CIA and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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Secret l<JOFOFU'il

The Central Intelligence Agency
and Overhead Reconnaissance:
The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Secret

~ec, et MOFORf~

The Central Intelligence Agency
and Overhead Reconnaissance:
The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Gregory W . Pedlow
and
Donald E. Welzenbach

History Staff
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D .C.
1992
Sec,et

♦ Chapter 1

Searching for a System

The Need for High-Altitude Reconnaissance ............................................ 1
Early Postwar Aerial Reconnaissance ................................................... 2
New Approaches to Photoreconnaissance........................................... 4
The Air Force Search for a New Reconnaissance Aircraft............... 8
Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA. ........................................ 13
Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance ............................................... 17
The BEACON HILL Report .................................................................... 17
Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack ................ 19
The Air Force Intelligence Systems Panel......................................... 21
British Overflight of Kapustin Yar ....................................................... 23
The Intelligence Systems Pane! and the CL-282 .............................. 24
The Technological Capabilities Panel ................................................. 26
Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282 .............................. 27
A Meeting With the President ............................................................. 32
CIA and Air Force Agreement on the CL-282 .................................. 33

♦ Chapter 2

Developing the U-2

The Establishment of the U-2 Project..................................................... 39
Funding Arrangements for Project AQUATONE .................................... 43
Major Design Features of the U-2 ........................................................... 45
The Development of the Camera System .............................................. 48
Preparations for Testing the U-2 ............................................................. 56
Security for the U-2 Project...................................................................... 59
The CIA - Air Force Partnership .............................................................. 60
Technical Challenges to High-Altitude Flight ......................................... 61
Delivery of the First U-2 ........................................................................... 66
Initial Testing of the U-2 ........................................................................... 68
U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK................................................ 72

Sec, el NOFORN

Hiring U-2 Pilots ........_................................................................................. 73
Pilot Training ............................................................................................... 75
Final Tests of the U-2 ................................................................................ 76
Three Fatal Crashes in 1956 ..................................................................... 79
Coordination of Collection Requirements ............................................... 80
Preparations To Handle the Product of U-2 Missions ......................... 82
The Impact of the Air Force Project GENETRIX Balloons................... 84
AQUATONE Briefings for Selected Members of Congress ................. 88
The U-2 Cover Story .................................................................................. 89

♦ Chapter 3

U-2 Operations in the Soviet Bloc and Middle East, 1956-1958

The Deployment of Detachment A to Lakenheath ............................... 94
The Move to Wiesbaden ........................................................................... 95
President Eisenhower's Attitude Toward Overflights............................ 96
First Overflights of Eastern Europe ....................................................... 100
First U-2 Flights Over the Soviet Union ............................................... 104
Soviet Protest Note .................................................................................. 109
The End of the Bomber Gap................................. :................................ 111
Tactical Intelligence From U-2s During the Suez Crisis .................... 112
Renewed Overflights of the Soviet Union ........................................... 122
Radar-Deceptive "Dirty Birds" ................................................................ 128
The New Detachment C .......................................................................... 133
Detachment B Flights From Pakistan .................................................... 135
The Decline of Detachment A ................................................................ 139
Cooperation With Norway ....................................................................... 142
Declining Overflight Activity.................................................................... 143
Concerns About Soviet Countermeasures Against the U-2 .............. 147
More Powerful Engines for the U-2 ...................................................... 149
Intervention in Lebanon, 1958 ................................................................ 152
British Participation in the U-2 Project ................................................. 153
The U-2 Project at the Beginning of 1959 ........................................... 157

♦ Chapter 4

The Final Overflights of the Soviet Union, 1959-1960

The U-2 and the "Missile-Gap" Debate................................................ 159
The Last Overflight: Operation GRAND SLAM .................................... 170
The Aftermath of the U-2 Downing ...................................................... 177
The Withdrawal of the Overseas Detachments ................................... 181
The Fate of Francis Gary Powers .......................................................... 183
Changes in Overflight Procedures After May 1960 ............................ 187

Geeret PJOFORN

..'t', Chapter 5

U-2 Operations After M ay 1960
U-2 Operations in Latin Ameri ca ................ ...................... ................... .. 197
U-2 Support to t he Bay of Pigs Invasion.. ..... ............ .............. ....... 197
Aerial Refueling Capability for the U-2 ........................... ........ ....... .. 198
U-2 Coverage Duri ng the Cuban Missile Crisis .............................. 199
U-2s Over South America ............. ..................................................... 211
U-2 Operations in Asia ........ ........................... ......................................... 211
Detachment C and the Indonesian Revolt of 1958 ............... .... ..... 211
China Offshore Islands Dispute of 1958 ................................ ..... ..... 215
U-2 Support for DDP Operations in Tibet....................................... 216
U-2Cs for Detachment C....................... .................... ... ....................... 217
U-2 Crash in Thailand ......................................................................... 219
End of Detachment C Operations ...................................... ............... 219
Detachment G Missions Over Laos and North Vietnam .............. 221
New Detachment on Taiwan ......... ......... ........................................... 222
Use of Detachment H Aircraft by US Pilots ............................ ....... 230
U-2s in India ................. ........................................................................ 231
Increasing Responsibilities. Inadequate Resources in Asia ........... 233
Advanced ECM Equipment for Detachment H................................ 237
Infrared Scanner Over PRC Nuclear Plants ....................... 238
.............................. ......... 240

~~::-::;--::,-;-~~:F:::.:-:=--::-r-;~
=-=-=~
The End of U-2 Overflights o
ain an China ............................. 242
Peripheral M issions by Detachment H ................... .......................... 244
Operation SCOPE SHIELD Over North Vietnam ............................. 246
Improvements in U-2 Technology .........................................................247
Modification of U-2s for Aircraft Carrier Deployment ... ... ............. 247
Use of Car rier-Based U-2 To Film a French Nuclear Test Site... 249
A New Version of the U-2 ...................................................... ........... 251
Replacement of the Orig inal U-2s W ith U-2Rs............. ........ .......... 253
The Final Years of the U-2 ................. ................................................ .... 253
Support to Ot her Agencies .... .......... .................................................. 254
Overseas Deployment Exercises and Missions ............................... 255
The Phaseout of the Office of Special Activities ........ ................... 257

0)

Chapter 6
The U-2·s Intended Successor: Project OXCART, 1956-1968
The Evaluation of Designs for a Successor to the U-2 .... ................ 260
Competition Between Lockheed and Convair ...................................... 267
The Selection of the Lockheed Design .............. ... ................ ................ 270
Efforts To Red uce t he A·12's Radar Cross Section ............................ 274
The OXCART Contract ............................................................................. 277

See, et NOFOAN

New Technologies Necessitated By OXCART's Hig h Speed ............. 279
Designing the OXCART's Cameras ........................................ ....... .. ... .... 281
Choosing Pilots for OXCART .................................................................. 283
Selection of a Testing Site fo r t he OXCART.............................. ......... 283
Delivery of t he First OXCART ............................................ .................... 286
Changes in the Project Management .................................................... 286
OXCART' s First Flights.............. ... .............................. .... ..... .......... .. ......... 288
Speed-Related Problems .... .. ........................................ ........... .... ............. 290
New Versions of the OXCART ............................ ............ ..... .................. 291
The Question of Surfacing a Version of the OXCART ...................... 292
Additional Problems During Final Testing ............................................ 295
Discussions on the OXCART's Future Employment ........................... 297
First A-12 Deployment: Operat ion BLACK SHIELD ............................. 304
The End of the OXCART Program ........................................................ 307
Possible Successors to the OXCART..................................................... 312
Summary of t he OXCART Program ...................................................... 313

♦ Chapter 7

Conclusion
U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union ..................................................... 315
Participation of Allies in t he U-2 Prog ram........................................... 319
U-2s as Collectors of Tactical Intelligence .................... ....................... 319
Advances in Technology............................................... ........................... 320
Cooperation With the Air Force ............................................................. 321
Impact of the Overhead Reconnaissance Program o n the CIA. ....... 321

♦ Appendix A: Acronyms ............................................................................. 325

♦ Appendix

B: Key Personnel ..................................................................... 327

♦ Appendix C: Electronic Devices Carried

by the U-2 ........................... 335

♦ Appendix D: U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union, ............................. 337

4 July 1954-1 May 1960
♦ Appendix E: Unmanned Reconnaissance Projects .................... .......... 339
♦ Bibliography ................................................................................................ 347
♦ Index ............................................................................................................ 355

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ieeret NOFGftN

FOREWORD

This History Staff Monograph offers a comprehensive and authoritative history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program.
which from 1954 to 1974 developed and operated two extraordinary
aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It describes not only the
program's technological and bureaucratic aspects, but also its political and international context. The manned reconnaissance program,
along with other overhead systems that emerged from it, changed the
CIA's work and structure i.n ways that were both revolutionary and
permanent. The formation of the Directorate of Science and
Technology in the I 960s, principally to develop and direct reconnaissance programs, is the most obvious legacy of the events recounted in
this study.
The authors tell an enigrossing story. The struggle between the
CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and A-12 OXCART
projects reveals how the manned reconnaissance program confronted
problems that still beset successor programs today. The U-2 was an
enormous technological suc:cess: its first flight over the USSR in July
1956 made it immediately the most important source of intelligence
on the Soviet Union. Using it against the Soviet target it was designed
for nevertheless produced a persistent tension between its program ·
managers and the President. The program managers, eager for coverage, repeatedly urged the President to authorize frequent missions
over the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower, from the outset doubtful of the prudence and prt0priety of invading Soviet airspace, only
reluctantly allowed any overflights at all. After the Soviets shot down
Francis Gary Powers' U-2 on I May 1960, President Eisenhower
forbade any further U-2 flights over the USSR. Since the Agency
must always assess a covert operation's potential payoff against the
diplomatic or military cost if it fails, this account of the U-2's employment over the Soviet Union offers insights that go beyond
overhead reconnaissance programs.
Indeed, this study should be useful for a variety of purposes. It is
the only history of this program based upon both full access to CIA
records and extensive classified interviews of its participants. The
authors have found records that were nearly irretrievably lost and
have interviewed participants whose personal recollections gave information available nowhere else. Although the story of the manned

-Sac,et

See1et N0F0RN

reconnaissance program offers no tidy model for imitation, it does
reveal how resourceful managers coped with unprecedented technological challenges and their implications for intelligence and national
pol icy. For this reason, the program's history provides profitable
reading for intelligence professionals and policymakers today.
Many people made import.1nt contributions to the production of
this volume. ln the History Staff's preparation of the manuscript,
Gerald Haines did the final revision, Diane Marvin again demonstrated her high talent as a copy editor, and[
[provided
staunch secretarial support throughout. As usual, we are indebted to
more members than we can name from the Publications, Design. and
Cartography Centers in the Office of Current Production and Analytic
Support, whose lively interest in the publication went far beyond the
call of duty. Their exceptional professional skill and the masterly
work of the Printing and Photography Group combined to create this
handsome volume.
Donald E. Welzenbach, who began this study, and Gregory W.
Pedlow, w_llo completed it, brought complementary strengths to _this
work. A ~eteran of C[A service since 1960, Mr. Welzenbach began
research on this study in 1983, when he joined the DCI History Staff
on a rotational assignment from the Directorate of Science and
Technology. After tireless documentary research and extensive interviewing. he finished a draft manuscript of the history before returning
to his directorate. In early 1986, Gregory W. Pedlow, a new member
of the DC( History Staff, was assigned to complete the study. A Johns
Hopkins University Ph.D. who has served as an Army intelligence
officer and University of Nebraska professor of history, Dr. Pedlow
undertook important research in several new areas, and reorganized.
edited, and revised the entire manuscript before leaving CIA to become NATO Historian in late 1989. The final work, which has greatly
benefited from both authors' contributions, is the CIA's own history
of the world's first great overhead reconnaissance program. ♦

J. Kenneth McDonald
Chief, CIA History Staff
April 1992

Secret l\10FeAN

PREFACE
When the Central Intelligence Agency came into existence in 1947,
no one foresaw that, in less than a decade, it would undertake a
major program of overhead reconnaissance, whose principal purpose
would be to fly over the Soviet Union. Traditionally, the military
services had been responsible for overhead reconnaissance, and
flights deep into unfriendly territory only took place during wartime.
By the early I 950s, howe v,er, the United States had an urgent and
growing need for strategic :intelligence on the Soviet Union and its
satellite states. At great risk, US Air Force and Navy aircraft had
been conducting peripheral reconnaissance and shallow-penetration
overflights, but these missions were paying a high price in lives lost
and increased international tension. Furthermore. many important
areas of the Soviet Union lay beyond the range of existing reconnaissance aircraft. The Air Force had therefore begun to develop a
high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft that would be able to conduct
deep-penetration reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his civilian scientific advisers
feared that the loss of such an aircraft deep in Soviet territory could
lead to war and therefore authorized the development of new nonmilitary aircraft, first the U-2 and later the A-12 OXCART, to be
manned by civilians and operated only under cover and in the
greatest secrecy. Primary responsibility for this new reconnaissance
program was assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency, but the Air
Force provided vital support.
The Agency's manned overhead reconnaissance program lasted
20 years. It began with President Eisenhower's authorization of the
U-2 project in late 1954 and ended with the transfer of the remaining
Agency U-2s to the Air Force in 1974. During this period the CIA
developed a successor to the U-2, the A- 12 OXCART, but this advanced aircraft saw little operational use and the program was
canceled in 1968 after the Air Force deployed a fleet of similar aircraft, a military variant of the A-12 called the SR-71.
Neither of these aircraft remai ns secret today. A great deal of information about the U-2 and its overflight program became known to
the public after I May 1960, when the Soviet Union shot down a CIA
U-2 and publicly tried its pilot. Francis Gary Powers. Four years

See,et

later, at press conferences in February and July 1. 964, President
Lyndon B. Johnson revealed the existence of the OXCART-type of
aircraft, although only in its military YF- l 2A (interceptor) and SR-7 l
(strategic reconnaissance) versions.
The two CIA reconnaissance aircraft have also been the subject
of a number of books, beginning with David Wise's and Thomas B.
Ross's The U-2 Affair in 1962 and then Francis Gary Powers'
memoirs, Operation Overflight, in 1970. Two recent books give many
more details about the U-2 and OXCART air,craft: Michael
Beschloss's Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair
(l 986) and William Burrows's Deep Black: Space Espionage and
National Security ( 1987). Although well written and generally accurate, these books suffer from their authors' lack of access to
classified official documentation. By drawing upon the considerable
amount of fonnerly classified data on the U-2 now available to the
public, Beschloss has provided an accurate and insightful depiction of
the U-2 program in the context of the Eisenhower 21dministration 's
overall foreign policy, but his book does contain errors and omissions
on some aspects of the U-2 program. Burrows's broader work suffers
more from the lack of classified documentation. particularly in the
OXCART/SR-71 section, which concentrates on the Air Force aircraft because little information about the Agency's aircraft has been
officially declassified and released.
After the present study of the Agency's overhead reconnaissance
projects was completed, a new book on the U-2 was p+ublished in the
United Kingdom. Chris Pocock's Dragon Lady: The History of the
U-2 Spyplane is by far the most accurate unclassified account of the
U-2 program. Pocock has been able to compensate for his lack of access to classified documents by interviewing many former
participants in the program, especially former pilots. Pocock is also
quite familiar with aircraft itself, for he had worked with Jay Miller
on the latter's excellent technical study of the U-2: Lockheed U-2
(l 983).
There has also been a classified official study of the U-2 and
OXCART programs. In 1969 the Directorate of Science and
Technology published a History of the Office of Speci,al Activities by

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Helen Hill Kleyla and Robert D. O'Hern. This 16-volume Top Secret
Codeword study of the Agency's reconnaissance aircraft provides a
wealth of technical and operational information on the two projects
but does not attempt to place them in their historical context. Without
examining the international situation and bureaucratic pressures affecting the president and other key policymakers, however, it is
impossible to understand the decisions that began, carried out, and
ended the CIA's reconnaissance aircraft projects.
In preparing this study of CIA's overhead reconnaissance program, the authors drew on published sources, classified government
documents, and interviews with key participants from the CIA, Air
Force, contractors, scientific advisory committees, and the
Eisenhower administration. The interviews were particularly important for piecing together the story of how the CIA became involved in
overhead reconnaissance in the first place because Agency documentation on the prehistory of the U-2 project is very sketchy and there
are no accurate published accounts. Research on the period of actual
reconnaissance operations included the records of the Director of
Central Intelligence, the Office of Special Activities in the
Directorate of Science and Technology, and the Intelligence
Community Staff, along with documents from the Eisenhower
Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas, and additional interviews.
Both authors are grateful for the assistance they have received
from many individuals who played important roles in the events they
recount. Without their help a good deal of this story could never have
become known. The assistance of Agency records management
officers in the search for documents on the overhead reconnaissance
program is also greatly appreciated.
To ensure that this study of the Agency's involvement in overhead reconnaissance reaches the widest possible audience, the authors
have kept it at the Secret classification level. As a result, some
aspects of the overhead reconnaissance program, particularly those
involving satellites and related interagency agreements, have had to
be described in very general terms. The omission of such information
is not significant for this book, which focuses on the Agency's reconnaissance aircraft. ♦

Seeret NOFORN
Chapter 1

1

Searching for a System

THE NEED FOR HIGH-ALTITUDE RECONNAISSANCE
For centuries, soldiers in wartime have sought the highest ground or
structure in order to get a better view of the enemy. At first it was tall
trees, then church steeples and bell towers. By the time oif the
American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, obse_ryers were using hot-air balloons to get up in the sky for a better
view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it
became possible to carry cameras into the sky to record the disposition of enemy troops and emplacements. Indeed, photoreconnaissance
proved so valuable during World War I that in 1938 Gen. Werner von
Fritsch, Commander in Chief of the German. Army, predicted: '·'The
nation with the best aerial reconnaissance facilities will win the next
1
war."
By World War II, lenses, films , and cameras had undergone many
improvements, as had the airplane, which could fly higher and faster
than the primitive craft of World War I. Now it was possible to use
photoreconnaissance to obtain information about potential targets before a bombing raid and to assess the effectiveness of the bombing
afteiwarcl
Peacetime applications of high-altitude photography at first included only photornapping and surveying for transcontinental highways and mineral and oil exploration. There was little thought given to
using photography for peacetime espionage until after World War II,
when the Iron Curtain rang down and cut off most fonns of communication between the Soviet Bloc of nations and the rest of the world.

' Roy M. Stanley II, World War I/ Photo Intelligence (New York: Scribners. 1981), p. 16.

6cc. ct P.OFORN

Chapter 1
2

By I 949 the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe had
been effectively curtained off from 1the outside world, and the Sov iet
military carried out its planning. production. and deployment activities with the utmost secrecy. All Soviet strategic capabilitiesbomber forces, ballistic missiles. submarine forces, and nuclear weapons plants-were concealed from outside observation. The Soviet air
defense system, a prime consideration in determining US retaliatory
policies, was also largely an unknown factor.
Tight security along the Soviet Bloc borders severely curtailed
the movement of human intelligence sources. In addition. the Soviet
Union made its conventional means of communication-telephone,
telegraph, and radio-telephone-mo re secure, thereby greatly reducing the intelligence available from tlhese sources. The stringent security measures imposed by the Communist Bloc nations effectively
blunted traditional methods for gathering intelligence: secret agents
using covert means to communicate intell igence, travelers to and
from target areas who could be asked to keep their eyes open and report their observations later, wiretaps and other eavesdropping methods. and postal intercepts. Indeed, the entire panoply of intelligence
tradecraft seemed ineffective against the Soviet Bloc, and no other
methods were available.

Early Postwar Aerial Reconnaissance
Although at the end of World War II the Un ited States had captured
large quantities of German photos and documents on the Soviet
Union, this material was rapidly becoming outdated. The main source
of current intelligence on the Soviet Union's military installations was
interrogation of prisoners of war returning from Soviet captivity. To
obtain information about Soviet sci,entitic progress, the intelligence
community established several programs to debrief German scientists
who had been taken to the Soviet Vinion after the end of the war but
were now being allowed to leave.~

: A t the end of World War II. th<! Bri tish had e:stablished Project DRAGON to g:iin infor.
mation from German scientists who had work,:d on the Peenernunde rocket project. and
the term DRAGON later was used to refer to individuals possessing scientific or technical
information. In 1948 the US Air Force set up Project WRINGER in Germany to gather
intt:lligence on the Soviet Union from defecto1rs and refugees: th is project was later absorbed into the combined armed forces/CIA Detector Reception Center (DRC). which b<! gan operations in February 1951. In October 1951. a separate organization 10 exploit
individuals with scientific or technical backgrou1nds. especially German scientists who had
worked inside the Soviet Union. c:ime into existence. This organiz:ition was known :is the
Returnee Exploitation Group ( REG) and was located in Fra~kfurt By 1958 the flow of
s,.i,-orisrs ~as so small that the REG merged wi·th the DRC.[
)
he Defecwr Receprio11 Center Germany. 1951 w /967. Clandestine Service
Historical Series CSHP-41 (CIA: History Staff.. 1972). pp. 5-6. 29-30 (S).

