, coupled with the extrenely limited scope of the analytical work ss.

done thus far, bas placed a_strict ceiling on the kind of interpratations that

Ca

ect pm ste tN te


on eye

ka hagb sn} harsh hei, ls mettre dil dreads

Liste pain af. Bb iba Dethdi bn cle

Dwr

nah

be atileg dad aches nbihdieiliatat

. oo

oes 4
-
Te eg

Oo

Ao end studios as voll as rree seatics could to rete . [Beare is rev no

rc

picture cf how tio various phonocorn ray hivo formed patterns, either rg
rocards accregation or @icnorgal ovr spocits & periods of tics,

aw EY Snr

draii-, thora mirht bo en obsootive etucy on the ebtritut

yee

\__ fate [ts far, Fopocts thencelves Anct Peete rs prasont within these reports) -

-

aro only clascod “explainable” or "not oxplained”, “It ts nse lnown to rhet

Ontos, oF these, olemnts of oszusistose = 7 my oxtoad SRrouS doth tho -

collestioa of. Pexpiainsblo™ reel Fant expisiasa® tops tegen pe eT

“160, vnere 13 no mecds by which to s Vid Glomwsts te Lye vw:
zy enoxe is 3_by 2 to sort. out walic closents fron otherwise

et, a> et ~ 5 rs en} a x *
unraliadle” resarts, nor is. TOF9 A BIANI by hon SO sort ous immlid elements

fro otherwise acowete roports, £n illustration of & consegionmsa of this =

B
Fs
:
B
aa
E
ck
Py
4

sovabls_umtacsy fate of 4 valid reports ot vhstimsa --

actully ericnize? cloud, whoa obser7sd on a wall establisted balloon track,

A& would, in ali protatility to clascad "explaimble” ag a balleen, - The

roleration cf this Tossrs to tho | “oxplainod" eatogory would tals aoe vid

. . . Sn Nepean ted were conte Ft Met

olomerts present in ths report_oud of the reach of “lator analycloe

y
«<P
é

tod comtrel adntatstrative suppor$ givoa to tho projoot

“pled with the omtronmaly liritod seojo of tho analytical work
_


OW ak era ee

PUNT Wea TOR MACERPR Be PA Ci SRDS OT
t

AAS, a0%: Ua kh Ube Bla dd Sia bes od aks

tm Bae’,

LE he

beset lA ch

dint

aye

eens erence
aocoadabnett tet as

‘° 7 Cpe ar ee
: Dub ; ey dip eh < wee te *~
don) thus for, Leodt nat o-boliove that’ any broad consinaions prosontly eran *
con be accepted, caly vith cautions . - . .
Le, or wl cr a a a Se ce *e

. .
a
raphe ge

As to the Rte, a licttod anount of - tmprovorent ray bo accomplished,

ptostrTer,
A rovised questionaire, now being designed by Air Forse and Patvole oxports

will give =~rs dotaal toeaoh casenhistory. [Fe have heard informally, Ahough, — —_.

that many objocts are not reported in Koroa bocauso of tha burden of reqired ~~

Paperework., A longer questicmaire vould rake pilots oven rore relustazt to

voport thoir r sightingse Also, Hany cross comparisons will. ‘te poss possible ie

-o_ "oe

Present plans to uso ponsh cards are carriod outs : In “eatttny tepeorocesan a
may be expected if Air Force follozs throw’ on its prosent plan to establish =

. ?

an adyisery board of top level _ssiontista, Further, the current plen to place

onphasis oa using instmirertation such as rofraction prid cameras and new typo _.

Sohmics tolescozes, will ylola nore usablo facts, Tho absence thus Tex, howsver,
of a well plansseg 024 properly. guided resoareh promran mikes it appear that it~

may be cose time in the future before wo can orueet comlote oxplamtions of

- - : tt ; : oa Tass - oe ~
wv opeeet aes ’ F Do. te lee :

77 re

é ow

For ths roxy part of our. pr oseutatio ee e Daven disouss com of $ the
. a | ;

many of tress phonesw=a,

factors that haves beon found, or ray bo involvod, in thece roports,


rer

5A WAN ADSL, eaten!

Selah daha % BA

ot ol weer wamenahenme

ald -

yr wo

sabes t de:

aide:

con

bivedahs

teil: A daidenbhdlatarskted:

las

ay

didi det

Shadtcaatnat tcl Seah Ala

:

te:

.

myer 5

Part I = Weather Lalloons

1. In tho analysis of Flyobrpts prior to 1 dul 52 approximately 15%
were classified as "possibly" or probably" balloon, Tho basis for deci
Sloa was gencrally little nore than a fora of muessworks if tho Flyobrpt
did not do anythinz, and much loevay vas allowed fox obgerrerts fallibility,
that a balloon could not do in maneuvers, spood, etes, and if the descrip
tion corresponded aven roughly to that of a balloon, it was so classified.
If there wis no particular reason to believe a tadloon wes in the ereay the
report becaze a "possible", If the sighting occurred near a balloon launch
ing site sr on or about the launch tine, it decane a "probable", It was
obvious that an effort to obtain factual-data to support such conclusions
Was in oréer, . , .