I

Sec, et NOF=ORI\J

Chapter 1
3

Interrogation of returning Germans offered only fragmentary information, and this source could not be expected to last much longer.
As a result, in the late 1940s, the US Air Force and Navy began trying
to obtain aerial photography of the Soviet Union. The main Air Force
effort involved Boeing RB-47 aircraft (the reconnaissance version of
the B-47 jet-propelled medium bomber) equipped with cameras and
electronic "ferret" equipment that enabled aircrews to detect tracking
by Soviet radars. At that time the Soviet Union had not yet completely ringed its borders with radars, and much of the interior also
lacked radar coverage. Thus, when the RB-47s found a gap in the
air-warning network, they would dart inland to take photographs of
any accessible targets. These ·'penetration photography" flights
(called SENSINT-sensitive intelligence-missions) occurred along
the northern and Pacific coasts of Russia. One RB-47 aircraft even
managed to fly 450 miles inland and photograph the city of Igarka in
Siberia. Such intrusions brought protests from Moscow but no Soviet
military response. 3
In 1950 there was a major change in Soviet policy. Air defense
units became very aggressive in defending their airspace, attacking all
aircraft that came near the borders of the Soviet Union. On 8 April
1950, Soviet fighters shot down a US Navy Privateer patrol aircraft
over the Baltic Sea. Following the outbreak of the Korean war in June
1950, the Soviet Union extended its "severe air defense policy'' to
the Far East. In the autumn of 1951, Soviet aircraft downed a twin-engine US Navy Neptune bomber near Vladivostok. An RB-29 lost in
the Sea of Japan on 13 June 1952 was probably also a victim of
Soviet fighters. The United States was not the only country affected
by the new aggressive Soviet air defense policy; Britain and Turkey
also reported attacks on their planes. 4

' A. L. George. Case Studies of Actual and Alleged Overflights. 1930-1953, Rand Study
RM-1349 (Santa Monica: Rand. 1955) (S). Arthur S. Lundahl and Dino Brugioni, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording. Washington. DC. 14 December 1983 (TS
Codeword). Recordings, transcript5, and notes for the interviews conducted for this study
are on file at the DCI History Staff.
' Jeffrey Richelson states on page 121 of American Espionage and the Soviet Target (New
York: Morrow, 1987) that "the first recorded attack by Soviet air defense forces, in this
case fighters. occurred on October 22. 1949." In this incident, however, Soviet fighters did
not attempt to hit the US aircrati; they merely fired warning shots. The real change in
Soviet policy did not occur until the April 1950 downing of the US Navy Privateer.
George, Case Studies, pp. 1-2. 6, 9-16 (S).

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Sec, et NOFORN

Chapter 1
4

The Soviet Union's air defense policy became even more aggressive in August I952, when its reconnaissance aircraft began violating
Japanese airspace over Hokkaido, the northernmost Japanese home
island. Two months later, on 7 October 1952, Soviet fighter aircraft
stalked and shot down a US RB-29 flying over Hokkaido. Aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Union and surrounding areas had become
a very dangerous business.
Despite the growing risks associated with aerial reconnaissance
of the Soviet Bloc, senior US officials strongly believed that such
missions were necessary. The lack of information about the Soviet
Union, coupled with the perception that it was an aggressive nation
determined to expand its borders-a perception that had been greatly
strengthened by the Soviet-backed North Korean invasion of South
Korea in June 1950--increased US determination to obtain information about Soviet intentions and capabilities and thus reduce the danger of being surprised by a Soviet attack.

New Approaches to Photoreconnaissance
While existing Navy and Air Force aircraft were flying their risky reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union, the United States began
planning for a more systematic and less dangerous approach using
new technology. One of the leading advocates of the need for new,
high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft was Richard S. Leghorn, a
Massachusetts Institute of Technology graduate and employee of
Eastman Kodak who had commanded the Army Air Forces' 67th
Reconnaissance Group in Europe during World War IL After the war
he returned to Kodak but maintained his interest in photoreconnaissance. Leghorn strongly believed in the need for what he called
pre-D-day reconnaissance, that is, reconnaissance of a potential
enemy before the outbreak of actual hostilities, in contrast to combat
reconnaissance in wartime. In papers presented in 1946 and 1948,
Leghorn argued that the United States needed to develop such a capability, which would require high-altitude aircraft and high-resolution
cameras. The outbreak of the Korean war gave Leghorn an opportunity to put his ideas into effect. Recalled to active duty by the Air
Force, Lieutenant Colonel Leghorn became the head of the
Reconnaissance Systems Branch of the Wright Air Development
Command at Dayton, Ohio, in April 1951. 5

' Richard S. Leghorn, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording, Washington,
DC. 19 August 1985 (S).

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5
In Leghorn's view, altitude was the key to success for overhead
reconnaissance. Since the best Soviet interceptor at that time, the
MIG-17. had to struggle to reach 45,000 feet,6 Leghorn reasoned that
an aircraft that could exceed 60,000 feet would be safe from Soviet
fighters . Recognizing that the fastest way to produce a high-altitude
reconnaissance aircraft was to modify an existing aircraft, he began
looking for the highest flying aircraft available in the Free World.
This search soon led him to a British twin-engine medium bomberthe Canberra-built by the English Electric Company. The Canberra
had made its first flight in May I949. Its speed of 469 knots (870 kilometers per hour) and its service ceiling of 48,000 feet made the
Canberra a natural choice for high-altitude reconnaissance work. The
Royal Air Force quickly developed a reconnaissance version of the
Canberra, the PR3 (the PR stood for photoreconnaissance). which began flying in March 1950. 7
At Leghorn's insistence, the Wright Air Development
Command invited English Electric representatives to Dayton in the
summer of 1951 to help find ways to make the Canberra fly even
higher. By this time the Air Force had already adopted the bomber
version of the Canberra, which the Glenn L. Marrin Aircraft
Company was to produce under license as the B-57 medium bomber. Leghorn and his English Electric colleagues designed a new
Canberra configuration with very long high-lift wings, new
Rolls-Royce Avon-109 engines, a solitary pilot, and an airframe that
was stressed to less than the standard military specifications.
Leghorn calculated that a Canberra so equipped might reach 63,000
feet early in a long mission and as high as 67,000 feet as the declining fuel supply lightened the aircraft. He believed that such a modified Canberra could penetrate the Soviet Union and China for a
radius of 800 miles from bases around their periphery and photograph up to 85 percent of the intelligence targets in those countries.
Leghorn persuaded his superiors to submit his suggestion to the
Pentagon for funding. He had not, however, cleared his idea with the
Air Research and Development Command, whose reconnaissance

• 13.716 meters. To avoid givi ng a false impression of e:imemely precise measurement.s.
original English measuring system figures in round numbers have not been converted to
the metric system. To convert feet to meters. multipl y by 0.3048. To convert airspeeds in
knots (nautical miles per hour) to kilometers per hour. multiply by 1.85.
' Dick van der Aart, Aerial Espionage. Secret Intelligence Flights by Easr and West
(Shrewsbury. England: Airlife Publishing, 1985). p. I8.

Richard S. Leghorn

Secret i'JOF'OfUd

Chapter 1
6

RAF Canberra Mark-PR3

division in Baltimore, headed by Lt. Col. Joseph J. Pellegrini. had to
approve all new reconnaissance aircraft designs. Pellegrini·s unit
reviewed Leghorn's design and ordered extensive modifications.
According to Leghorn, Pellegrini was not interested in a special- purpose aircraft that was only suitable for covert peacetime reconnaissance missions, for he believed that all Air Force reconnaissance
aircraft shou ld be capable of operating under wartime conditions.
Pellegrini therefore insisted that Leghorn ·s design meet the specifications for combat aircraft, which required heavily stressed airframes,
armor plate. and other apparatus that made an aircraft too heavy to
reach the higher altitudes necessary for safe overflights o f the Soviet
Bloc. The final result of Leghorn's concept after its alteration by
Pellegrini ·s staff was the RB-57D in I 955, whose maximum altitude

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Chapter 1
7

was only 64,000 feet. Meanwhile Leghorn, frustrated by the rejection
of his original concept, had transferred to the Pentagon in early 1952
to work for Col. Bernard A. Schriever, Assistant for Development
Planning to the Air Force's Deputy Chief of Staff for Development.~
In his new position Leghorn became responsible for planning the
Air Force's reconnaissance needs for the next decade. He worked
closely with Charles F. (Bud) Wienberg-a colleague who had followed him from Wright Field-and Eugene P. Kiefer, a Notre
Dame-educated aeronautical engineer who had designed reconnaissance aircraft at the Wright Air Development Center during World
War IL All three of these reconnaissance experts believed that the Air
Force should emphasize high-altitude photoreconnaissance.
Underlying their advocacy of high-altitude photoreconnaissance
was the belief that Soviet radars would not be able to track aircraft
flying above 65,000 feet. This assumption was based on the fact that
the Soviet Union used American-built radar sets that had been supplied under Lend-Lease during World War II. Although the SCR-584
(Signal Corps Radio) target-tracking radar could track targets up to
90,000 feet. its high power consumption burned out a key component
quickly, so this radar was normally not turned on until an early warning radar had detected a target. The SCR-270 early warning radar
could be left on for much longer periods and had a greater horizontal
range (approximately 120 miles) but was limited by the curvature of
the earth to a maximum altitude of 40,000 feet. As a result, Leghorn,
Kiefer, and Wienberg believed that an aircraft that could ascend to
65,000 feet before entering an area being swept by the early warning
radar would go undetected, because the target-tracking radars would
not be activated. 9
The problem with this assumption was that the Soviet Union, unlike Britain and the United States, had continued to improve radar
technology after the end of World War II. Even after evidence of improved Soviet radar capabilities became available, however, many advocates of high-altitude overflight continued to believe that aircraft
flying above 65,000 feet were safe from detection by Soviet radars.

' Leghorn interview (S).
' Ivan A. Getting, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, Los Angeles, 28 August 1988 (U).

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8

The Air Force Search for a Ni:tw
Reconnaissance Aircraft
With interest in high-altitude reconnaissance growi ng, several Air
Force agencies began to develop ain aircraft to conduct such missions. In September 1952, the Air Research and Development
Command gave the Martin Aircraft Company a contract to examine
the high-altitude potential of the B-57 by modifying a single aircraft
to give it long, high-l ift wings and tlhe American version of the new
Rolls-Royce Avon-109 engine. These were the modifications that
Richard Leghorn had suggested during the previous year."'
At about the same time, another Air Force office, the Wright Air
Development Command (WADC) in Dayton, Ohio, was also examining ways to achieve sustained flight at high altitudes. Working with
two German aeronautical experts--Woldemar Voigt and Richard
Vogt-who had come to the United States after World War II, Air
Force Maj. John Seaberg advocated the development of a new aircraft
that would combine the high-altitude perfonnance of the latest turbojet engines with high-efficiency wings in order to reach ultrahigh altitudes. Seaberg, an aeronautical engineer for the Chance Vought
Corporation until his recall to active duty during the Korean war, was
serving as assistan t chief of the New Developments Office of
WADC's Bombardment Branch.
By March 1953, Seaberg had expanded his ideas for a high-altitude aircraft into a complete request for proposal for "an aircraft
weapon system having an operational radius of 1.500 nm [nautical
miles) and capable of conducting pre- and post-strike reconnaissance
missions during daylight, good visibility conditions." The requirement stated that such an aircraft must have an optimu m subsonic
cruise speed at altitudes of 70,000 feet or higher over the target.
carry a payload of 100 to 700 pounds of reconnaissance equipment.
11
and have a crew of one.
The Wright Air Development Command decided not to seek proposals from major airframe manufacturers on the grounds that a
smaller company would give the new proj ect a higher priority and

'" Phi lip G. Strong. Chic:f. Operations Staff. OSI. Memorandum for the Record. '" Reconnaissance Capabilities." 21 August I 953. OSI records (S).
" Jay Miller. uKkheed U-2. Aerograph 3 (Aus:tin. Texas: Acrofax. 1983). p. 10.

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Chapter 1

9
produce a bener aircraft more quickly. In July 1953, the Bell Aircraft
Corporation of Buffalo, New York, and the Fairchild Engine and
Airplane Corporation of Hagerstown, Maryland, received study contracts to develop an entirely new high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft.
In addition, the Glenn L. Martin Company of Baltimore was asked to
examine the possibility of improving the already exceptional high-altitude performance of the 8-57 Canberra. By January 1954 all three
firms had submitted their proposals. Fairchild's entry was a singl.e-engine plane known as M-195, which had a maximum altitude potc!ntial
of 67,200 feet; Bell's was a twin-engine craft called the Modd 67
(later the X- 16), which had a maximum altitude of 69,500 feet; and
Martin's design was a big-wing version of the 8-57 called the Model
294, which was to cruise at 64,000 feet. In March 1954, Seaberg and
other engineers at Wright Field, having evaluated the three contending designs, recommended the adoption of both the Martin and Bell
proposals. They considered Martin's version of the B-57 an interim
project that could be completed and deployed rapidly while the more
advanced concept from Bell was still being developed. 11
Air Force headquarters soon approved Martin's proposal to mod•ify" the B-57 and was very much interested in the Bell design. But
word of the competition for a new reconnaissance airplane had
reached another aircraft manufacturer, the Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation, which submitted an unsolicited design.
Lockheed had first become aware of the reconnaissance aircraft
competition in the fall of 1953. John H. (Jack) Carter, who, had
recently retired from the Air Force to become the assistant director
of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program, was in the Pentagon
on business and dropped in to see Eugene P. Kiefer, an old friend
and colleague from the Air Force's Office of Development Planning
(more commonly known as AFDAP from its Air Force office
symbol). Kiefer told Carter about the competition for a high-flying
aircraft and expressed the opinion that the Air Force was going about
the search in the wrong way by requiring the new aircraft to be suitable for both strategic and tactical reconnaissance .
Immediately after returning to California, Carter proposed to
Lockheed Vice President L. Eugene Root (previously the top civilian
official in the Air Force's Office of Development Planning) that

'' The request for proposal. known as ··Design Study Requirements. ldentiticatic1n No.
53WC-J6j07:· has been reprinted in Miller, Lockheed U·Z, pp. 10- 11.

Secret ld0F8RN

Chapter 1
10

Designs for the Air Force
competition for a high-altitude
reconnaissance aircraft

Lockheed also submit a design. Carter noted that the proposed aircraft
would have co reach altitudes of between 65. 000 and 70,000 feet and
correctly forecast, "If extreme altitude performance can be realiz:ed in
a practical aircraft at speeds in the vicinity of Mach 0.8. it should be
capable of avoiding virtually all Russian defenses until about 1960."
Carter added, ··To achieve these characteristics in an aircraft which
will have a reasonably useful operational life during the period before
1960 will. of course, require very strenuous efforts and extraordinary
procedures, as well as nonstandard design philosophy." Some of the
"nonstandard" design cnaracteristics suggested by Carter were the
elimination of landing gear, the disregard of military specifications.
and the use of very low load factors. Carter's memorandum closed
with a warning that time was of the essence: " In order that this special aircraft can have a reasonably long and useful l ife, it is obvious
that its development must be greatly accelerated beyond that considered normal. .. 1•1
Lockheed's senior officials approved Carter's proposal, and
early in 1954 the corporation's best aircraft designer-Clarence L.
(Kelly) Johnson-began working on the project, then known as the
CL-282 but later to become famous under its Air Force designa1torthe U-2. Already one of the world's leading aeronautical engirneers,
Kelly Johnson had many successful military and civi lian designs to
his credit. including the P-38, P-80, F-I04. and Constellmtion.
Johnson quickly came up with a radical design based upon the
fuselage of the F-I04 jet fighter but incorporating a high-aspect--ratio
sailplane wing. To save weight and thereby increase the aircraft"s altitude. Johnson decided to stress the airframe to only 2.5 units of

" Milkr. U1''kheed U-2. p. 12.

-See,oc

/
Chapter 1

11

gravity (g's) instead of the mi litary specification strengLh of 5.33 g's.
For the power plant he selected the General Electric 173/GE-3 nonafterburning turbojet engine with 9,300 pounds of thrust (this was the
same engine he had chosen for the F- 104, which had been the basis
1
for the U-2 design). " Many of the CL-282's design features were
adapted from gliders. Thus, the wings and tail were detacihable.
Instead of a conventional landing gear, Johnson proposed using two
skis and a reinforced belly rib for landing- a common saillplane
technique-and a jettisonable wheeled dolly for takeoff. Other teatures included an unpressurized cockpit and a 15-cubic-foot prnyload
area that could accommodate 600 pounds of sensors. The CL--282's
maximum altitude would be just over 70,000 feet with a 2, 000-mile
range. Essentially, Kelly Johnson had designed a jet-propelled
gl I"der. .~•
Early in March 1954, Kelly Johnson submitted the CL-282 design to Brig. Gen. Bernard A. Schriever's Office of Development
Planning. Eugene Kiefer and Bud Wienberg studied the design and
recommended it to General Schriever. who then asked Lockheed to
. sµbmit a specific proposal. In early April, Kelly Johnson _presented a
full description of the CL-282 and a proposal for the construction and
maintenance of 30 aircraft to a group of senior Pentagon official s that
included Schriever·s superior. Lt. Gen. Donald L. Putt, Deputy Chief
of Staff for Development, and Trevor N. Gardner, Special Assistant
for Research and Development to the Secretary of the Air Force.
Afterward Kelly Johnson noted that the civi lian officials were very
16
much interested in his design but the generals were not.

Kelly Johnson

The CL-282 design was also presented to the commander of the
Strategic Air Command (SAC), Gen. Curtis E. LeMay. in early April
by Eugene Kiefer. Bud Wienberg, and Burton Klein from the Office of

" Lockheed Corporation. ··strategic Reconnai ssance and Intelligence ... Development
Planning Note #I. 30 November 1953 (U).
" Miller. locklctted U-2. p. 12. For more: J.:tails on Kdly Johnson's original pr,:,posal.
see '"Profile of CL-282 High Altitude Aircraft prepared by Lockheed Aircrati
Corporation. 5 March 1954'" in Helen H. Kkyla and Robert D. o ·Hem. Hiswrv of the
Office of Special Activities. DS&T. Directorate of Science an<l Technology Hi~:torical
Series OSA-1. 16 vols. (CIA: DS&T. 1969). chap. I. annex 2 (TS Codeword). Th,: 16
volumes of this history contain 20 chaptr:rs . .:ach paginated separately. Future rd,:rcm;,;;s
will be shorten,:d to OSA Hiswry. follow<:!d by the rekvant chapter and pag<:! numbers.
•· Kelly Johnson Papers. ··Log for Project x:· April 1954. Lo.:khec:d Corporation.
Advanced Devdopmcnt Projec:ts Divi~ion. Burbank. California.

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12

The Lockheed CL-282

Development Planning. According to Wienberg, General LeMay
stood up halfway through the briefing, took his cigar out of his mouth,
and told the briefers that, if he wan1ted high-altitude photographs, he
would put cameras in his B-36 bombers and added that he was not
interested in a plane that had no whe:els or guns. The general then left
the room, remarking that the whole business was a waste of his time."
Meanwhile, the CL-282 design proceeded through the Air Force
development channels and reached Major Seaberg at the Wright Air
Development Command in mid-May. Seaberg and his colleagues carefully evaluated the Lockheed submission and finally rejected it in early
June. One of their main reasons for doing so was Kelly Johnson's
choice of the unproven General Electric J73 engine. The engineers at
Wright Field considered the Pratt aind Whitney J57 to be the most
powerful engine available, and the de:signs from Fairchild, Martin, and
Bell all incorporated this engine. The: absence of conventional landing
gear was also a perceived shortcoming of the Lockheed design."
Another factor in the rejection of Kelly Johnson's submission
was the Air Force preference for multiengine aircraft. Air Force reconnaissance experts had gained their practical experience during

" C. F. Wienb<!rg. telephone conversation with Donald E. Welzenbach. 23 July 1988 (U).
" Miller. Lockheed U-2. p. 12.

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13

World War II in multiengine bombers. In addition, aerial photography
experts in the late 1940s and early 1950s emphasized focal length as
the primary factor in reconnaissance photography and, therefore, preferred large aircraft capable of accommodating long focal-length
cameras. This preference reached an extreme in the early 1950s with
the development of the cumbersome 240-inch Boston camera, a device so large that the YC-97 Boeing Stratocruiser that carried it had to
be partially disassembled before the camera could be installed.
Finally, there was the feeling shared by many Air Force officers that
two engines are always better than one because, if one fails, there is a
spare to get the aircraft back to base. In reality, however, aviation records show that single-engine aircraft have always been more reliable
than multiengine planes. Furthermore, a high-altitude reconnaissance
aircraft deep in enemy territory would have little chance of returning
if one of the engines failed, forcing the aircraft to descend. 19
On 7 June 1954, Kelly Johnson received a letter from the Air
Force rejecting the CL-282 proposal because it had only one engine
and was too unusual and because the Air Force was already committed to the modification of the Martin B-57.w By this time, the Air
Force had also selected the Bell X-16; the formal contract calling for
28 aircraft was signed in September. Despite the Air Force's selection
of the X-16, Lockheed continued to work on the CL-282 and began
seeking new sources of support for the aircraft.

Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA
Although the Air Force's uniformed hierarchy had decided in favor of
the Bell and Martin aircraft, some high-level civilian officials continued to favor the Lockheed design. The most prominent proponent of
the Lockheed proposal was Trevor Gardner, Special Assistant for
Research and Development to Air Force Secretary Harold E. Talbott.
Gardner had many contacts in west coast aeronautical circles because
before coming to Washington he had headed the Hycon
Manufacturing Company, which made aerial cameras in Pasadena,
California. He had been present at Kelly Johnson's presentation on
the CL-282 at the Pentagon in early April 1954 and believed that this

'" Allen F. Donovan, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, Corona del Mar, California,
20 May 1985 (S).
'" Johnson, "Log for Project X," 7 June 1954.

iaaret

Sec, et NOFOAN

Chapter 1
14
design showed the most promise for reconnaissance of the Soviet
Union. This belief was shared by Gardner's special assistant,
Frederick Ayer, Jr., and Garrison Norton. an adviser to Secretary
Talbott.~'
According to Norton, Gardner tried to interest SAC commander
LeMay in the Lockheed aircraft because Gardner envisioned it primarily as a collector of strategic. rather than tactical. intell igence. But
General LeMay had already showni that he was not interested in an
unarmed aircraft. Gardner, Ayer, and Norton then decided to seek CIA
support for the high-flying aircraft. At that rime the Agency·s official
involvement in overhead reconnaissance was limited to advising the
A ir Force on the problems of launiching large camera-carryi ng balloons for reconnaissance flights· over hostile territory (for the details
of this program. see chapter 2). The Chief of the Operations Staff in
the Office of Scientific Intelligence, Philip G. Strong. however.
served on several Air Force advisory boards and kept himself well informed on developments in reconnaissance aircraft.!!
Trevor Gardner

Gardner, Norton, and Ayer met with Strong in the Pentagon on
12 May 1954, six clays before the Wright Air Deve lopment Command
began to evaluate the Lockheed proposal. Gardner described Kelly
Johnson's proposal and showed the drawings to Strong. After this
meeting. Strong summarized his impressions of the Air Force·s search
for a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft:

Proposals for special reconnaissance aircraft have been received in the Air Staff from Lockheed. Fairchild. and Bell. ...
The Lockheed proposal is considered to be the best. It has been
given the type designation of CL-282 and in many respects is a
jet-powered glider based essentially on the Lockheed Day
Fighter XF-104. It is primarily subsonic but can attain transonic
speeds over the target with a consequent loss of range. With an
altitude of 73,000 feet over the target it has a combat radius of
1,400 nautical miles. ... The CL-282 can be manufactured

" Garrison Norton. interview by Donald E. Wt!lzcnbach . tape recording. Wa.shington. DC.
23 May 1983 (S): Michael R. Beschloss. Mayd"y: Eisenhower. Kltrmhchev and the U-2
Affuir (New York: Harper & Row. 1986). p. 79.
" Strong was a colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve and often used that tille even though
he was not on active duty. He later ad,·anced to• the rank or brigadier general in the reserve.
For S1rong·.~ contacts with senior Air Force officials concerning 1he CL-282. see the
Norton interview (S).

6ee,ot

Set1 el NOP'OAN
Chapter 1

15

mainly with XF-104 jigs and designs . ... The prototype of this
plane can be produced within a year from the date of order: Five
planes could be delivered for operations within two years.
The Bell proposal is a more conventional aircrai having normal landing gear. As a result, its maximum altiwde over .rarget
is 69,500 feet and the speed and range are not as good as the
Lockheed CL-282. :;
Gardner's enthusiasm for the CL-282 had given Strong the false
impression that most A ir Force officials supported the Lockhee:d design. (n reality, the Air Force's uniformed hierarchy was in the process of choosing the modified version of the Mart in B-57 and the new
Bell X- 16 to meet future reconnaissance needs.
During their meeting with Strong, Trevor Gardner, Fredlerick
Ayer, and Garrison Norton explained that they favored the CL-282
because it gave promise of flying higher than the other designs and
because at maximum altitude its smaller radar cross section might
make it invisible to existing Soviet radars. The three officials :asked
S.trong if the CIA would be interested in such an aircraft. Strong
promised to talk to the Director of Central Intelligence's newly hi red
Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination. Richard M. Bissell .
Jr., about possible Agency interest in the CL-282.:"'

Philip Strong

Richard Bissell had already had an active and varied career before he joi ned the CIA. A graduate of Groton and Yale, Bissell studied at the London School of Economics for a year and then
completed a doctorate at Yale in 1939. He taught economics, first at
Yale and then from 1942 at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (M IT), where he became a full professor in 1948. During
World War II. Bissell had managed American shipping as executive
officer of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. A fter the war,
he served as deputy director of the Marshall Plan from 1948 unt il the
end of 195 1, when he became a staff member of the Ford
Foundation. His first association with the Agency came in late 1953,
when he undertook a contract study of possible responses the United

'·' Philip G. Strong. Memorandum for the Record . ..Special Aircraft for Penetr:nion Photo
Reconnaissance," 12 May 1954. OSI records (now in OSWR). job 80R-0l424. box I (Sl.
'' Karl H. Weber. The Office of Scientific /r11elligence. /949-68. Directorate of Science
and Technology Historical Series OSI- I (CIA: DS&T. I 971). vol. I. tab A. pp. 16- 17 (TS
Codeword).

Gee,et

Chapter 1
16

States might use against the Soviet Bloc in the event of another uprising such as the East Berlin riots of June 1953. Bissell quickly
concluded that there was not much hope for clandestine operations
against Bloc nations. As he remark,ed later: "I know I emerged from
that exercise feeling that very little could be done." This belief
would later make Bissell a leading advocate of technical rather than
25
human means of intelligence collection.
Bissell joined the Agency in late January 1954 and soon became
involved in coordination for the operation aimed a t overthrowing
Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbe1nz. He was, therefore very preoccupied when Philip Strong approached him in mid-May 1954 with the
concept of the proposed spyplane from Lockheed. Bissell said that the
idea had merit and told Strong to get some topflight scientists to advise on the matter. Afterward he returned to the final planning for the
0
Guatemalan operation and promptly forgot about the CL-282.!

Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

Meanwhile, Strong went about drumming up support for high-altitude overflight. In May 1954 he persuaded DCI Allen W. Dulles to
ask the Air Force to take the initiative in gaining approval for an
overflight of the Soviet guided-missile test range at Kapustin Yar.
Dulles's memorandum did not me,ntion the CL-282 or any of the
other proposed high-altitude aircraft. CIA and Air Force officials met
on several occasions to explore the ,overflight proposal, which the Air
Force finally turned down in October I 954.!'
Although Allen Dulles was willing to support an Air Force overflight of the Soviet Union, he was mot enthusiastic about the CIA undertaking such a project. Few detaiils about Dulles's precise attitude
toward the proposed Lockheed reconnaissance aircraft are available,
but many who knew him believe that he did not want the CIA to become involved in projects that belonged to the military, and the
Lockheed CL-282 had been designed for an Air Force requirement.

" Thomas Powers. The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1979). p. 79; Beschloss. Mayday. pp. 86-89.
,. Memorandum for H. Marshall Chadwell. Assistant Director/Scientific Intelligence.
from Chief. Support Staff, OSI. " Review of OSA Activities Concerned with Scientific and
Technical Collection Techniques:· 13 May 1955. p. 6. OSI (OSWR) records. job
S0R-0 1424. bo" I (S); Richard M. Bissell. Jr., interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape
recording. Farmington. Connecticut. 8 November 1984 {S).
" Memorandum for Richard M. Bissell. Speci,al Assistant to the Director for Planning and
Coordination. from Philip G. Strong, Chief. Operations Staff. OSI. --overflight of
Kapustin Yar.'' 15 October 1954. OSI (OSWR) records, job S0R-01424. bo" I (TS. downgraded 10 S).

Secret

iac;ret l)IQFORL'I

Chapter 1

17
Moreover, high-altitude reconnaissance of the Soviet Union did not fit
well into Allen Dulles·s perception of the proper role of an intelligence agency. He tended to favor the classical form of espionage,
1
which relied on agents rather than technology. s
At this point, the summer of 1954, L ockheed's CL-282 proposal
still lacked official support. Although the design had strong backers
among some Air Force civilians and CIA officials, the key
decisionmakers at both· Air Force and CI A remained unconvinced. To
make Kelly Johnson' s revolutionary design a reality, one addit ional
source of support was necessary: prominent scientists serving on government advisory boards.

SCIENTISTS AND OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE
Scientists and engineers from universities and private industry had
played a major role in advising the government on technical matters
during World War II. At the end of the war, most of the scientific advisory boards were disbanded, but within a few years the growing
te_n_sions of the Cold War again led governmen t agencies to seek scientific advice and assistance. In 1947 the Air Force established a
Scientific Advisory Board, which met periodically to discuss topics of
current interest and advise the Air Force on the potential usefulne:ss of
new technologies. The following year the Office of Defense
Mobilization established the Scientific Advisory Committee, bU1t the
Truman administration made little use of this new advisory body.=-•

The BEACON HILL Report
In 1951 the Air Force sought even more assistance from scientists because the Strategic Air Command's requests for information about
targets behind the Iron Curtain could not be fl tied. To look for new
ways of conducting reconnaissance against the Soviet Bloc, the Air
Force's Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, Maj. Gen. Gordon P.
Saville, added 15 reconnaissance experts to an existing project on air

" Powers. Man Who Kept rhe Secrets. pp. 103-104: Edwin H. Land. interview by Donald
E. Welzenbach. tape recording. Cambridge. Massachusetts. 17 and '.!0 Septembc:r 198.t
(TS Codeword): Robert Amory. Jr.. interview by Donald E. Welzenbach and Gregory W.
Pedlow. Washingt0n. DC. 22 April 1987 (S}.
"' For more informa1ion on the Air Force·s use of sciemisL~ see Thomas A. Sturm. Tit<'
USAF Scienrific Advisorv Board: Its First Twenty Years. /9.J.J. /964 (Washington. DC:
USAF Historical Oftice. 1967) (U).

DC/ Allen W. Dulles

Secret ~OfiORN

Chapter 1
18

defense known as Project LINCOLN, then under way at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. By the end of the year, these
experts had assembled in Boston to begin their research. Their headquarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which
soon became the codename for the reconnaissance project. The consultants were called the BEACON HILL Study Group.
The study group's chairman was Kodak physicist Carl F. P.
Overhage, and its members included James G. Baker and Edward M.
Purcell from Harvard; Saville Davis from the Christian Science
Monitor; Allen F. Donovan from the Cornell Aeronautical
Laboratory; Peter C. Goldmark from Columbia Broadcasting System
Laboratories; Edwin H. Land, founder of the Polaroid Corporation;
Stewart E. Miller of Bell Laboratories; Richard S. Perkin of the
Perkin-Elmer Company; and Louis N. Ridenour of Ridenour
Associates, Inc. The Wright Air Development Command sent Lt. Col.
Richard Leghorn to serve as its liaison officer. 30
During January and February 1952, the BEACON HILL Study
Group traveled every weekend to various airbases, laboratories, and
firms for briefings on the latest technology and projects. The panel
members were particularly interested in new approaches to aerial reconnaissance, such as photography from high-flying aircraft and
camera-carrying balloons. One of the more unusual (albeit unsuccessful) proposals examined by the panel was an "invisible" dirigible.
This was to be a giant, almost flat-shaped airship with a blue-tinted,
nonreflective coating; it would cruise at an altitude of 90,000 feet
along the borders of the Soviet Union at very slow speeds while using
a large lens to photograph targets of interest. 31
After completing these briefings at the end of February 1952, the
BEACON HILL Study Group returned to MIT, where the panel members spent the next three months writing a report detailing their
recommendations for ways to improve the amount and quality of intelligence being gathered on the Soviet Bloc. Published as a classified

"' USAF, Project LINCOLN. BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence
and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 15 June 1952, pp. v, xi: app.
A (S. downgraded to C).
'' Allen F. Donovan. telephone conversation with Donald E. Welzenbach. 21 June 1985
(U) : James G. Baker, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording, Washington,
DC, 24 April 1985 (S}.

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Sec. et NOFOAN

Chapter 1
19

document on 15 June 1952, the BEACON HILL Report advocated
radical approaches to obtain the information needed for national intelligence estimates. Its 14 chapters covered radar, radio, and photographic surveillance: examined the use of passive infrared and
microwave reconnaissance; and discussed the development of advanced reconnaissance vehicles. One of the report's key recommendations called for the development of high-altitude reconnaissance
aircraft:

We have reached a period in history when our peacetime knowledge of the capabilities, activities and dispositions of a potentially hostile nation is such as to demand that we supplement it
with the maximum amount of information obtainable through
aerial reconnaissance. To avoid political involvements, such
aerial reconnaissance must be conducted either from vehicles
flying in friendly airspace, or-a decision on this point
permitting-from vehicles whose performance is such that they
can operate in Soviet airspace with greatly reduced chances of
detection or interception. 1J

Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack
The Air Force did not begin to implement the ideas of the BEACON
HILL Report until the summer of 1953. By this time interest in reconnaissance had increased after Dwight D. Eisenhower became
President in January 1953 and soon expressed his dissatisfaction with
the quality of the intelligence estimates of Soviet strategic capabilities
and the paucity of reconnaissance on the Soviet Bloc. 11
To President Eisenhower and many other US political and military leaders, the Soviet Union was a dangerous opponent that appeared to be moving inexorably toward a position of military parity
with the United States. Particularly alarming was Soviet progress in
the area of nuclear weapons. In the late summer of 1949, the Soviet
Union had detonated an atomic bomb nearly three years sooner than
US ex.perts had predicted. Then in August 1953-a scant nine months
after the first US test of a hydrogen bomb-the Soviet Union detonated a hydrogen bomb manufactured from lithium deuteride, a technology more advanced than the heavy water method used by US

'' BEACON Hill Report, pp. 164, 167-168 (C). This section of the report was written by
Allen Donovan and Louis Ridenour.
'' Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword).

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Sec, et NOFOAN

Chapter 1
20
scientists. Thus, new and extremely powerful weapons were coming
into the hands of a government whose actions greatly disturbed the
leaders of the West. Only two months before the successful hydrogen
bomb test, Soviet troops had crushed an uprising in East Berlin. And,
at the United Nations, the Soviet Bloc seemed bent on causing dissension between Western Europe and the United States and between the
developed and undeveloped nations. This aggressive Soviet foreign
policy. combined with advances in nuclear weapons, led officials such
as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to see the Soviet Union as a
menace to peace and world order.
The Soviet Union's growing military strength soon became a
threat not just to US forces overseas but to the continental United
States itself. In the spring of 1953. a top secret RAND study pointed
out the vulnerability of the SAC's US bases to a surprise attack by
Soviet long-range bombers.-'•
Concern about the danger of a Soviet attack on the continental
United States grew after an American military attache sighted a new
Soviet intercontinental bomber at Ramenskoye airfield. south of
Moscow, in 1953. The new bomber was the Myasishchev-4, later
designated Bison by NATO. Powered by jet engines rather than the
turboprops of Russia's other long-range bombers. the Bison appeared
to be the Soviet equivalent of the US B-52. which was only then
going into production. Pictures of the Bison taken at the Moscow
May Day air show in 1954 had an enormous impact on the US intelligence community. Unlike several other Soviet postwar aircraft, the
Bison was not a derivative of US or British designs but represented
a native Soviet design capability that surprised US intelligence experts. This new long-range jet bomber, along with the Soviet Union's
large numbers of older propeller and turboprop bombers, seemed to
pose a significant threat to the United States, and, in the summer of
1954, newspapers and magazines began publishing articles highlighting the growing airpower of the Soviet Union. Pictures of the Bison
bomber featured prominently in such stories. 1;

" RAND Corporation. Plans Analysis Section. ··V11/11aahi/ity of U.S. Strategic Power to a
Surprise A/lack in /956, .. RAND Special Memorandum No. 15. Santa Monica. California:
the RAND Corporation, April 15, 1953 (TS. dcclassiticd May 1967).

'' "AF Cites Red Bomber Progress," Aviation Week. May .2-t 1954. p. 14; "Is Russia
Winning the Arms Race?, .. US News cmd World Report, June: 18. 1954, 'pp. 28-19;
"Russia Parades Airpower as 'Big Stick'." Aviation Week. June .28. 1954. p. 15; "Red
Air Force: The World's Biggest." Newsweek. August .23, 1954. pp. 28-33.

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Sec, et NOf'Oft~

Chapter 1
21

•.. g,.,
au£

•

Soviet Myasishchev-4 bomber
(the Bison)

..