@o ATIAS=5 anproached.the problem of weather balloons first. Weather
balloons ers of the foll wing types: ot

a. Padiosonda + Pubcerized tan latex, 6" in diazeter at launch, —

"Up to 20" at altitude. Carries a transritier and telecetering devieo for

tezperatura pressure, dewocins seauences, which transmitter-under certain = ~~
conditions would give redar returns. Also carries a white running lisht
during nicht_launches battery operated, which showld last for_duration of
flight. Nornal-ascent-is to_70,090! ~ 100,000", at +.1,000 ft/min, at which ~~
altitude the talloca bursts_and equipaont recovery is effected by a red
paractutc. .

b. Ravin-= Sate balloon as above, but it carries only a radar:
Ptriancle", end is-a winds-eloft otservation. ~~

ee Cy Rerinsonda = S28e, a conoination of ravin- and radiosende, - ~~

a. Patel --Sanaltype of_balloon; tracked by theodolite for winds

'O, Pibal =A yubcarigedtan-latex balloon, 30" in diameter at re~
lease ard i: or 5! at albitade. “Burst and climb.conparable to radiosonds,-- —-— -_-
A winds 2icis observation, tracked by thoodolite, Cerries running lizht for
night lesnctes. os : _-

2c

Ali Sypos_of dalisons are launched at 03002, 09007, 15002 and 71007
daily. Eowevery-sone stations launch one, tio, three, or four tincs daiivy.
others launsa irrerslasly, soze launeh only one type, and others several or
all, in acgisiony tine of launch may. vary aoproxinately thirty minutes fron
the scheduled tine, either way. ALL efenoles vhich launen balloons are quick
to adzit that Dslloons can nelfunction and that many ere lost. In addition, —
Wind currents 2% altitude can cause the balloons to assume odd shapes end
Strange nanssvers.~ Tho talloons under certain atcoasheric conditions enn
eppear vo os alros¢ any color, and nay te visible oven at extrene altitudes,
particularly ab sunrisa and sunset, to an ovserver on tho ground,


bed batieicn

Leki

atts bm tisk eicia tdai

FENG S

oe
re

ae re

ve ‘rs ay

?
ay
eS

-.caunched in the U.S.s froa overseas imerican oisos, and rroa all tha U,S.-

TTT St emtme mone me ae eta eee te eee Re Ae a

© , b

3e ATIAM5, fooed with this situation, cespiled in July a file of bal-
Joon launch data cerds for Air Voathor Servica, Naval Air ‘eather Service,
ard “eather bureau launch stations. In addition, this information is pice
tured fraphically cn tho weather balloon launth Yocation charts: Combining
thig infornation with the winds aloft data whieh ATIC receives froa tha fac~
Sicils charts has often provided a solution to” Flyobrpts. SGicnificantly,
»balloons, possivle and probvavle, increasud from 15 in Juno to 303 in August,
with 22 in July, Tho percentazse of reports analyzed as "unknorn"” decreased
proportionately. This gain is a real Ongy and rosults fron the accumulation ~~
of the tacicround data and the elininstion of guesswork.

- bh. The actual rediosonds moteorolorical infornation is extracted by 211
agencies Inuncring cellcons oato VLAN 3lay 31b, ond dlc. For winds aloft obe -- = |
sorvations, all agencies use WOAN 20 and 202, and these forms also insludg :
the trac of the balloon, ALL agoncies forzard thesa records to the hational.
Weather Records Censor, Grove Areado Building, Asheville, North Carolina,

ATTAA=5 has recuested the Co, ASS) which naintaing a‘detachnent at iskeville, —

to permit "Blue Fook" to deal diroctly with Asheville, Tho inscabion is to. —
requast phorostata of the scunding_(WDAN 3lay by ¢) and tho balloon: track : oe
(SUS 20 and ¢0a) at-cortain Spscific_tines and placcs.. If this ig approved,
ATIC WiLL. be in a position to obtain these reconts for. every balloon flight

ships and weather staidins at sea, In addition, ATTUAS will contime-to-usa —--
the calloon launeh information aveilable-tn- this office and will froa tine to --

tine Tid varlous launch sites for specific informations Those methods of
approach will solve tha problen of weather balloons, Sa ee ane

er Air Research Balloons—— 2

Part I -t

at

1. Sneclally desimned typ2s of balloons are used by the USAF and the _.
U.S. Navy in cooperation with various contracsors to obtain upper air data
for scicnzifie purteses, Hore is no doubt that these balloon couse Fly- ;
obrpts; trzciinz data of eleven such flishts in-duly resultod in positive — ——
identizic.tiea in throe esses;-probablo-identification in three more. Tha”
U.S. Uavy, varough-its-field ropresentabive of CNR at the University of
Eirmnesota, desis with varee contractors, ine blloons roleased are larse
white polyetayiens types capaule of expanding to 100! in disceter and csrry<
ing up to 550 pounds of metallic equipient, VYalvo and inflation arrangements
control tlrating-cltitudes. Naturally, troy aru visible even abt extrong-
altdtudces undor sony conditions end sre-capabie of assuning alnost any shapa.
The consracsors often release fron tine to tine fres or attached clusters of
the PA axa F type rucberized balloons, as-welle

-.. __@e These flizhta aro often of long durations ono Kinneasolis roleagad
balloon w2s tracked to Cape Cod and lost, then it was recoverca in Pordeoaux,
Frances; T2cy ara trashed by ten EDF stations hrousnoub tha Unitod States,
Awoten Rees sn wat womettt fig LS pain . :
- 3» ATiA‘e5 hss teken steps to sav up a reporting syste: for all bale -—— --—
‘loon fliphts of tho Navy contractors, This provrun will be iauloronted

15 Cct 5% snd will persancntly solve tho prevlea of U.S. Navy upper air

Yosoarch talloons, ’

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