~: ... .
:-.·~·~ .'
.

~~~f':.:l-f.Je.) \': .

The Air Force Intelligence Systems Panel
Even before the publication of photographs of the Bison· raised fears
that the Soviet bomber force might eventually surpass that o f the
United States, the Air Force had already established a new advisory
body to look for ways to implement the main recommendation of the
BEACON HILL Report-the construction of high-flying aircraft and
high-acuity cameras. Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems
Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL Study
Group: Land, Overhage, Donovan, and Miller. At the request of the
Air Force, the CIA also participated in the panel, represent«!d by
Edward L. Allen of the Office of Research and Reports (ORR) and
31
Philip Strong of the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI). '
The chairman of the new panel was Dr. James G. Baker. a research associate at the Harvard College Observatory. Baker had been
involved in aerial reconnaissance since 1940, when he first advised
the Army Air Corps on ways to improve its lenses. He then established a full-scale optical laboratory at Harvard-the Hrnrvard
University Optical Research Laboratory-to produce high-quality

"' Mc:moram.lum for Rolxrt Amory. Jr.. Dt::puty Direclor. lnlelligence from Edward L .
Allen. Chief. Economic Research. ORR and Philip G. Strong. Chief. Operation:s Staff.
OSI. "Meeling of lhe Intelligence Systems Panc:l of th.: Scientific Advisory Board.
USAF:· 26 Augusl 1953. OSI (OSWR) records. job 80R-0l 424. bo:< I (S).

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Secret l\'JOFOAl\1

Chapter 1

22
lenses. Since the university did not wish to continue manufacturing
cameras and lenses after the end of the war, the optical laboratory
moved to Boston University, which agreed to sponsor the effort as
long as the Air Force would fund it. Baker decided to remain at
Harvard, so his assistant, Dr. Duncan E. Macdonald, became the new
head of what was now called the Boston University Optical Research
Laboratory (8 UORL). Baker's association with the Air Force did not
end with the transfer of the optical laboratory to Boston University,
because he continued to design lenses to be used in photoreconnaissance. 17
The [SP first met at Boston University on 3 August 1953. To
provide background on the poor state of US knowledge of the Soviet
Union, Philip Strong informed the other panel members that the best
intelligence then available on the Soviet Union's interior was photography taken by the German Luftwaffe during World War [l. Since the
German photography covered only the Soviet Union west of the
Urals, primarily west of the Volga River, many vital regions were not
included. The ISP would, therefore, have to look for ways to provide
up-to-date photography of all of the Soviet Union. Several Air Force
agencies then briefed the panel members on the latest developments
and proposed future projects in the area of aerial reconnaissance, including new cameras, reconnaissance balloons. and even satellites.
Among the Air Force reconnaissance projects discussed were multiple sensors for use in existing aircraft such as the RB-47, RB-52, and
RB-58; Project FICON-an acronym for "fighter conversion"-for
adapting a giant, I 0-engine 8-36 bomber to enable it to launch and
retrieve a Republic RF-84F Thunderflash reconnaissance aircraft; reconnaissance versions of the Navajo and Snark missiles; the high-altitude balloon program, which would be ready to go into operation by
the summer of 1955; and the search for a new high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. 3~

" Baker interview (S). In 1957. after the Air Force decided to cut back its funding of
BGORL. Duncan Macdonald and Richard Leghorn (by then retired from the Air Force)
formt:d their own corporation-ltek-an<l purchased the laboratory from Boston
University (Leghorn interview [SJ).
" :\lemorandurn for Robert Amory. Jr.. Deputy Din.:ctor. lntc:lligence. from Edward L.
Allen. Chief. Economic Research, ORR. and Philip G. Strong. Chief. Operations Staff.
OSI. "Meeting of the Intelligence Systems Panel of the Scientitic Advisory Boar<l. USAF,''
26 August I 953; Memorandum for H. Marshall Cha<lwell. Assistant Director/Scientific
lnrelligence. from Chief. Support Staff. OSI. .. Review of OSA Activities Concerned with
Scientific an<l Technical Collection Techniques... 13 May I955. p. 6, OSI (OSWR) records.
job S0R-01424. bo:< I (S); Donovan interview. 22 May 1985 !S) .

..Sasret

See1 et NOFOftN

Chapter 1

23

The wide variety of programs discussed at the conference were
all products of the Air Force's all-out effort to find a way to collect
intelligence on the Communist Bloc. Some of the schemes went beyond the existing level of technology; others, like the camera-carrying
balloons, were technically feasible but involved dangerous political
consequences.

British Overflight of Kapustin Var
The British were also working on high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. In 1952 the Royal Air Force (RAF) began Project ROBIN,
which was designed to modify the Canberra bomber for high-altitude
reconnaissance. This project was probably inspired by Richard
Leghorn's collaboration with English Electric Company designers in
195 I, when they calculated ways to increase the altitude of the
Canberra. The RAF equipped the new Canberra PR7 with RollsRoyce Avon-109 engines and gave it long, fuel-filled wings. The
range of this variant of the Canberra was now 4,300 miles, and, on
29 August 1955, it achieved an altitude of 65,880 feet.n
Sometime during the first half of 1953, the RAF employed a
high-altitude Canberra on a daring overflight of the Soviet Union to
photograph the missile test range at Kapustin Yar. Because of advanced warning from either radar or agents inside British intelligence, the overflight did not catch the Soviet Union by surprise.
Soviet fighters damaged and nearly shot down the Canberra.")
Rumors about this flight reached Washington during the summer of
1953, but official confirmation by the United Kingdom did not come
until February 1954. While on a six-week tour of Europe to study
aerial reconnaissance problems for the US Air Force's Scientific
Advisory Board, James Baker was briefed by RAF intelligence officials on the Canberra overflight of the Soviet Union. On 22 and 23
March 1954, he reported on it to the full Scientific Advisory Board
at Langley AFB, Virginia.

'" Van der Aart, Aerial Espionage, p. 18; Philip G. Strong, Chief, Operations Staff. OSI.
Memorandum for the Record. "Meeting of Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, 18-21
October 1953," 26 October 1953, OSI (OS WR) records, job 80R-0 1424, box I (TS,
downgraded to S).
~, Stewart Alsop, The Center, (New York: Popular Library. 1968), p. 194; Beschloss,
Mayday, pp. 78-79. Both of these books state that the project included the CIA. but there
is no evidence to support this assertion.

GeeFot

Sec, et NOFOAP~

Chapter 1
24

Baker also chaired the next meeting of the Air Force's
Intelligence Systems Panel in late April 1954 but could not tell its
members about the British overflight of Kap~stin Yar because they
were not cleared for this information . The panel did. however. discuss
the modi fications for high-alti tude flight being made to the US
Canberra, the B-57."

The Intelligence Systems Panel and the CL-282

Allen F. Donovan

The next Intell igence Systems Panel meeting took place on 24 and 25
May at Boston University and the Polaroid Corporation. Panel member Allen F. Donovan from the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory evaluated the changes bei ng made to the B-57 by the Martin Aircraft
Company. Even wichout Martin 's specifications or drawings,
Donovan had been able to estimate what cou ld be done to the 8-57 by
lengthening the wings and l ightening the fuselage. He had determined
that alterations to the B-57 airframe would not sol ve the reconnaissance needs ex.pressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically,
he explained to the panel. any multiengine aircraft built accordiing to
military specifications. including the B-57. would be too heavy to fly
above 65,000 feet and hence would be vulnerable to Soviet interception. To be safe, Donovan explained, penetrating aircraft would need
10 fly above 70,000 feet for the entire mission.':
Developme nt of such an aircraft was already under way.
Donovan continued. for Philip Strong of the CIA had told him that the
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation had designed a lightweight, high-flying aircraft. ISP chairman Baker then urged Donovan to travel t9
southern California to evaluate the Lockheed design and gather ideas
on high-altitude aircraft from other aircraft manufacturers.
When he was finally able to make this tri p in late summer,
Donovan found the plane that he and the other ISP members had. been
seeking. On the afternoon of 2 August 1954. Donovan met wiith L.
Eugene Root. an old Air Force acquai ntance who was n,ow a
Lockheed vice-president. and learned about the Air Force's competition for a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. Kelly Johnson then
showed Donovan the plans for Lockheed's unsuccessful entry. A lifelong sailplane enthusiast. Donovan im mediately recognized that the

.,: Donovan interview (S); Baker interview (S).

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25
CL-282 design was essentially a jet-propelled glider capable of attaining the altitudes that he felt were necessary to carry out reconnaissance of the Soviet Union successfully: 1
Upon his return east on 8 August, Donovan got in touch with
James Baker and suggested an urgent meeting of the Intelligence
Systems Panel. Because of other commitments by the members, however, the panel did not meet to hear Donovan's report until 24
September 1954 at the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory. Several
members, including Land and Strong, were absent. Those who did attend were upset to learn that the Air Force had funded a closed competition for a tactical reconnaissance plane without informing them.
But once Donovan began describing Kelly Johnson's rejected design
for a jet-powered glider, they quickly forgot their annoyance and listened intently.
Donovan began by stressing that high-altitude reconnaissance
aircraft had to fly above 70,000 feet to be safe from interception.
Next, he set out what he considered to be the three essential requirements for a high-altitude spyplane: a single engine, a sailplane
wing, and low structural load factors. Donovan strongly favored
single-engine aircraft because they are both lighter and more reliable than multiengine aircraft. Although a twin-engine aircraft could
theoretically return to base on only one engine, Donovan explained,
it could only do so at a much lower altitude, about 34,000 feet,
where it was sure to be shot down.
The second of Donovan's essential factors, a sailplane wing (in
technical terms a high-aspect-ratio, low-induced-drag wing). was
needed to take maximum advantage of the reduced thrust of a jet engine operating in the rarefied atmosphere of extreme altitude. Because
of the thinness of the atmosphere above 70,000 feet, engineers estimated that the power curve of a jet engine would fall off to about 6
percent of its sea-level thrust.
Finally, low structural load factors, like those used by transport
aircraft, were necessary to reduce weight and thereby achieve maximum altitude. Donovan explained that strengthening wings and

" Donovan interview (S)

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Set1et NOl'ORN

Chapter 1
26
wingroot areas to withstand the hi.gh speeds and sharp turns mandated by the standard military airworthiness rules added too much
weight to the airframe, thereby negating the efficiency of the sailplane wing.
In short, it was possible to achiieve altitudes in excess of 70, 000
feet, but only by making certain that al l parts of the aeronautical
equation were in balance: thrust, !lift. and weight. T he only plane
meeting these requirements, Donovan insisted, was Kelly Johnson's
CL-282 because it was essentially a sailplane. In Donovan's view, the
CL-282 did not have to meet the S[Pecifications of a combat aircraft
because it could fly safely above Soviet fighters.....
Donovan's arguments convince:d the Intelligence Systems Panel
of the merits of the CL-282 proposal, but this panel reported to the ·
A ir Force, which had already rejectc:d the CL-282. Thus, even though
the Lockheed CL-282 had several important sources of support by
September I954-the members of the Intelligence Systems Panel and
high-ranking Air Force civilians such as Trevor Gardner-these backers were all connected with the Air !Force. They could not offer funds
to Lockheed to pursue the CL-282 c,oncept because the Air Force was
already committed to the Martin RB -57 and the Bell X- I6. Additional
support from outside the Air Force was needed to bring the CL-282
project to life, and this support would come from scientists serving on
high-level advisory committees.

The Technological Capabilities Panel
The Eisenhower administration was growing increasingly concerned
over the capability of the Soviet Un,ion to launch a surprise attack on
the United States. Early in 1954, Trevor Gardner had become alarmed
by a RAND Corporation study waming that a Soviet surprise attack
might destroy 85 percent of the SAC bomber force. Gardner then met
with Dr. Lee DuBridge, Presiden t of the Cal ifornia Institute of
Technology and Chairman of the Office of Defense Mobilization 's
Science Advisory Committee, and criticized the committee for not
deal ing with such essential problems as the possibility of a surprise
attack. This criticism led DuBridge to invite Gardner to speak at the
Science Advisory Committee's next meeting. After l istening to

" Donovan interview (S); Baker in1erview (S}.

~ et PdOfiOP\r\J

Chapter 1
27

Gardner. the committee members decided to approach President
Eisenhower on the matter. On 27 March l 954. the President told them
about the discovery of the Soviet Bison bombers and his concern that
these new aircraft might be used in a surprise attack on the United
States. Stressing the high priority he gave to reducing the risk of military surprise, the President asked the committee to advise him on this
problem.is
T he President's request led Chairman DuBridge to ask one of the
most prominent members . MIT President James R. Killian. Jr. , to
meet with other Science Advisory Committee members in the Boston
area to discuss the feasibility of a comprehensive scientific assessment of the nation's defenses. At their meeting at MIT on 15 April
1954, the group called for the recruitment of such a task force if the
President endorsed the concept.
On 26 July 1954. President Eisenhower authorized Killian to recruit and lead a panel of experts to study "' the country's technological capabilities to meet some of its current problems." Killian
quickly set up shop in offices located in the Old Executive Office
B_u_ilding and organized 42 of the nation's leading scientists into
three special project groups investigating US offensive, defensive.
and i ntelligence capabilites. with an additional communications
working group (see chart. page 28). The Technological Capabi lities
Panel (TCP) groups began meeting on 13 September 1954. For the
next 20 weeks, the members of the various panels met on 307 separate occasions for briefings. field trips. conferences. and meetings
with every major unit of the US defense and intelligence establishments. After receiving the most up-to-date information available on
the nation's defense and intelligence programs, the panel members
began drafting their report to the National Security Council.'A

James R. Killian, Jr.

Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282
Even before the final Technological Capabilities Panel report was
ready. one of the three working groups took actions that would have a
major impact on the US reconnaissance program. Project Three had

" Beschloss. MC1ydav. pp. 73-7-': Technolog ii:al C:1pabi li1ies Pan.:I of 1he Science
Advisory Committee. Meeting the Threat of Surprise Auack. I-i February 1955. p. 185
(hereafter cited as TCP Report) CTS/ Rcs1ri<:1eJ Dat:1. <lowngrnJed to S) .

.. Jamc:s R. Killian. Jr.. Spmnik. Scie111ists. and Eisettlww,:r: A Memoir of the r;;_~t
Special Assiswnr to the Pre.~ide11t for Science and Technology (Cambridge: MIT Press .
1977), p. 68: Beschloss. ,W<1yJay. p. 7-i: TCP Reporr. pp. 185- 186 (S).

Secret

Secf@t NOl'OPU'-.t
Chapter 1

28

Technological Capabilities Panel

IThe President of the United States I
Director, Office of
Defense Mobilization
Executive Staff

Technological Capabilities
Panel of the Science
Advisory Committee

David Z. Beckler, ODM
Lt. Col. V. T. Ford, USAF

Military Advisory
_ _ Committee
Lt. Gen. L. L Lemnitzer, USA
RAdm. H. 0. Felt, USN a
Brig. Gen. 8. K. Holloway,
USAF a
Maj. Gen. H. McK. Roper a

Steering Committee
Administrative Staff
J. R. Killian, Jr., Director
J. B. Fisk, Deputy Director
L. A. OuBridge
J. P. Baxter
M. G. Holloway
J. H. Doolittle
L. J. Haworth
E. H. Land
R. C. Sprague, Consultant

William Brazeal
M. Comerford
C. Klett
L Wiesner
E. Hockett
D. _Le_wis
K. Welchold

• Constitute military consultant
group.

Project 1

Project 2

Project 3

M. G. Holloway, Dir.
E. P. Aurand
R. L. Belzer
S. C. Hight
R. Mettler
E. H. Plesset
W. Stratton
J. West
C. Zimmerman
B. Horton

L. J. Haworth, Dir.
E. Barlow

J. G. Baker

D. Dustin
R. Emberson
A.G. Hill
B. McMillan
R. Rollefson
H. Scoville. Jr.
M.A. Tuve
R. Gilruth
J. L Morton
J. Mouzon

Consultant for Technical
Personnel

Communications
Working Group

E. H. Land, Dir.
J.Kennedy
A. Latham, Jr.
E. Purcell
J. W. Tukey

J. 8. Wiesner, Chmn.
G. W . Gilman
H. T. Friis
W. H. Radford
Subcommittee
H. A. Affel
W. 8. Davenport, Jr.
R. H. Scherer

Agency Contacts

LKacl.We.he.r._e;IA
H. D. Chittim

___JCIA
S. R Clements, DOD

Sec, ct NOl'OP\111
Chapter 1
29

the task of investigating the nation's intelligence capab ilities. Its
chairman was Edwin H. (Din) Land, the inventor of the polarizing fi lter and the instant camera. When James K illian asked Land to head
Project Three, Land had to make a major dec ision about his caree:r. At
the time, the 45-year-old millionaire was on a leave of absence from
Polaroid and was living in Hollywood, advising Alfred Hitchcock on
the technological aspects of making three-dimensional movies. Land
decided to give up his interest in cinema's th ird dimension and return
1
east to Polaroid and the panel appointmem!
Land's Project T hree was the smallest of the three Technological
Capabilities Panel projects, for he preferred what he called " tax icab
committees··-committees small enough to fit into a single taxicab.
The Project Three committee consisted of Land; James Baker and
Edward Purcell of Harvard; chemist Joseph W. Kennedy of
Washington University, St. Louis: mathematician John W. Tuke:y of
Princeton University and Be ll Telephone Laboratories : and A llen
Latham, Jr.. of Arthur D. Little. l nc., an engineer and former treasurer
of the Polaroid Corporation:~

Edwin H. Land

[n mid-August 1954. Land and Baker went to Washington t,o arrange for the various intelligence organizations to brief the Project
Three study group. As the briefings progressed. the pane l members
became more and more distressed at the poor state of the nation' s intelligence resources. Land later noted, "We would go in and interview
generals and admirals in charge of intelligence and come away worried. Here we were, five or six young men. asking questions that these
high-ranking officers couldn't answer." Land added that the Prnject
Three members were also not overly impressed with the Central
Intelligence Agency.~·1
Land learned the details of Lockheed's proposed CL-282 aircraft
soon after he arrived in Washington. Philip Strong showed him Kelly
Johnson's conceptual drawing of the plane and told him that the: Air
Force had rejected it. A lthough Land had heard Allen Donovan

'' James R. Killian. Jr.. interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording. C:imbridgc.
Massachusetts. 2 November 198-' (S); Land interview (TS Codcword).

" TCP Report. p. 188 (S).
,., Land interview (TS Codeword).

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Sec, et NOFORM

Chapter 1
30
briefly mention a Lockheed design for a high-flying aircraft at the
24-25 May meeting of Baker's Intelligence Systems Panel, he did not
realize that that plane and the one in Strong's drawing were the same.
As soon as Land saw Strong's copy of the CL-282 drawing. however,
he telephoned Baker to say, ·•Jim, l think l have the plane you are
after." 50
A few days later, when Land showed Kelly Johnson's conceptual
drawing to Baker and the other Project Three members, they all became enthusiastic about the aircraft's possibilities. Although Baker
had heard Allen Donovan ·s brief mention of the Lockheed design in
May, he had not yet seen a drawing of the aircraft because Donovan
did not report to the ISP on his early-August trip to Lockheed until 24
September. After seeing the CL-282 drawing, Baker began designing
a camera and lens system that would fit in the Lockheed craft. 51
At the end of August, Land discussed the CL-282 with Allen
Dulles's Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination. Richard
Bissell, who came away from the meeting without any definite ideas
as to what Land wanted to do with the aircraft. Overhead reconnaissance was not uppermost in Bissell's mind at the time, and it was unclear to him why he had even been contacted. 51 Bissell's outstanding
academic credentials, his acquaintanceship with James Killian
through his previous teaching experience at MIT, and his direct access
to DCI Dulles may have led the Technological Capabilities Panel
members to consider him the best CIA point of contact.
Although surprised that he had become involved in the CL-282
project, Bissell's interest was piqued, and he set out to learn what he
could about reconnaissance systems. In early September 1954,
Bissell had Douglas E. Ashford, a young Air Force officer on his
staff, put together a general status report on air reconnaissance programs. Bissell forwarded the 16-page study to the Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence (DDCI), Lt. Gen. Charles Pearre Cabell, USAF,
on 24 September. In a covering memorandum, Bissell called Cabell's

'" Baker interview (S).
" Ibid.
'' Bissell interview (S).

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Secret l'<JOFOAN

Chapter 1
31

attention to a section of the report about a "stripped or specialized
aircraft" called the Lockheed CL-282. 53
By September 1954, Land's Project Three study group had become very much interested in the Lockheed CL-282 design. Their interest grew even stronger when James Baker told them of Allen
Donovan's strong case for the CL-282 at the 24-25 September meeting
of the ISP. It is not possible to determine exactly when the Land committee decided to back the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been
a formal decision as such. In view of Land's impulsive nature, he
probably seized upon the CL-282 design as being a workable concept
and immediately began developing it into a complete reconnaissance
system.
During September and October the Project Three study group
met frequently to discuss the Lockheed design and the reconnaissance
equipment it would carry. Meetings were small, generally with fewer
than IO participants; Garrison Norton was often the only government
official in attendance. At times outside experts joined in the proceedings. When the discussion turned to cameras and film, Land invited
- Dr. Henry Yutzy, Eastman Kodak's film expert, and Richard S.
Perkin, President of the Perkin-Elmer Company, to participate. For
discussions on the 157 engine, the panel members asked Perry W.
Pratt, Pratt and Whitney's chief engineer, to attend. Kelly Johnson
also met with the panel to review plans for the CL-282 system. 5~
By the end of October, the Project Three meetings had covered
every aspect of the Lockheed design. The CL-282 was to be more
than an airplane with a camera, it was to be an integrated intelligence-collection system that the Project Three members were confident could find and photograph the Soviet Union's Bison bomber
fleet and, thus, resolve the growing "bomber gap" controversy. It was
not just the Lockheed aircraft that had captured the Land group's fancy; the plane was seen as the platform for a whole new generation of
aerial cameras that several committee members had been discussing
since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings.
James Baker was in the process of developing a revolutionary new

·'·' Memorandum for DOC! Charles Pearre Cabell from R. M. Bissell, Special Assistant
to the Director for Planning and Coordination, "Aerial Reconnaissance,"' 24 September
I954, DCI Records, job 80-B- I 676R. box 25 (TS. downgraded to S).
"' Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, p. 82.

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Secret NelFOAN

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32

camera with tremendously improved resolution and film capacity, and
the Eastman Kodak company was working on new thin, lightweight
film. 55
By October l 954, the Project Three study group had drafted a
complete program for an overhead reconnaissance effort based on the
CL-282 aircraft. The one remaining question was who would conduct
the overflights. The committee's members, particularly Land, were
not in favor of the Air Force conducting such missions in peacetime.
Firmly believing that military overflights in armed aircraft could provoke a war, they argued for civilian overflights in unarmed, unmarked
aircraft. In their view, the organization most suited for this mission
was the Central Intelligence Agency. 56
In late October l 954, the Project Three panel discussed the
CL-282 system concept with DCI Allen Dulles and the Secretary of
the Air Force's Special Assistant for Research and Development,
Trevor Gardner. Dulles was reluctant to have the CIA undertake the
project. He did not like to involve the CIA with military projects, even
ones that the military had rejected, like the CL-282. Furthermore, the
DCI strongly believed that the Agency's mission lay in the use of human operatives and secret communications. the classic forms of intelligence gathering. Land came away from this meeting with the
impression that Dulles somehow thought overflights were not fair
play. Project Three committee members were nevertheless convinced
that technology, particularly in the form of the CL-282 and the new
camera designs, would solve the nation's intelligence problems. 57

A Meeting With the President
Allen Dulles's reluctance to involve the CIA in the CL-282 project did
not stop the Project Three committee from pursuing its aims because it
was able to go over Dulles's head and appeal directly to the President.
Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence
Systems Panel, several Project Three members had definite ideas on
how to improve intelligence collection, ideas that they were determined to present to the highest levels of government. They were able

" Land interview (TS Codeword).
" Land interview (TS Codeword): Baker interview (S).
" Land interview (TS Codeword).

Scere~

Secret NOfiORN

Chapter 1
33

to do so because the Land committee was part of a panel commissioned by President Eisenhower to examine the nation's intelligence
community and recommend changes. The committee thus had a direct
line to the White House through James Killian's contacts there:
Early in November 1954, Land and Killian met with President
Eisenhower to discuss high-altitude reconnaissance. Killian's memoirs contain an account of this crucial meeting:
Land described the [CL-282] system using an unarmed plane and
recommended that its development be undertaken. After listening to
our proposal and asking many hard questions, Eisenhower approved the development of the system, but he stipulated that it
should be handled in an unconventional way so that it would not
become entangled in the bureaucracy of the Defense Department
or troubled by rivalries among the services. 58
The scientists from the advisory committees and the President
were thus in agreement that the new reconnaissance program should
be controlled by the CIA, not the military.

- ClA and Air Force Agreement on the CL-282
Meanwhile Edwin Land and his Project Three colleagues were working to convince Allen Dulles that the CIA should run the proposed
overflight program. On 5 November Land wrote to the DCI strongly
urging that the CIA undertake the CL-282 project:
Here is the brief report from our panel telling why we think
overflight is urgent and presently feasible. I [Land] am not sure
that we have made it clear that we feel there are many reasons
why this activity is appropriate for CIA, always with Air Force
assistance. We told you that this seems to us the kind of action
and technique that is right for the contemporary version of
CIA: a modem and scientific way for an Agency that is always
supposed to be looking, to do its looking. Quite strongly, we
feel that you must always assert your first right to pioneer in
scientific techniques for collecting intelligence-and choosing
such partners to assist you as may be needed. This present opportunity for aerial photography seems to us a fine place to
start. 59

" Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, p. 82. The exact date of the meeting cannot
be detennined, but it occurred during the first half of November 1954.
,. Letter, Project Three Panel to DCI Allen F. Dulles, 5 November 1954, in OSA History,
chap. I, annex I (TS Codeword).

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Sec, et NOFORN

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34

The letter had two attachments: a two-page summary of a complete operational plan for organizing, building, and deploying the
CL-282 within a period of 20 months at a cost of $22 million and a
three-page memorandum, entitled "A Unique Opportunity for
Comprehensive Intelligence."
Aware of Dulles's preference for classical intelligence work, the
Project Three memorandum stressed the superi.ori.ty of the CL-282
program over traditional espionage methods:

We believe that these planes can go where we need to have them
go efficiently and safely, and that no amount offragmentary and
indirect intelligence can be pieced together to be equivalent to
such positive information as can thus be provided. 60
The Land committee memorandum also stressed the need for the
CIA to undertake such reconnaissance missions rather than the Air
Force, noting that "For the present it seems rather dangerous for one
of our military arms to engage directly in extensive overflight." The
committee members also listed the advantages of using the CL-282
rather than an Air Force aircraft:

The Lockheed super glider will fly at 70,000 feet, well out of the
reach of present Russian interceptors and high enough to have a
good chance of avoiding detection. The plane itself is so light
(15,000 pounds), so obviously unarmed and devoid of military
usefulness, that it would minimize affront to the Russians even if
through some remote mischance it were detected and identified_ 61
One additional advantage of the Lockheed design over the Air
Force's proposed high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft was a faster
completion time. Kelly Johnson had promised the Land committee
that his aircraft would be flying by August 1955, just eight months
after he proposed to start construction. The Bell X-16 prototype was
not scheduled for completion before the spring of 1956.
The strong advocacy of Killian and the other scientists on the
various advisory committees concerned with overhead reconnaissance, combined with President Eisenhower's support, finally won

"'' Memorandum for DCI Allen F. Dulles from Project Three Panel, "A Unique
Opportunity for Comprehensive Intelligence," 5 November 1954, p. 3 (TS, downgraded to
S) in OSA History, chap. I, annex I (TS Codeword).
•• Ibid.
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~eeret NOF6ftr<J

Chapter 1
35

over DCI Dulles, but a project of this magnitude also required the
support of the Air Force. Some Air Force officials, however, feared
that a decision to build the CL-282 might jeopardize the Air Force's
own RB-57 and X-16 projects. Just one month earlier, in October
1954, the Wright Air Development Command had appealed to the Air
Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, Lt. Gen. Donald L.
Putt, to oppose the adoption of the Lockheed design. The officials argued that the Bell X-16 was a better design because it was more airworthy than the CL-282 and could be used throughout the Air Force
in different types of missions because it had two engines, wheels, and
an armor-plated, pressurized pilot's compartment. If 157 engines were
diverted to the CL-282, the appeal to General Putt warned, there
would not be enough of these popular powerplants to meet the needs
of the X-16 prograrn. 62
Having heard of the Wright Air Development Command attack
on the CL-282, Allen Donovan of the Intelligence Systems Panel met
with General Putt on 19 October to argue in favor of the Lockheed
design. This discussion led General Putt to meet with 15 scientists
from the Technological Capabilities Panel on 18 November 1954 to
discuss the merits of the four proposed reconnaissance aircraft. Also
present as a briefer was Maj. John Seaberg from the Wright Air
Development Command, who later recalled:
What I did was present the results of my comparative analysis of
all four designs. I showed the relative high altitude performance
capabilities of all four. I pointed out that aerodynamically the
Bell, Fairchild, and Lockheed designs were close. Martin '.s B-57,
being a modification, was not quite as capable. I stated that, in
my opinion, the 173 [General Electric engine] would not be
good enough to do the job in Johnson's airplane. And further, I
overlaid a curve showing that with the 157 [Pratt & Whitney engine} installed, it would then be competitive with the Bell and
Fairchild designs. 63
This meeting-along with the knowledge that President
Eisenhower also supported the CL-282-helped win over the Air
Force. To be on the safe side, however, the Air Force did not abandon
the X-16 program until the Lockheed aircraft had begun flying .

•, Donovan interview (S).
•-' Quoted in Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 13.

Secret

Sec, et NOP'ORl\1

Chapter 1
36

On 19 November, the day after Seaberg's briefing, the final decision on the CL-282 came at a luncheon hosted by Air Force Secretary
Talbott. The participants-Dulles and Cabell from the CIA; Gardner,
Ayer, and General Putt from the Air Force; Kelly Johnson; and Edwin
Land-all agreed "that the special item of material described by
Lockheed was practical and desirable and would be sought. ... It was
agreed that the Project should be a joint Air Force-CIA one but that,
regardless of the source of the funds, whether AF or CIA. CIA
unvouchered channels would be needed to pass the funds.,,,,.,
It is interesting to note that Lockheed, which had originally developed the CL-282 on its own and had devoted considerable effort to
promoting it, had to be persuaded to undertake the project in
November 1954 because the company had become heavily committed
to several other civilian and military projects. When Kelly Johnson
received a call from Trevor Gardner on l 7 November asking him to
come to Washington for conversations on the project, his instructions
from Lockheed's senior management were ''to not commit to any
program during the visit, but to get the information and return."
When he returned to California, Johnson noted in his project log that
"I was impressed with the secrecy aspect and was told by Gardner
that I was essentially being drafted for the project. It seemed, in fact,
that if I did not talk quietly, I might have to take a leave of absence
from my job at Lockheed to do this special project." 05 Of course,
Kelly Johnson did not need to be drafted or persuaded into undertaking such a bold step forward in aircraft design. He used Gardner's
statement to convince Lockheed's senior management to approve the
project, which they did after meeting with Johnson when he returned
to California on the evening of I 9 November.
Four days later, on 23 November, the Intelligence Advisory
Committee (IAC) approved DCI Dulles's request to undertake the
CL-282 project. The following day Dulles signed a three-page memorandum, drafted by DDCI Cabell. asking President Eisenhower to
approve the overhead reconnaissance project. That same afternoon, at
a meeting attended by the Secretaries of State and Defense and senior
Air Force officials. Dulles and Cabell presented the document to the

"" Charles Pearre Cabell, Memorandum for the Record...Luncheon Meeting with the
Secretary of the Air Force,.. 19 November 1954. in OSA History. chap. 2, annex 4 (TS
Codeword).
"" Johnson, "Log for Project X," 17 and 19 :-.:ovember 1954.

6eerati

Sec, et NOi-ORN
Chapter 1
37

President and received verbal authorization to proceed. Eisenhower
told Dulles that the project was to be managed by the Agency and
that the Air Force was to provide any assistance needed to get it
operational. 66
Thus, it was that the CIA entered into the world of high technology primarily because of decisions and actions taken outside the
Agency: the Air Force's refusal to build the CL-282 aircraft,
President Eisenhower's desire to have a sensitive overflight project
conducted by a civilian agency rather than the military, and, above all,
the determination by a small group of prominent scientists that the
Lockheed design represented the best possible overhead reconnais6,
sance system.

"" Charles Pearre Cabell, Memorandum for the Record. "Meeting at the White House:·
24 November 1954. in OSA History, chap. 2. annex 8 (TS Codeword) ; Beschloss.
Mayday, pp. 82-83: Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum of Conference with the
President, 24 November 1954," White House Office of the Staff Secretary, Alpha Series.
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (hereafter cited as WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL) (TS.
declassified).
" Scientists remained active in advising the government on overhead reconnaissance. In
February 1955, the Technological Capabilities Panel issued its final report, which strongly
urged the use of technology to gather intelligence. President Eisenhower strongly backed
the panel's findings and directed government agencies to respond to the recommendations
by June. The CIA's most important reaction to the Technological Capabilities Panel report
was to create its own Scientific Advisory Board composed of the members of the Project
Three Study Group with the addition of James Killian and Jerome B. Wiesner, professor of
electrical engineering at MIT. Edwin Land served as chairman of the CIA Scientific
Advisory Board for the next 10 years, and it soon became known unofficially as the Land
Panel. This panel provided important advice to the Agency, particularly in the field of overhead reconnaissance.
President Eisenhower also acted to increase the amount and quality of scientific advice
he was receiving. In January 1956 he established the President's Board of Consultants on
Foreign Intelligence Activities (renamed the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board in 1961) to oversee the intelligence community and advise him on intelligence matters. The board's first chairman was James Killian. In 1957 the President reorganized and
upgraded the Office of Defense Mobilization's Science Advisory Committee, which became the President's Science Advisory Committee. He also named James Killian to be the
first Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. In this new position
Killian served as the President's scientific advisor and the chairman of the President's
Scientific Advisory Committee (Killian stepped down as chairman of the President's Board
of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities but remained a member). These actions by
the President brought scientists into the White House and gave them considerable influence.

See,et

. ~--·-·· ~8 ~.
~l0-,vi

.,..

.

.

: .

l

Sec, et NOPOPU~

Chapter 2
39

Developing the U-2

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE U-2 PROJECT
On 26 November 1954, the day after Thanksgiving, Allen Dulles
called his special assistant. Richard Bissell, into his office to te:ll him
that President Eisenhower had just approved a very secret program
and that Dulles wanted Bissell to take charge of it. Saying it was too
?~cret for him to explain, Dulles gave Bissell a packet of docuiments
and told him he could keep it for several days to acquaint himself
with the project. Bissell had long known of the proposal to build a
high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, but only in the most general
terms. Now he learned in detail about the project that proposed sending aircraft over the Soviet Union.
Late on the morning of 2 December 1954, Dulles told Bissell to
go to the Pentagon on the following day to represent the Agency at an
1
organizational meeting for the U-2 project. Before leaving, Bissell
asked Dulles which agency was to run the project. The DCI replied
that nothing had been clearly decided. Bissell then asked who was
going to pay for the project. Dulles answered: "That wasn'li even
2
mentioned. You'11 have to work that out."
Bissell was accompanied by Herbert I. Miller, chief of the Office
of Scientific Intelligence's Nuclear Energy Division, who soon became the executive officer of the overflight project. When Bissell and
Miller arrived at the Pentagon on the afternoon of 3 Decembeli, they

' Although the Lockheed CL-282 was not designated as the U-2 until July 1955, this
study will use the more widely known designator to avoid confusion.
1

Bissell interview {S); OSA History, chap. 3, p. 1 {TS Codeword).

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Secret 1\101'0~1\1

Chapter 2
40

sat down with a group of key Air Force officials that included Trevor
Gardner and Lt. Gen. Donald L. Putt. The participants spent very little time delineating Air Force and Agency responsibilities in the !Project, taking for granted that the CIA would handle the secuirity
matters. Much of the discussion centered on methods for diverting
Air Force materiel to the program, particularly the Pratt & Whitney
J57 engines, because a separate contract for the engines might jeopardize the project's security. The Air Force promised to tum ov,er a
number of J57 engines, which were then being produced for B-:52s,
KC- l 35s, F-100s, and RB-57s. Eventually Bissell asked who was
going to pay fo r the airframes to be built by Lockheed. His query was
greeted with silence. Everyone present had their eyes on him because
they all expected the Agency to come up with the funds. Bissell rose
from his chair, said he would see what he could do, and the rnee1ting
3
adjoumed.

James A. Cunningham, Jr.

After the meeting. Bissell told Dulles that the CIA would hav,e to
use money from the Contingency Reserve Fund to get the project
going. The DC! used this fu nd to pay for covert activities, following
approval by the President and the Director of the Budget. Dulles 1told
Bissell to draft a memorandum for the President on funding the overfli ght program and to start putting together a staff for Project
AQUATONE. the project's new codename.
At first the new " Project Staff" (renamed the Development
Projects Staff in April 1958) consisted of Bissell. Miller, and the
small existing staff in Bissel l's Office of the Special Assistant to the
DCI. During the months that followed the establishment of the project, its administrative workload increased rapidly, and in May 1955
the project staff added an administrative officer, James A.
Cunningham, Jr., a former Marine Corps pilot then working in the
Directorate of Support. Cunningham stayed with the U-2 project for
the next lO years. Two other key project officials who began their du~ in 1955 wer~
] the finance officer, and
L _ l the contracting officer."

c==i

' OSA History, chap. 3. p. 2 (TS Codeword): Bissell interview, 8 November 1984 (S);
Beschloss, Maydt1y. p. 89.
• OSA History. chap. 3. pp. 6-7. chap. 4, pp. 1-2. chap. 5. pp. 27-29 (TS Codeword);
Chronology of rite Office of Speda/ Activities. 195.J• /968. (CIA: DS&T. 1969). p. 2-4 (TS
Codeword) (hereafter cited as OSA Chronology).

Gee, ct NOfOftN
Chapter 2
41

============
AOUATONE
Project

Personnel

Special Assistant to the DCI
for Planning and Coordination

I
Headquarters
CIA
USAF

J

-1]
25

I

I

I

I

I

US Field Test Base
26
CIA

Foreign Field Base A
CIA
16
USAF
34
Contract
52

Foreign Fielcj Base B
16
CIA
USAF
34
Contract
52

Foreign Field Base C
CIA
16
USAF
34
52
Contract

26

102

102

102

Total employees: CIA
USAF
Contract

During the firs t hal f of 1955. the project staff grew slowly: many
of the individuals working on overhead reconnaissance remained on
the rolls of other Agency components. To achieve maximum security,
Bissell made the project staff self-sufficient. Project AQUATONE had
its own contract management, administrative, financial, logistic, communications, and security personnel , and, thus, did not need to tum
to the Agency directorates for assistance. Funding for Proj,ect
AQUATONE was also kept separate from other Agency components;
its personnel and operating costs were not paid out of regular Agency
accounts. As approving officer for the project, Richard Bissell could
obligate funds in amounts up to $100,000; larger sums requ ired i.he
1
DCl's approval.
At the end of April 1955, Bisselrs staff developed, and the
Deputy Director for Support approved, the firs t table of organization
for Proj ect AQUATONE. Once operational. the project would have a

' OSA History. chap. 3. pp. 5-7 (TS Ccxkword).

Sec.ct NOFOAN

Chapter 2
42

The Matomic Building

total of 357 personnel divided among project headquarters, a US testing faci lity. and three foreign field bases. C IA employees represented
only one-fourth (92) of .the total. The Air Force personnel commitment was larger, with l09 positions on the 1955 table of organization
(th is total does not include many other Air Force personnel, such as
SAC meteorologists. who supported the U-2 project in addition to
their other duties). The largest Project AQUATONE category was
contract employees, with 156 positions in 1955. This category included maintenance and support personnel from Lockheed (five per
aircraft), the pilots, and support personnel from other contractors for
6
items such as photographic equipment.
The first project headquarters was in CIA's Administration (East)
Building at 2430 E Street, NW. Continued growth caused the
AQUATONE staff to move several times during its first two years.
On l May l 955, the project staff moved to the third floor of a small
red brick building (the Briggs School) at 2210 E Street, NW. Then on
3 October. the staff moved to Wings A and C of Quarters Eye, a
World War fI "temporary" building on Ohio Drive. NW. in the West
Potomac Park area of Washington. On 25 February l956, the project
staff moved again. this time to the fifth floor of the Matomic Building

• Proj,:ct AQUATONE Table of Organization. 28 April 1955 in OSA History. chap. 3, anneK 15 (TS Codeword).

Secret

Seth!l NOFORN

Chapter 2
43

at 1717 H Street, NW. Here the staff remained for the next six years
until it moved into the new CIA Headquarters building at Langley in
March 1962. The final move came in January 1968, when the project
staff (by that time known as the Office of Special Activities) moved
1
to the Tyler Building in Tysons Comer, Virginia.
Bissell reported directly to the DCI, although in reality the
DDCI, Gen. Charles Pearre Cabell, was much more closely involved
in the day-to-day affairs of the overhead reconnaissance project.
Cabell's extensive background in Air Force intelligence, particularly
in overhead reconnaissance, made him ideally qualified to oversee the
U-2 project. Cabell frequently attended White House meetings on the
U-2 for the DCI.

FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR
PROJECT AOUATONE
Although Allen Dulles had approved the concept of covert funding
for the reconnaissance project, many financial details remained to be
settled, including the contract with Lockheed. Nevertheless. work on
the U-2 began as soon as the project was authorized. Between 29
November and 3 December 1954, Kelly Johnson pulled together a
team of 25 engineers, which was not easy because he had to take
them off other Lockheed projects without being able to explain why
to their former supervisors. T he engineers immediately began to work
45 hours a week on the project. The project staff gradually expanded
to a total of 8 1 personnel, and the workweek soon increased to 65
8
hours.

DDCI Charles Pearre Cabell

Kelly Johnson's willingness to begin work on the aircraft without a contract illustrates one of the most important aspects of this program: the use of unvouchered funds for covert procurement.
Lockheed was well acquainted with the covert procurement process,
having previously modified several aircraft for covert use by the CI A.
Covert funding for sensiti ve projects sirnpli fies both procurement and security procedures because the funds are not attributable to
the Federal Government and there is no public accountabi lity for their

' OSA History. chap. 18. pp. 7-8 (TS Codeword); OSA Chronology. pp. 4. 7. 10. 45 (TS
Codeword).

• Johnson. '"Log for Project X ... 29 November-3 December 1954 (U).

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Sasret NOFORN

Chapter 2
44

use. Public Law 110, approved by the 81st Congress on 20 June 1949,
designates the Director of Central Intelligence as the only government
employee who can obligate Federal money without the use of vouchers. By using unvouchered funds, it is possible to eliminate competitive bidding and thereby limit the number of parties who know about
a given project. The use of unvouchered funds also speeds up the
Federal procurement cycle. A general contractor such as Lockheed
can purchase much, if not all, of the supplies needed for a project
without resorting at each step to the mandated procurement procedures involving public, competitive bidding. Covert contracting also
permits the use of second and third parties, many of them dummy
corporations or unwitting suppliers, thus hiding the intended destination or use of the various purchases.
In mid-December 1954, President Eisenhower authorized DCI
Dulles to use $35 million from the Agency's Contingency Reserve Fund
to finance the U-2 project. Then on 22 December 1954, the Agency
signed a letter contract with Lockheed, using the codename Project
OARFISH. The Agency had proposed to give Lockheed "performance
specifications., rather than the standard Air Force "technical specifications," which were more rigid and demanding, and Kelly Johnson agreed
that such a move would save a lot of money. Lockheed's original proposal to the Air Force in May l 954 had been $28 million for 20 U-2s
equipped with GE 173 engines. During negotiations with CIA General
Counsel Lawrence R. Houston, Lockheed changed its proposal to $26
million for 20 airframes plus a two-seat trainer model and spares; the Air
Force was to furnish the engines. Houston insisted that the Agency could
only budget $22.5 million for the airframes because it needed the balance
of the available $35 million for cameras and life-support gear. The two
sides finally agreed on a fixed-price contract with a provision for a review three-fourths of the way through to determine if the costs were
going to exceed the $22.5 million figure. The formal contract, No.
SP-1913, was signed on 2 March 1955 and called for the delivery of the
first U-2 in July 1955 and the last in November 1956. Meanwhile, to
keep work moving at Lockheed, Richard Bissell wrote a check for
~nd mailed it to Kelly Johnson's
$1,256,000 I
9
home on 21 February 1955.

• John S. Warner. Oftice of the General Counsel, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach,
Washington, DC, tape recording, 5 Aug 1983 (S): OSA History, chap. 5, pp. 1-2 and annex
42 (TS Codeword): Johnson, "Log for Project X," 21 February 1955 .

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6eeret NOFOAN

Chapter 2
45

As it turned out, no review of the contract was necessary at the
three-fourths point. Lockheed delivered the aircraft not only on time
but under budget. During the final contract negotiations in the spring
of 1958, Lockheed and the US Government agreed on a price for the
original 20 aircraft of $17,025,542 plus a profit of $1,952,055 for a
total of $18,977,597-less than $1 million for each aircraft. Because
its design was based on Lockheed's F-104, the U-2 was relatively inexpensive even though only a small number of aircraft had been ordered. Only the wings and tail were unique; Lockheed manufactured
the other portions of the aircraft using the F-104's jigs and dies.

MAJOR DESIGN FEATURES OF THE U-2
Aware of the great need for secrecy in the new project, Kelly Johnson
placed it in Lockheed's Advanced Development facility at Burbank,
California, known as the Skunk Works. 10 Lockheed had established
this highly secure area in 1945 to develop the nation's first jet aircraft,
the P-80 Shooting Star. The small Skunk Works staff began making
the _detailed drawings for the U-2, which was nicknamed the "Angel"
because it was to fly so high.
Kelly Johnson's approach to prototype development was to have
his engineers and draftsmen located not more than 50 feet from the
aircraft assembly line. Difficulties in construction were immediately
brought to the attention of the engineers, who gathered the mechanics
around the drafting tables to discuss ways to overcome the difficulties. As a result, engineers were generally able to fix problems in the
design in a matter of hours, not days or weeks. There was no emphasis placed on producing neatly typed memorandums; engineers simply made pencil notations on the engineering drawings in order to
keep the project moving quickly. 11
A little more than a week after he had been authorized to begin
the project, Kelly Johnson wrote a 23-page report detailing his most
recent ideas on the U-2 proposal. The aircraft, he explained, would be
designed to meet load factors of only 2.5 g's, which was the limit for
transport aircraft rather than combat planes. The U-2 would have a

'" The Lockheed '"Skunk Works" was named after the Kickapoo Joy Juice factory known
as the .. Skonk Works" in Al Capp·s comic strip Li'/ Abner.
Ben A. Rich (current head of the "Skunk Works"). interview by Donald E. Welzenbach
and Gregory W. Pedlow, Burbank, California, 26 August 1988.

11

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Secret NOfi6fltN

Chapter 2
46

·\......,. - ~... :: ·

..

··•:Jt·1 "' .... 1._.,

~ .

·• ~i~·;'"; ~·- . ·•.

< >. ~)\~~,-~,

Skunk Works Design Staff

speed of Mach 0.8 or 460 knots at altitude. Its initial maximum altitude would be 70,600 feet and the lllltimate maximum altitude would
be 73,100 feet. According to these early December 1954 specifications, the new plane would take off at 90 knots, land at 76 knots, and
be able to glide 244 nautical miles from an altitude of 70,000 feet.
After discussing the reconnaissance bay with James Baker, Johnson
had worked out various equipment combinations that would not exceed the weight limit of 450 pounds. Johnson ended his report by
promising the first test flight by 2 August l 955 and the completion of
four aircraft by I December I955.':

" Kell y Johnson. ·• A High-Altitude: Rcconnai~san(;C: Aircraft," 9 Dc:cc:mbc:r 195-i.
Lockheed Contract Filc:s. OSA Records (S ).

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Secr&t PJOFOFU'd

Chapter 2
47

In designing the U-2 aircraft, Kelly Johnson was confronted with
two major problems-fuel capacity and weight. To achieve intercontinental range, the aircraft had to carry a large supply of fuel, yet, it
also had to be light enough to attain the ultrahigh altitudes needed to
be safe from interception. Although the final product resembled a typical jet aircraft, its construction was unlike any other US military aircraft. One unusual design feature was the tail assembly, which-to
save weight-was attached to the main body with just three tension
bolts. This feature had been adapted from sailplane designs.
The wings were also unique. Unlike conventional aircraft, whose
main wing spar passes through the fuselage to give the wings continuity and strength, the U-2 had two separate wing panels, which were
attached to the fuselage sides with tension bolts (again, just as in sailplanes). Because the wing spar did not pass through the fuselage,
Johnson was able to locate the camera behind the pilot and ahead of
the engine, thereby improving the aircraft's center of gravity and reducing its weight.
The wings were the most challenging design feature of the entire
airp~ane. Their combination of high-aspect ratio and low-_drag ratio
(in other words, the wings were long, narrow, and thin) made them
unique in jet aircraft design. The wings were actually integral fuel
tanks that carried almost all of the U-2's fuel supply.
The fragility of the wings and tail section, which were only
bolted to the fuselage, forced Kelly Johnson to look for a way to protect the aircraft from gusts of wind at altitudes below 35,000 feet,
which otherwise might cause the aircraft to disintegrate. Johnson
again borrowed from sailplane designs to devise a "gust control"
mechanism that set the ailerons and horizontal stabilizers into a position that kept the aircraft in a slightly nose-up attitude, thereby
avoiding sudden stresses caused by wind gusts. Nevertheless, the U-2
remained a very fragile aircraft that required great skill and concentration from its pilots.
The final major design feature was the lightweight, bicycle-type
landing gear. The entire structure-a single oleostrut with two lightweight wheels toward the front of the aircraft and two small,
solid-mount wheels under the tail-weighed only 208 pounds yet
could withstand the force of touchdown for this 7-ton aircraft. Because
both sets of wheels were located underneath the fuselage, the U-2 was
also equipped with detachable pogos (long, curved sticks with two
small wheels on them) on each wing to keep the wings level during
takeoff. The pilot would drop the pogos immediately after takeoff so

Seeret

Sec, et NOFORN

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48

U-2 at testing site before
attachment of wings and
tail assembly

that they could be recovered and reused. The aircraft landed on its
front and back landing gear and then gradually tilted over onto one of
1
the wingtips, which were equ ipped with landing skids. )

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAMERA SYSTEM
By December 1954, Kelly Johnson was at work on drawings for the
U-2's airframe and Pratt & Whitn•:!Y was already building the J57 jet

" For the design ft:atures of the U-'.! in early 1955. see R. F. Boc:hrne. Summary Report:
Reconnaissance Aircraft . Lockheed Aircraft Corpor.ition Report I04'.!0. 28 January 1955.
pp. 7-9. OSA Records. job 74-B-6-l5. box I (S).

Sec. et NOFOAN

Chapter 2
49

.. ·-

. ·. •

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,•

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engine, but no firm plans existed for the all-important cameras.
Existing cameras were too bulky and lacked sufficient resolution to
be used in high-altitude reconnaissance.

U-2 landing gear and pogos

The workhorses of World W'ilf II aerial photography had been the
Fairchild K-19 and K-21 framing cameras with lenses of varying focal
lengths from 24 to 40 inches. Late in the war, the trimetrogon K-17
.mapping-camera system came into use. This system consis~ed of lhree
separate cameras which made three photographs simultaneously: a
vertical, an oblique to the left, and an oblique to the right The major
shortcomings of the trimetrogon system were the large amount of film
required and the system's lack of sharp definition on the obliques.
The standard aerial cameras available in the e'ilfly 1950s c:ould
achieve resolutions of about 20 to 25 feet (7 to 8 meters) on a side
when used at an altitude of 33,000 feet (10,000 meters), or about 25
lines per millimeter in current tenns of reference. Such resolution was
considered adequate because aerial photography was then used primarily to choose targets for strategic bombing, to assess bomb damage after air raids, and to make maps and charts. Unfortunately, a
camera with a resolution of only 20 to 25 feet at a height of 33,000
feet was too crude to be used at twice that altitude. lndeed, for intelligence purposes a resolution of less than 10 feet was necessary to discern smaller targets in greater detail. This meant that any camera
carried to altitudes above 68, 000 feet had to be almost four times as
good as existing aerial cameras in order to achieve a resolution of less
than 10 feet As a result, some scientists doubted that useful photography could be obtained from altitudes higher than 40,000 feet.'"

" Baker imervil!w (S).

.Sea,et-

Seeret NOFORN

Chapter 2
50

+

·~;~ ,·\ ·~~:f~: .i ~ ~~\ ~~
;.;.,-::., .

James G. Baker

The first success in designing very-high-acuity lenses came in
the mid- I940s, when James G. Baker of Harvard and Richard S.
Perkin of the Perkin-Elmer (P-E) Company of Norwalk, Connecticut,
collaborated on a design for an ex.perimental camera for the Army Air
Force. They developed a 48-inch focal-length scanning camera that
was mounted in a modified B-36 bomber. When tested over Fort
Worth, Texas, at 34,000 feet, the new camera produced photographs
in which two golf balls on a putting green could be distinguished (in
reality. however, the "golf balls··· were 3 inches in diameter). These
photographs demonstrated the high acuity of Baker's lens, but the
camera weighed more than a ton and was much too large to be carried
aloft in an aircraft as small as the U-2.
Realizing that size and weiglht were the major restraining factors
in developing a camera for the U--2. James Baker began working on a
radically new system in October 1954, even before the CIA adopted
the Lockheed proposal. Baker quickly recognized, however, that he
would need almost a year to produce a working model of such a complex camera. Since Kelly Johnson had promised to have a U-2 in the
air within eight months, Baker needed to find an existing camera that
could be used until the new came:ra was ready. After consulting with
his friend and colleague Richard Perkin. Baker decided to adapt for
the U-2 an Air Force camera krnown as the K-38. a 24-inch aerial
framing camera built by the Hycon Manufacturing Company of
Pasadena, California.
Perkin suggested modifying several standard K-38 cameras in
order to reduce their weight to the U-2's 450-pound payload limit. At
the same time, Baker would ma:ke critical adj ustments to existing
K-38 lenses to improve their acuiity. Baker was able to do this in a
few weeks, so several modified K-38s, now known as A-1 cameras,
were ready when the first "Angel" aircraft took to the air in
15
mid-1955.
CIA awarded Hycon a contract for the modified K-38 cameras,
and Hycon, in tum. subcontracte:d to Perkin-Elmer to provide new
lenses and to make other modifications to the cameras in order to
make them less bulky. In its tum, Perkin-Elmer subcontracted to
Baker to rework the existing K-38 lenses and later design an improved lens system. To keep his liens-designing efforts separate from

" Ibid.

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51

A-1 camera

his research associate duties at Harvard and his service on go,vemment advisory bodies, Baker established a small firm known as Spica,
Incorporated, on 31 January 1955.
The A-1 camera system consisted of two 24-inch K-38 framing
cameras. One was mounted vertically and photographed a 17.2° swath
beneath the aircraft onto a roll of 9.5- inch fi lm. The second K-38 was
placed in a rocking mount so that it alternately photographed the left
oblique and right oblique out to 36.5° onto separate rolls of 9.5-inch
fi lm. The film supplies unwound in opposite directions in ordler to
minimize their effect on the balance of the aircraft. Both cameras
used standard Air Force 24-inch focal-length lenses adjusted for maximum acuity by Baker. The development of the special rocking mount
by Perkin-Elmer's Dr. Roderic M. Scott was a major factor in neducing the size and weight of the A- I system, because the mount provided broad transverse coverage with a single lens, ending the need
for two separate cameras. 16

•• OSA History. chap. I. annt!x 3, pp. 1-3 (TS Co1kword).
SeGF&t

Settet N0FORl)I
Chapter 2
52

A-2 camera

U-2s equipped with the A- I camera system also carried a
Perkin-Elmer tracking camera using 2.75-inch film and a 3-inch lens.
This device made continuous horizon-to-horizon photographs of the
terrain passing beneath the aircraft. Because the A - I system was: new,
it also included a backup camera system. a K-17 6-inch three-camera
trimetrogon unit using 9-inch film.
W hi le the A -1 system was still being developed, James )Baker
was already working on the next generation of lenses for high-alrtitude
reconnaissance. B aker was a pioneer in using computers to synthesize
optical systems. His software algorithms made it possible to model
lens designs and determine in advance the effects that variatio,ns in
lens curvatures. glass compounds. and lens spacings would have on
rays of light passing through a lens. These .. ray-tracing" programs required extensive computations, and, for this he turned to the most
modem computer available, an IBM CPC (card-programmed callcula17
tor) installation at nearby Boston University.

" Ibid.. chap. I. pp. 7-8 (TS Codeword).

-Seeret

Seeret NOFORN

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53

Baker's new lenses were used in a camera system known as the
A-2, which returned to a trimetrogon arrangement because of problems with the A-1 system's rocking mount. The A-2 consisted of
three separate K-38 framing cameras and 9.5-inch film magazines.
One K-38 filmed the right oblique, another the vertical, and a third
the left oblique. The A-2 system also included a 3-inch tracking
camera. All A-2 cameras were equipped with the new 24-inch f/8.0
Baker-designed lenses. These were the first relatively large photographic objective lenses to employ several aspheric surfaces. James
Baker personally ground these surfaces and made the final bench tests
on each lens before releasing it to the Agency. These lenses were able
to resolve 60 lines per millimeter, a 240-percent improvement over
existing lenses. 18
Once Baker and Scott had redesigned the 24-inch lens for the
K-38 devices, they turned their attention to Baker's new camera design, known as the B model. It was a totally new concept, a high-resolution panoramic-type framing camera with a much longer 36-inch
f/10.0 aspheric lens. The B camera was a very complex device that
- used a single lens to obtain photography from one horizon to the
other, thereby reducing weight by having two fewer lenses and shutter
assemblies than the standard trimetrogon configuration. Because its
lens was longer than those used in the A cameras. the B camera
achieved even higher resolution-100 lines per millimeter.
The B camera used an 18- by 18-inch format, which was
achieved by focusing the image onto two counterrotating but overlapping 9. 5-inch wide strips of film. Baker designed this camera so that
one film supply was located forward, the other aft. Thus, as the film
supplies unwound, they counterbalanced each other and did not disturb the aircraft's center of gravity.
The B camera had two modes of operation. In mode I, the
camera used a single lens to make seven unique exposures from 73.5°
on the far right and far left obliques to vertical photos beneath the aircraft, effectively covering from horizon to horizon. Mode II narrowed
the lateral coverage to 21 S on either side of vertical. This increased
the available number of exposures and almost doubled the camera's

" "Basic Configuration and Camera Data:· 24 January 1956. OSA Records (TS
Codeword); OSA History, chap. 5. annex 44 (TS Codeword).

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&ee1 et NOFOAN

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B camera .

operating time. Three of the seven B-camera frames provided stereo
coverage. The complex B cameras were engineered by Hycon's chief
designer, William McFadden.'"
James Baker's idea for the ultimate high-altitude camera wa:s the
C model that would have a 240-inch focal length. In December 1954,
he made preliminary designs for folding the optical path using three
mirrors, a prism, and an f/20.0 lens system. Before working ouIt the
detai ls of this design, however, Baker flew to California in early
January 1955 to consult with Kelly Johnson about the weight and
space limitations of the U-2·s payload compartment. Despite eve~y effort to reduce the physical dimensions of the C camera, Baker ne,eded
an additional six inches of payload space to accommodate the bigger
lens. When he broached this subject to Johnson, the latter replied,
" Six more inches? I'd sell my grandmother for six more inches!I" ~

•·• Ibid.: Bakl!r interview (S),
'' Bakc:r intl!rvkw (S).

6ee1 et NOFOfitM

Chapter 2

55

Realizing that the 240-inch lens was both too large and too
heavy for the camera bay, Baker scaled the lens down to a 200-inch
f/16. 0 system. This was still too big. Further reductions followed, resulting by July 1955 in a 120-inch fl 10.9 lens that met both the weight
and space limitations. Later in the year, Baker decided to make the
mirrors for the system out of a new, lightweight foamed silica material developed by Pittsburgh-Coming Glass Company. This reduced
the weight significantly, and he was able to scale up the lens to a
180-inch f/13.85 reflective system for a 13- by 13-inch format. In the
past, the calculations for such a complex camera lens would have
taken years to complete, but thanks to Baker's ray-tracing computer
program, he was able to accomplish the task in just 16 days.
When a C camera built by Hycon was flight-tested on 31 January
l 957, project engineers discovered that its 180-inch focal length,
which was five times longer than that of the B camera, made the
camera very sensitive to aircraft vibration and led to great difficulty
in aiming the C camera from altitudes above 68,000 feet. The engineers, therefore, decided to shelve the camera. More than five years
later, a redesigned C camera was employed during the Cuban Missile
Crisis in 0ctober 1962, but the results were not very satisfactory.
The failure of the C camera design was not a serious setback to
the high-altitude reconnaissance program, because the B camera
proved highly successful. Once initial difficulties with the film-transport system were overcome, the B camera became the workhorse of
high-altitude photography. An improved version known as the B-2 is
still in use. Both of the earlier A-model cameras were phased out after
September 1958.
During the period when he was designing lenses for the CIA's
overhead reconnaissance program, James Baker was also working on
classified lens designs for the Air Force and unclassified designs for
the Smithsonian Institution. To protect the security of Baker's work
for the Agency, Herbert Miller of the Development Projects Staff told
Baker to work on lenses for the U-2 in the open and not make any
effort to classify the documents connected with the project. Miller believed that by not calling attention to the effort through the use of special security measures, the project could be completed faster and still
not be compromised. This "hiding in the open" strategy proved very
successful?

" Ibid.

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Sec, et NOFORN

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In addition to the camera systems, the U-2 carried one other important item of optical equipment, a periscope. Designed by James
Baker and built by Walter Baird of Baird Associates, the optical periscope helped pilots recognize targets beneath the aircraft and also
proved to be a valuable navigational aid. 22

PREPARATIONS FOR TESTING THE U-2
As work progressed in California on the airframe, in Connecticut on
the engines, and in Boston on the camera system, the top officials of
the Development Projects Staff flew to California and Nevada to
search for a site where the aircraft could be tested safely and secretly.
On 12 April 1955 Richard Bissell and Col. Osmund Ritland (the senior Air Force officer on the project staff) flew over Nevada with
Kelly Johnson in a small Beechcraft plane piloted by Lockheed's
chief test pilot, Tony Le Vier. They spotted what appeared to be an airstrip by a salt flat known as Groom Lake, near the northeast corner of
the Atomic Energy Commission's (AEC) Nevada Proving Ground.
After debating about landing on the old airstrip, LeVier set the plane
down on the lakebed, and all four walked over to examine the strip.
The facility had been used during World War II as an aerial gunnery
range for Army Air Corps pilots. From the air the strip appeared to be
paved, but on closer inspection it turned out to have originally been
fashioned from compacted earth that had turned into ankle-deep dust
after more than a decade of disuse. If Le Vier had attempted to land on
the airstrip, the plane would probably have nosed over when the
wheels sank into the loose soil, killing or injuring all of the key figures in the U-2 project. 23
Bissell and his colleagues all agreed that Groom Lake would
make an ideal site for testing the U-2 and training its pilots. Upon returning to Washington, Bissell discovered that Groom Lake was not
part of the AEC proving ground. After consulting with Dulles, Bissell
and Miller asked the Atomic Energy Commission to add the Groom
Lake area to its real estate holdings in Nevada. AEC Chairman Adm.
Lewis Strauss readily agreed, and President Eisenhower also approved the addition of this strip of wasteland, known by its map designation as Area 51, to the Nevada Test Site. The outlines of Area 51

" Information supplied by James Baker to Donald E. Welzenbach, 12 May 1986 (U).

'·' OSA History, chap. 8, pp. 1-2 (TS Codeword); Miller, Lockheed U-2. pp. 19-20.

Sea,at

~ M t N6f0Ri\J

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are shown on current unclassified maps as a small rectangular area
adjoini ng the northeast comer of the much larger Nevada Test Site. To
make the new facility in the middle of nowhere sound more attractive
to his workers. Kelly Johnson called it the Paradise Ranch, which was
soon shortened to the Ranch. !•

Area 51, the Ranch

Although the dry lakebed could have served as a landing strip.
project managers decided that a paved runway was needed so that
testing could also take place during the times when rainwater runoff
from nearby mountains filled the lake (at such times the base acquired
yet another unofficial name, Watertown Strip). By July 1955 the base
was ready, and Agency, Air Force, and Lockheed personnel began
moving in.

x:·

'' OSA History, chap. 8. pp. 2-6 (TS Co,kword): John:;on, "Log for Project
::?5-29
April I955: Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnso n with Maggi<! Smith. Kelly: More Thun My
Share of Ir All (Washington. DC: Smithsonian Institute Press. 1985). p. 123.

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Sec,et NOFORN

Chapter 2
59

SECURITY FOR THE U-2 PROJECT
On 29 April 1955, Richard Bissell signed an agreement with the Air
Force and the Navy (which at that time was also interested in the U-2)
in which the services agreed that the CIA "assumed primary responsibility for all security" for the overhead reconnaissance project
(AQUATONE). From this time on, the CIA has been responsible for
the security of overhead programs. This responsibility has placed a
heavy burden on the Office of Security for establishing procedures to
keep large numbers of contracts untraceable to the Central
Intelligence Agency. The Office of Security has also had to determine
which contractor employees require security clearances and has had
to devise physical security measures for the various manufacturing facilities. Keeping the U-2 and subsequent overhead systems secret has
been a time-consuming and costly undertaking. 25
The most important aspect of the security program for the U-2
project was the creation of an entire new compartmented system for
the product of U-2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the
U-2 would be strictly controlled, which often limited the ability of
_CIA analysts to use the products of U-2 missions.
The terminology used to describe U-2 aircraft and pilots also
played a part in maintaining the security of the overhead reconnaissance program. To reduce the chances of a security breach, the
Agency always referred to its high-altitude aircraft as "articles," with
each aircraft having its own "article number." Similarly, the pilots
were always called "drivers." In cable traffic the aircraft were known
as KWEXTRA-00 (the two-digit number identified the precise aircraft; these numbers were not related to the three-digit article numbers assigned by the factory). The pilots were referred to as
KWGLITTER-00 (the two-digit number identified the precise pilot).
Thus, even if a message or document about overflight activities fell
into unfriendly hands, the contents would simply refer to codewords
or at worst to "articles" and "drivers," giving no indication of the
nature of the program. '6
Even the aircraft's onboard equipment required the involvement
of CIA security planners. Thus, when Kelly Johnson ordered altimeters from the Kollman Instrument Company, he specified that the

" OSA History. chap. 7, pp. 4-6 (TS Codeword).
,. lnfonnation supplied by James Cunningham to Donald E. Welzenbach (S).

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60

devices had to be calibrated to 80,000 feet. This immediately raised
eyebrows at Kollman because its instruments only went to 45,000
feet. Agency security personnel quickly briefed several Kollman officials and produced a cover story that the altimeters were to be used on
experimental rocket planes. 27

THE CIA - AIR FORCE PARTNERSHIP
At the initial interagency meetings to establish the U-2 program in
December 1954, the participants did not work out a clear delineation
of responsibilities between the CIA and the Air Force. They agreed
only that the Air Force would supply the engines and the Agency
would pay for the airframes and cameras. With a myriad of details still
unsettled, CIA and Air Force representatives began to work on an
interagency agreement that would assign specific responsibilities for
the program. These negotiations proved difficult. Discussions on this
subject between DCI Allen Dulles and Air Force Chief of Staff Nathan
Twining began in March 1955. Twining wanted SAC, headed by Gen.
Curtis E. LeMay, to run the project once the planes and pilots were
ready to fly, but Dulles opposed such an arrangement. The CIA-USAF
talks dragged on for several months, with Twining determined that
SAC should have full control once the aircraft was deployed.
Eventually President Eisenhower settled the dispute. "I want this
whole thing to be a civilian operation," the President wrote. "If uniformed personnel of the armed services of the United States fly over
Russia, it is an act of war-legally-and I don't want any part of it." 28
With the issue of control over the program settled, the two agencies soon worked out the remaining details. On 3 August 1955, Dulles
and Twining met at SAC headquarters in Omaha to sign the basic
agreement, titled "Organization and Delineation of ResponsibilitiesProject OILSTONE" (OILSTONE was the Air Force codename for the
project). This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection
and training, weather information, mission plotting, and operational
support. The Agency was responsible for cameras, security, contracting, film processing, and arrangements for foreign bases, and it also
had a voice in the selection of pilots. All aeronautical aspects of the

n Ibid.

,. OSA History. chap. 3, pp. 8-15 (TS Codeword): Beschloss, Mayday, pp. 105-107.

ieare:&

See, el N61-0ftN
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project-the construction and testing of the aircraft-remained the ex9
clusive province of Lockheed.~
As a result of this agreement, CIA remained in control of the
program, but the Air Force played a very important role as well. As
Richard Bissell later remarked about the U-2 project, "The Air Force
wasn't just in on this as a s upporting element, and to a major degree it
wasn't in on it just supplying about half the government personnel;
but the Air Force held, if you want to be precise, 49 percent of the
30
common stock."
One of the first Air Force officers assigned to Project OILSTONE
was Col. Osmund J. Rieland. He began coordinating Air Force a:ctivities in the U-2 program with Richard Bissell in December 1954. On 27
June 1955, Rieland became Bissell's deputy, although Air Force Chief
of Staff Twining did not officially approve this assignment until 4
August, the day after the signing of the CIA- Air Force agreement. ln
March 1956, Colonel Ritland returned to the Air Force and was followed as deputy project director by Col. Jack A. Gibbs.
Osmund J. Rieland

. . . - Another Air Force officer. Lt. Col. Leo P. Geary. joined the: program in June 1955 and remained with it until August 1966. l1onger
than any of the other project managers. Using the Air !Force
Inspector General's office as cover with the title of Project Otificer,
AFCIG-5, Geary served as the focal point for all Defense
Department support to the U-2 and OXCART programs. His 11 years
with the overhead reconnaissance projects provided a high degree of
Air Force continuity.J•

TECHNICAL CHALLENGES TO
HIGH-ALTITUDE FLIGHT
To get the U-2 aircraft ready to Ry, Lockheed engineers had to solve
problems never before encountered. Among these problems w21s the
need for a fuel that would not boil off and evaporate at the very high
altitudes for which the aircraft was designed. Gen. James H. Doolittle

,. OSA History. chap. 3. p. 15 and annex 14 (TS Codeword).
•• Speech given by Richard Bissell at CIA Headquaners. 12 October 1965 (TS Codc::word).
" Brig. Gen. Leo A. Geary (USAF-Ret.). interview by Donald E. Wc:lzc:nbach. tape recording, 3 April 1986 (S); OSA History, chap. 3, p. 3 (TS Codtword).

Secret

See, el N61'0Rl\1
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(USAF. Ret.), a vice president of the Shell Oil Company who had
long been involved in overhead reconnaissance (most recently as a
member of the Technological Capabilities Panel), arranged for Shell
to develop a special low-volatility, low-vapor-pressure kerosene fuel
for the craft. The result was a dense mixture, known as LF-1 A, JP-TS
(thermally stable), or JP-7, with a boiling point of 300°F at sea level.
Manufacturing this special fuel required petroleum byproducts that
Shell normally used to make its "Flit" fly and bug spray. In order to
produce several hundred thousand gallons o f LF-1 A for the U-2 project in the spring and summer of 1955. Shell had to limit the production of Flit. causing a nationwide slhortage. Because of the new fuel' s
density, it required special tanks .:11nd modifications to the aircraft's
fuel-control and ignition systems.)~

Leo P. Geary

Even more important than the problem of boiling fuel was the
problem of boiling blood, namely the pilot's. At altitudes above
65,000 feet, fluids in the human body will vaporize unless the body
can be kept under pressure. Furthermore, the reduced atmospheric
pressure placed considerable stress on the pilot's cardiovascular system and did not provide adequate oxygenation of the blood. Keeping
the pilot alive at the extreme altitudes required for overflights therefore called for a totally different approach to environmental equipment; it required a system that coul,d maintain pressure over much of
the pilot's body. The technology tha,t enabled U-2 pilots to operate for
extended periods in reduced atmospheric pressure would later play a
major role in the manned space program.
Advising the Agency on high-•altitude survival were two highly
experienced Air Force doctors, Col. Donald D. Flickinger and Col. W.
Randolph Lovelace, 11. Dr. Lovelace had begun his research on
high-altitude flight before World War II and was a coinventor of the
standard Air Force oxygen maslk. In the early 1950s, he and
Flickinger made daring parachute jiumps from B-47 bombers to test
pilot-survival gear under extreme conditions. Flickinger served as the
medical adviser to Project AQUATONE for almost a decade.H
Flickinger and Lovelace suggested that the Agency ask the
David Clark Company of Worcester, Massachusetts, manufacturer of
environmental suits for Air Force pilots. to submit designs for more

" Land interview (TS Codeword): Bissell inte,rview (S): James A. Cunningham. Jr.. interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. Washington. DC. tape recording. 4 October 1983 (TS
Codeword).
'·' OSA History. chap. 10. pp. 29-34 (TS Codeword).

SacFat NQFOAN

Chapter 2
63

MC-2 partial-pressure suit (seen
on pilot Francis Gary Powers)

advanced gear for the U-2 pilots. David Clark expert Joseph Rus•!ckas
then developed a complex life-support system, which was the first
partially pressurized "spacesuit" for keeping humans alive for
lengthy periods at ultrahigh altitudes. The effort to provide a safe environment for pilots at high altitudes also involved the Fi1rewel
Company of Buffalo, New York, which pressurized the U-2 cockpit to
create an interior environment equivalent to the air pressure at an altitude of 28,000 feet. The system was designed so that, if the interior
cockpit pressure fell below the 28,000-feet level, the pilot's suit
would automatically inflate. In either case, he could obtain oxygen
only through his helmet.·~

"' Ibid.. chap. 5. p. 19 (TS Codeword).

Secret

6eeret NOFOAN

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64

The early models of these MC-2 and MC-3 partial-pressure suits
were very uncomfortable for the pilots. To prevent loss of pressure,
the heavy coverall had to fit tightly at the wrists and ankles (in the
early models of these suits, the feet were not included in the pressurization scheme). The pilot had to wear gloves and a heavy helmet that
tended to chafe his neck and shoulders and was prone to fogging.
Problems with the pilot life-support system were believed to have
been the cause of several early crashes of the U-2.
Having gotten a pilot into this bulky suit and shoehorned him
into his seat in the cockpit, the next problem was how to get him out
in an emergency. The U-2 cockpit was very small, and the early models did not have an ejection seat. Even after an ejection seat was installed, pilots were reluctant to use it because they were afraid they
would lose their legs below the knees when they were blown out of
the cockpit. To save weight, the first pilot's seat was extremely simple
with no height adjustment mechanism. Designed for pilots of
above-average height, the seat could be adjusted for shorter pilots by
inserting wooden blocks beneath the seat to raise it. In later versions
of the aircraft, Kelly Johnson added a fully adjustable seat. 35
The Air Force undertook bailout experiments at high altitudes
from balloons in the autumn of 1955 to determine if the suit designed
for the U-2 pilot would also protect him during his parachute descent
once he was separated from the life-support mechanisms inside the
aircraft. To avoid getting the "bends" during such descents or during
the long flights, pilots had to don their pressure suits and begin
breathing oxygen at least 90 minutes before takeoff so that their bodies would have time to dissipate nitrogen. This procedure was known
as prebreathing. Once the pilots were in their suits, eating and drinking became a major problem, as did urination. The first model of the
pressure suit, used by Lockheed test pilots, made no provision for urination. A subsequent model required the pilot to be catheterized before donning his flying suit. This method of permitting urination
during flight proved very uncomfortable and, by the autumn of 1955,
was replaced with an external bladder arrangement that made the
catheter unnecessary. To reduce elimination, pilots ate a low-bulk,
high-protein diet on the day before and the morning of each mission.

" Lecture by Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Halloran (former Air Force U-2 pilot) at the National
Air & Space Museum, 24 April 1986 (U).

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Pilot undergoing prebreathing

To prevent pilots from becoming dessicated during the long
missions-a condition aggravated by their having to breathe pure
oxygen-provision was made for them to drink sweetened water. This
was accomplished by providing a small self-sealing hole in the face
mask through which the pilot cou ld push a strawlike tube attached to
the water supply. Project personnel also pioneered in the development
of ready-to-eat foods in squeezable containers. These were primarily
bacon- or cheese-flavored mixtures that the pilot could squeeze into
his mouth using the self-sealing hole in the face mask. Despite all
these precautions. U-2 pilots normally lost 3 to 6 pounds of body
weight during an eight-hour mission:"'
Food and water were not the only items provided to pilots on
overflight missions: they also received a suicide pill. During the early
l950s, tales of Soviet secret police torture of captured foreign agents

•• lnforma1ion supplied by fames Cunningham and former U-2 pilots Carmine Vi10.
Hervey Stockman. Jacob Krall. and Gkndon Dunaway 10 Donald E. Wel1.cnbach. May

1986.

•

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66
led Bissell and Cunningham to approach Dr. A lex Batlin of Technical
1
Services Division in the Directorate ,of Plans ) for ideas to help "captured" U-2 pilots avoid such suffering. Battin suggested the method
used by Nazi war criminal Hermarnn Goering, a thin glass ampule
containing liquid potassium cyanide. He said a pilot had only to put
the ampule in his mouth and bite down on the glass; death would follow in 10 to 15 seconds. Project AQUATONE ordered six of the poison ampules, called L-pills, and offered one to each pilot just before a
mission. It was up to each pilot to decide if he wanted to take an
33
L-pill with him. Some did; most did not.

DELIVERY OF THE FIRST U-2
On 25 July. less than eight months after the go-ahead call from Trevor
Gardner, Kelly Johnson was ready to ,deliver the first aircraft, known as
article 341, to the " Paradise Ranch" site. With its long, slender wings
and tail assembly removed, the airc:raft was wrapped in tarpaulins,
loaded aboard a C-124, and flown to Groom Lake, where Lockheed mechanics spent the next six days readyi.ng the craft for its maiden flight.
Before "Kelly's Angel" could actually take to the air, however,
it needed an Air Force designator. Col. Allman T. Culbertson from the
Air Force ·s Office of the Director of Research and Development
pointed this out to Lieutenant Colonel Geary in July 1955, and the
two officers then looked through the aircraft designator handbook to
see what the options were. They decided that they could not call the
project aircraft a bomber, fighter, or transport plane, and they did not
want anyone to know that the new plane was for reconnaissance, so
Geary and Culbertson decided that i t shou ld come under the uti lity
aircraft category. At the time, there were only two utility aircraft on
the books, a U- l and a U-3. Geary told Culbertson that the Lockheed
CL-282 was going to be known officially as the U-2.39

" At the time this Direc1ora1e was known as th,e Deputy Directorate/Plans. with the slash
interpreted to mean eith.:r "for" or "of."· Terminology for the major subdivisions of the
CIA and their directors ha.~ varied over the pa.~t four decades. For the sake of consistency.
all titles of Directorates and Deputy Directors h,1vc bc:c:n placed in the curre nt Agency format: the organization is known a., the "Directorate of
and the head is known as the
··Deputy Di rector for

x:·

x··

" Information supplied by James Cunningham to Donald E. Wdzenbach: Sayre Stevens.
Memorandum for the Record. ·•Discussion with Dr. Alex Batlin Re Project MKNAOMI."'
July 1975 (S).
•• Geary intervic:w (S).
$1)Qf8t

Secret NOFORN
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67

Arrival of U-2 prororype ar Area 51
(left); Article 341, the U-2
prototype (below}

;. ;:;-~

;t~

~~ .

...~.,, •i~;:t~

Johnson had designed the U-2 to use the Pratt & Whitney
(P&W) J57/P-3 I engine. which developed 13,000 pounds of thrust
and weighed 3.820 pounds. giving it a power-to-weight ratio of 3.4: 1.
When the U-2 firs t took to the air. however, these engines were not
available because the entire production was needed to power spedally
configured Canberra RB-57Ds for the Air Force. The first U-2s therefore used P&W 157/P-37 engines, which were 276 pounds heavier
and delivered only 10.200 pounds of thrust at sea level; the resulting
Secret

Sec,el NOFOPIN
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power-to-weight ratio of 2.7: I was almost 20 percent less efficient
than the preferred P-31 version:"
To conduct lengthy missions over hostile territory, the U-2
needed to carry a large amount of fuel. Kelly Johnson used a
'·wet-wing" design for the U-2, which meant that fuel was not stored
in separate fuel tanks but rather in the wing itself. Each wing was divided into two leak-proof compartments, and fuel was pumped into
all the cavities within these areas; only the outer 6 feet of the wings
were not used for fuel storage. The U-2 also had a I 00-gallon reserve
tank in its nose. Later, in 1957, Johnson increased the fuel capacity of
the U-2 by adding 100-gallon "slipper" tanks under each wing, projecting slightly ahead of the leading edge.
One of the most important considerations in the U-2's fuel system was the need to maintain aircraft trim as the fuel was consumed.
The aircraft therefore contained a complex system of feed lines and
valves draining to a central sump, which made it impossible to provide the pilot with an empty/full type of fuel gauge. None of the first
50 U-2s had normal fuel gauges. Instead there were mechanical fuel
totalizer/counters. Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set
the counters to indicate the total amount of fuel in the wings, and then
a flow meter subtracted the gallons of fuel actually consumed during
the flight. The pilot kept a log of the fuel consumption shown by the
counters and compared it with estimates made by mission planners
for each leg of the flight. As a double check. U-2 pilots also kept
track of their fuel consumption by monitoring airspeed and time in
the air. Most pilots became quite expert at this. Several who did not
came up short of their home base during the 20 years these planes
were flown:'

INITIAL TESTING OF THE U-2
Preliminary taxi trials began on 27 July 1955, when the first run down
the newly completed runway took the plane to 50 knots. Lockheed's
chief test pilot, Tony Le Vier, was at the controls. A second taxi trial

"' OSA Hiswry. chap. 8. p. 13 (TS Codeword).
" Information supplied by Norman Nelson. former director of Lockheed's Skunk Works.
10 Donald E. Welzenbach, 14 March 1986 (U): Miller, ltickheed U-2. pp. 77, 96.

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followed on I August. Le Vier accelerated to 70 knots and began to try
the ailerons. ·'It was at this point that I became aware of being airborne.'' LeYier noted afterward. "which left me with utter amazement, as I had no intentions whatsoever of flying. I immediately
started back toward the ground, but had difficulty determining my
height because the lakebed had no markings to judge distance or
height. I made contact with the ground in a left bank of approximately
l 0 degrees." The U-2 bounced back into the air, but Le Vier was able
to bring it back down for a second landing. He then applied the brakes
with little effect, and the aircraft rolled for a long distance before
.
,,
coming to a stop. Bissell, Cunningham. and Johnson saw the aircraft fall and
bounce. Leaping into a jeep, they roared off toward the plane. They
signaled to Le Vier to climb out and then used fire extinguishers to put
out a fire in the brakes. At a debriefing session that followed. LeYier
complained about the poor performance of the brakes and the absence
of markings on the runway. Damage to the prototype U-2 was very
minor: blown tires, a leaking oleostrut on the undercarriage, and damaged brakes. This unplanned flight was but a foretaste of the airworthiness of the U-2. New pilots all had difficulty in getting the U-2's
wheels on the ground because at low speeds it would remain in
ground effect and glide effortlessly above the runway for great distances.
Taxi trials continued for one more day and were followed by the
first planned flight on 4 August 1955. LeVier was again at the controls and had been instructed by Kelly Johnson to land the U-2 by
making initial contact with the main or forward landing gear and letting the plane settle back on the rear wheel. LeVier had disagreed
with this approach. believing that the U-2 would bounce if he tried to
touch down on the forward gear first. After flying the aircraft up to
8,000 feet, Le Vier leveled off and began cycling the landing gear up
and down: then he tested the flaps and the plane's stability and control
systems. Finally. LeYier made his first landing approach. As the U-2
settled down. the forward landing gear touched the runway and the
plane skipped and bounced into the air. Le Vier made a second attempt
to land front wheels first. and again the plane bounded into the air.

'' Transcripts of th.: test pilors· and obs.:rv.:rs· comments on the initial U-2 tt:st flights
have been published in ··secret First Flight of Artide 0OI ... Spyplanes vol. 2. 1988. pp.
64• 7 I. 82-85.

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First flight of the U-2,
4 August 1955

With Kelly Johnson watching from a chase plane and giving a constant stream of instructions, LeYie:r made three more unsuccessful
landing attempts. With the light fading and a thunderstorm fast approaching from the mountains to the west, LeVier made one last approach using the method he had advocated: letting the aircraft touch
on its rear wheel first. This time the U-2 made a near-perfect landing,
which came just in the nick of tim<!. Ten minutes later, the thunderstorm began dumping an unheard-of 2 inches of rain , flooding the dry
1
lakebed and making the airstrip unusable:
Now that the first problems in flying and landing the U-2 had
been worked out, Kelly Johnson scheduled the "official" first flight
for 8 August 1955. This time outsiders were present. includi ng
Richard Bissell. Col. Osmond Ritla1nd, Richard Homer. and Garrison
Norton. The U-2 flew to 32,000 feet and performed very well. Kelly
Johnson had met his eight-month deadline."

•• Ibid.. pp. 21 -22: Johnson, .. Log for Project X." 4 August 1955.
.. Johnson. " Log for Project X," 8 August 1955.

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Le Vier made an additional 19 flights in article 341 before moving on to other Lockheed flight test programs in early September.
This first phase of U-2 testing explored the craft's stall envelope, took
the aircraft to its maximum stress limit (2.5 g's), and explored its
speed potential. LeVier soon flew the aircraft at its maximum speed
of Mach 0.85. Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to altitudes never before attained in sustained flight. On 16 August LeVier
took the aircraft up to 52,000 feet. In preparation for this flight, the
42-year-old test pilot completed the Air Force partial-pressure suit
training program, becoming the oldest pilot to do so. Testing at even
higher altitudes continued, and on 8 September the U-2 reached its
initial design altitude of 65,600 feet. 05
On 22 September 1955, the U-2 experienced its first flameout at
64,000 feet-more than 12 miles up. After a brief restart, the 157/
P-37 engine again flamed out at 60,000 feet, and the aircraft
descended to 35,000 feet before the engine could be relit. Engineers
from Pratt & Whitney immediately set to work on this problem. The
P-37 model engine had significantly poorer combustion characteris_ti~~ than the preferred but unavailable P-31 version and therefore
tended to flame out at high altitudes. Combustion problems usually
became apparent as the U-2 began the final part of its climb from
57,000 to 65,000 feet, causing pilots to refer to this area as the "badlands" or the "chimney." F\ameouts bedeviled the U-2 project until
sufficient numbers of the more powerful P-31 engines became available in the spring of 1956:0
Meanwhile, with the airworthiness of the U-2 airframe proven,
Lockheed set up a production line in the Skunk Works, but delivery of
even the second-choice 157/P-37 engines became a major problem.
Pratt & Whitney's full production capacity for these engines for the
next year was contracted to the Air Force for use in F-100 fighters
and KC-135 tankers. Colonel Geary, with the help of a colleague in
the Air Force Materiel Command, managed to arrange the diversion
of a number of these engines from a shipment destined for Boeing's
KC-135 production line, making it possible to continue building the
U-2s. 47

" OSA Chronology, p. 7 (TS Codeword); Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 22.
"' OSA Hiswry, chap. 8, pp. 12-14 (TS Codeword).
" Geary interview (S ).

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As the deliveries of U-2 airframes to the testing site increased, a
major logistic problem arose: how to transfer Lockheed employees
from Burbank to Area 5 l without arousing a great deal of curiosity.
The project staff decided that the simplest approach would be to fly
the essential personnel to the site on Monday morning and return
them to Burbank on Friday evening. Frequent flights were also necessary to bring in supplies and visitors from contractors and headquarters. Therefore, a regularly scheduled Military Air Transport Service
(MATS) flight using a USAF C-54 aircraft began on 3 October 1955.
James Cunningham promptly dubbed this activity ·•Bissell's
Narrow-Gauge Airline." Less than seven weeks after it started, a
MATS aircraft bound for Area SI crashed on 17 November. killing all
14 persons aboard the plane, including the Project Security Officer,
CIA's William H. Marr, four members of his staff, and personnel from
Lockheed and Hycon. This crash represented the greatest single loss
of life in the entire U-2 program:"

U-2s, UFOs, AND OPERATION BLUE BOOK
High-altitude testing of the U-2 soon led to an unexpected side
effect-a tremendous increase in reports of unidentified flying objects
(UFOs). In the mid- l 950s, most commercial airliners flew at altitudes
between 10,000 and 20,000 feet and military aircraft like the B-47s
and B-57s operated at altitudes below 40,000 feet. Consequently,
once U-2s started flying at altitudes above 60,000 feet, air-traffic controllers began receiving increasing numbers of UFO reports.
Such reports were most prevalent in the early evening hours
from pilots of airliners flying from east to west. When the sun
dropped below the horizon of an airliner flying at 20,000 feet, the
plane was in darkness. But, if a U-2 was airborne in the vicinity of the
airliner at the same time, its horizon from an altitude of 60,000 feet
was considerably more distant, and, being so high in the sky, its silver
wings would catch and reflect the rays of the sun and appear to the
airliner pilot, 40,000 feet below. to be fiery objects. Even during daylight hours, the silver bodies of the high-flying U-2s could catch the
sun and cause reflections or glints that could be seen at lower altitudes and even on the ground. At this time, no one believed manned
flight was possible above 60,000 feet, so no one expected to see an
object so high in the sky.

" OSA Hisrory. chap. 7. pp. 17-19 (TS Co<lcwor<l).

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Not only did the airline pilots report their sightings to air-traffic
controllers, but they and ground-based observers also wrote letters to
the Air Force unit at Wright Air Development Command in Dayton
charged with investigating such phenomena. This, in turn, led to the
Air Force's Operation BLUE BOOK. Based at Wright-Patterson, the
operation collected all reports of UFO sightings. Air Force investigators then attempted to explain such sightings by linking them to natural phenomena. BLUE BOOK investigators regularly called on the
Agency's Project Staff in Washington to check reported UFO sightings against U-2 flight logs. This enabled the investigators to eliminate the majority of the UFO reports, although they could not reveal
to the letter writers the true cause of the UFO sightings. U-2 and later
OXCART flights accounted for more than one-half of all UFO reports
during the late 1950s and most of the I 960s!"

HIRING U-2 PILOTS
In authorizing the U-2 project, President Eisenhower told DC! Dulles
that he wanted the pilots of these planes to be non-US citizens. It was
his belief that, should a U-2 come down in hostile territory. it would
be much easier for the United States to deny any responsibility for the
activity if the pilot was not an American.
The initial effort to find U-2 pilots was assigned to the
Directorate of Plans Air/Maritime Division (AMO). The DDP had exAMO op~e_ra_t~iv-e~---------------~-a~sk~e-d~th,---,at discreet
~ ~ - ~ - - - ~ - - - , - - - - - - - - r = ._

inquiries be made to see if an

high-paying covert project
1

_J

fliers were interested in a

~---~

brought to the United States---.t_o_r...,.tr_a_t_m_n_g_.~r,.;~i-e-an-w~h~1,~e-,~A~N~l~D~h-,r~e~a~a-nlflier residing in England, and he also came to the
United States for training.

In theory the use of foreign pilots seemed quite logical: in practice it did not work out. Th ~ - - - - - - ~ - - - ~ ~ ~ a n d
could only tly light aircraft. Language was also a barrier for the
although several were good fliers. Because Lieutenant
~C_o_l_o_n_e_l Geary \ad taken a class~ ofl
~hrough tlyincr
school at Randolph AFB in 1950, he got the job of training t h e =

" Information suppli.:d by James Cunningham to Donald E. Welzcnbach (U).

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recruits in mid-1955. Geary arranged for an Air Force officer of
I
Jto stay with the group during a preliminary training
program at Lu e Air Force~e plan to use foreign pilots soon
ran into trouble when onlyl _ _ __ _ _ _ ___,pilots passed the
school and reported to Area 5 1. T hey made only a few flights in the
51
U-2, and by the autumn of 1955 they were out of the program. '
Even before the elimination of the I
lit was clear that there
would not be enough trained foreigrn pilots available in time for deployment. Bissell therefore had to start the search for U-2 pilots all
over again. Lt. Gen . Emmett (Rosy) O' Donnell, the Air Force's
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, authorized the use of Air Force
pi lots and provided considerable assistance in the search for pilots
who met the high standards established by the Agency and the Air
Force. The search included only SAC fighter pilots who held reserve
commissions. The use of regular Air Force pilots was not considered
because of the complexities involved in having them resign from the
Air Force, a procedure that was necessary in order to hire them as civilians for the AQUATONE project.
SAC pilots interested in the U-2 project had to be willing to re- ·
sign from the Air Force and assume c ivil ian status-a process known
as sheep-dipping-in order to conduct the overflights. Although Air
Force pilots were attracted by the challenge of flying U-2s over hostile territory, they were re luctant to leave the service and give up their
seniority. To overcome pilots' reluctance, the Agency offered handsome salaries, and the Air Force promised each pilot that, upon satisfactory conclusion of his employment with the Agency. he could
return to his unit. In the meantime, he would be considered for promotion along with his contemporari,es who had continued their Air
Force careers.~'
The selection process for Agenc:y U-2 pilots was very rigorous.
Because of the strain involved in flying at extreme altitudes for long
periods of time, painstaking efforts were made to exclude all pilots
who might be nervous or unstable in any way. The physical and psy. chological screening of potential U--2 pilots was conducted by the
Lovelace Foundation for Medical Education and Research in
Albuquerque, New Mexico, under a contract signed with the CIA on

'' OSA History, chap. 10. pp. 1-10 (TS Codeword): Geary interview (S).
' ' OS..\ History. chap. 10. pp. 5-6 (TS Codeword) ; Geary interview (S); Francis Gary
Powers with Curt Gentry. Openuion Overflight (New York: Holt. Rinehart. and Wilson.
1970). pp. 25-27.

~eeret NOFOAPJ
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28 November 1955. The CIA's insistence on more stringent physical
and mental examinations than those used by the Air Force to select
pilots for its U-2 fleet resulted in a higher rejection rate of candidates.
The Agency's selection criteria remained high throughout its manned
overflight program and resulted in a much lower accident rate for
CIA U-2 pilots than for their counterparts in the Air Force program. 51

PILOT TRAINING
Even before the recruiting effort got under way, the Air Force and
CIA began to develop a pilot training program. Under the terms of the
OILSTONE agreement between the Agency and the Air Force, responsibility for pilot training lay with SAC. This essential activity
was carried out under the supervision of Col. William F. Yancey. who
was assigned to March AFB and flew to nearby Area 51 each day.
Colonel Yancey was in charge of six SAC pilots who were to be
trained by Lockheed test pilots to fly the U-2. Once they became
qualified, these SAC pilots would become the trainers for the
··_sheep-dipped" former Reserve SAC pilots. who would fly U-2 missions for the CIA.
•
The original U-2 test pilot. Tony Le Vier, trained several other
Lockheed test pilots in the difficult art of flying the U-2. Eventually
there were enough trained Lockheed pilots available to test the aircraft coming off the assembly line and also train the SAC pilots.
Training was difficult because there was no two-seat model of the
U-2. All instruction had to be given on the ground before takeoff and
then over the radio once the craft was airborne. Almost 15 years
elapsed before a two-seat U-2 was available for training new pilots.
Despite the difficulties involved in training U-2 pilots. Colonel
Yancey had a cadre of six qualified Air Force U-2 pilots by
September 1955. These six were now ready to train the Agency's pilots. 51
Training pilots was not easy because the U-2 was a mixture of
glider and jet. Although those chosen for the overflight program were
all qualified fighter pilots, they now had to learn to fly the delicate
U-2. Its large wings had tremendous lift but were also very fragile

" OSA History, chap. 10. pp. 5-6: chap. 5. p. 18 (TS Codeword).
" OSA History. ch,1p. 11. pp. 1-7 (TS Codeword).

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and could not survive the stresses of loops and barrel rolls. Moreover,
the original U-2s were placarded, which meant that they could not be
flown at sea level faster than 190 knots in smooth air or 150 knots in
rough air. At operational altitude, where the air was much less dense,
they could not exceed Mach 0.8 (394 knots). Speeds in excess of
these limits could cause the wings or tail section to fall off.
Airspeed was a very critical factor for the U-2. At maximum altitude only 6 knots separated the speeds at which low-speed stall and
high-speed buffet occurred. Pilots called this narrow range of acceptable airspeeds at maximum altitude the .. coffin corner" because at
this point the U-2 was always on the brink of falling out of the sky. If
the aircraft slowed beyond the low-speed stall limit, it would lose lift
and begin to fall, causing stresses that would tear the wings and tail
off. A little too much speed would lead to buffeting, which would
also cause the loss of the wings or tail. Flying conditions such as
these required a U-2 pilot's full attention when he was not using the
autopilot. Airspeed was such a critical factor that Kelly Johnson
added a vernier adjustment to the throttle to allow the pilot to make
minute alterations to the fuel supply. 50
Among the unique devices developed for the U-2 was a small
sextant for making celestial .. fixes" during the long overflights.
Because cloud cover often prevented U-2 pilots from locating navigational points on the earth through the periscope, the sextant turned out
to be the pilots' principal navigational instrument during the first
three years of deployment. When clouds were not a factor, however.
the periscope proved highly accurate for navigation. During the final
tests before the aircraft became operational. U-2 pilots found they
could navigate by dead reckoning with an error of less than I nautical
mile over a 1.000-nm course. 5'

FINAL TESTS OF THE U-2
Flight-testing of the U-2 continued throughout the fall and winter of
1955-56 in order to test all the various systems. By mid-January
1956. SAC officials were so impressed that they also wanted to purchase a fleet of these planes. On 30 January. DCI Dulles agreed to
" Cunningham int.:rview (TS Codeword): John Parangosky. intt:rview by Donald E.
Wdzenhach. tape recording. 6 March 1986 (S): information supplied by James
Ch..:rbonneaux to Donald E. Wdzenhach (S).
" Cunningham interview (TS Codeword).

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A-2 camera being installed
in U-2

have CIA ace as executive agent for this transaction, which the A ir
Force called Project DRAGON LADY. To maintain secrecy, the Air
Force transferred funds to the CIA, which then placed an order with
Lockheed for 29 U-2s in configurations to be determined by the Air
Force. The Air Force later bought two more U-2s, for a total of 31 .
The aircraft purchased for the Air Force were known as the
Follow-On Group, which was soon shortened to FOG.56
Once enough pilots had been trained, Project AQUATONE managers concentrated on checking out the complete U-2 system: planes,
pilots, navigation systems, life-support systems, and cameras. From
10 through 14 April 1956, U-2s equipped with A-2 cameras took off
from Area 5 1 and made eight overflights of the United States in order
to test the various flight and camera systems as part of the standard
Air Force Operational Readiness Inspection. Colonel Yancey and his
detachment served as observers during this weeklong exercise.

•· OSA Historv. chap. 5. pp. '.!5-26 (TS Code.word).

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U-2 detachment in formation
over Nevada

Colonel Yancey's group carefully examined all aspects of the
U-2 unit from flight crews to camera technicians and mission programmers. When the exercise was over, Yancey reported that the detachment was ready for deployment. He then briefed a high-level
Pentagon panel that included the Secretary of the Air Force and the
Chief of Air Staff. These officials concurred with Yancey's detem1i57
nation that the U-2 was ready for deployment.
During these final tests in the spring of 1956, the U-2 once again
demonstrated its unique airworthiiness. On 14 April 1956, James
Cunningham was sitting in his office in Washington when he received
a call from Area 51 informing him that a westward-bound U-2 had
experienced a flameout over the Mississippi River at the western border of Tennessee. After restarting his engine, the pilot reported a second flameout and engine vibrations so violent that he was unable to
get the power plant to start again. Early in the program Bissell and
Ritland had foreseen such an emergency and, with the cooperation of
the Air Force, had arranged for sealled orders to be delivered to every
airbase in the continental United States giving instructions about what
to do if a U-2 needed to make an e:mergency landing.
Cunningham had the project office ask the pilot how far he could
glide so they could determine which SAC base should be alerted. The
pilot, who by this time was over Arkansas. radioed back that, given
the prevailing winds and the U-2·s 21:1 glide ratio, he thought he
could reach Albuquerque. New Mexico. Within minutes Cunningham
was on the phone to Colonel Geary in the Pentagon, who then had the
Air Force's Assistant Director of Operations. Brig. Gen. Ralph E.

" Bbscll imcrvicw (S); OSA flisrory. chap. 11. pp. 15-16 (TS Codeword).

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Koon, call the commander of Kirtland AFB near Albuquerque.
General Koon told the base commander about the sealed orders and
explained that an unusual aircraft would make a deadstick landing at
Kirtland within the next half hour. The general then instructed the
base commander to have air police keep everyone away from the craft
and get it inside a hanger as quickly as possible.
After a half hour passed, the base commander called the
Pentagon to ask where the crippled aircraft was. As he was speaking,
the officer saw the U-2 touch down on the runway and remarked,
"It's not a plane, it's a glider!" Even more surprised were the air police who surrounded the craft when it came to a halt. As the pilot
climbed from the cockpit in his "space" suit, one air policeman remarked that the pilot looked like a man from Mars. The pilot, Jacob
Kratt, later reported to Cunningham that, from the beginning of the
first flameout until the landing at Albuquerque, the U-2 had covered
over 900 miles, including more than 300 by gliding. 58
Aside from this extraordinary gliding ability, however, the U-2
was a very difficult aircraft to fly. Its very light weight, which enabled
it to achieve extreme altitude, also made it very fragile. The aircraft
-was also very sleek, and it sliced through the air with little drag. This
feature was dangerous, however, because the U-2 was not built to
withstand the G-forces of high speed. Pilots had to be extremely careful to keep the craft in a slightly nose-up attitude when flying at
operational altitude. If the nose dropped only a degree or two into the
nose-down position, the plane would gain speed at a dramatic rate,
exceeding the placarded speed limit in less than a minute, at which
point the aircraft would begin to come apart. Pilots, therefore, had to
pay close attention to the aircraft's speed indicator because at 65,000
feet there was no physical sensation of speed, without objects close at
hand for the eye to use as a reference. 59

THREE FATAL CRASHES IN 1956
The first fatality directly connected with flying the U-2 occurred on
15 May 1956, when test pilot Wilburn S. Rose, flying article 345A,
had trouble dropping his pogos, the outrigger wheels that keep the

,. Bissell interview (S); Cunningham interview (TS Codeword); Brig. Gen. Leo A. Geary,
interview by Gregory W. Pedlow, Colorado Springs, Colorado, 12 October 1988 (S).
'" James Cherbonneaux, Carmine Vito, and Hervey Stockman (former U-2 pilots), interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, Washington, DC, May 1986 (S).

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wings parallel to the ground duriing takeoff. Once airborne, Rose
made a low-level pass over the airstrip and shook loose the lefthand
pogo. When he attempted to make a righthand turn to come back over
the runway to shake loose the remaining pogo. Rose stalled the U-2
and it plunged to earth, disintegratiing over a wide area. Three months
later. on 3 1 August 1956, a second fa tal crash occurred during a
night-flying exercise. Frank G. Grace stalled article 354 at an altitude
of about 50 feet when he tried to climb too steeply at takeoff. The
craft fell , cartwheeled on its left wing. and struck a power pole near
the runway. More experienced U-2 pilots always cut back abruptly on
the throttle as soon as the pogo sticks fell away in order to avoid such
stal Is.
Before the year was out, two more U-2s were destroyed in
crashes. one of them fatal. On 17 September 1956, article 346 lost
part of its right wing while on its takeoff ascent from Lindsey Air
Force Base in Wiesbaden, Germany. The aircraft disintegrated in midair. killing pilot Howard Carey. T he loss of article 357 on l 9
December 1956 resulted from pilot hypoxia. A small leak prematurdy depleted the oxygen supply and impaired Robert J. Ericson's
judgment as he flew over Arizona. Because o f his inability to act
quickly and keep track of his aircraft's speed. the U-2 exceeded the
placarded speed of 190 knots and literall y disintegrated when it
reached 270 knots. Ericson managed to jettison the canopy and was
sucked out of the aircraft at 28,0001 feet. His chute opened automatically at 15,000 feet, and he landed without injury. The aircraft was a
total loss."''

COORDINATION OF COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
From the very beginning o f the U-2 program. it was apparent that
some sort of an interagency task force or office would be needed to
develop and coordinate collection requirements for the covert overhead reconnaissance effort. In a 1three-page memorandum to DCI
Dulles on 5 November 1954 setting forth the ideas of the
Technological Capabilities Panel's Project 3 on this subject. Edwin
L and wrote:
It is recommended that . .. a permanent task force. including Air

Force supporting elements. he set up under suitable cover to
provide guidance on procurement, to consolidate requirements

· • U-2 Acci<l.:nt R.:port~. folders -1. 10. and 1-1. OSA records. job 67 -8--115. box I (S).

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and plan missions in view of priority and feasibility, to maintain
the operation on a continuing basis, and to carry out the dissemination of rhe resulting information in a manner consistent with
its special security requirementsY
When the U-2's deve lopment and testing approached completion, Land's recommendation was put into effect. Following a mt!eting with Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles and Trevor
Gardner (who had been promoted from his special assistant post co
become Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and
Development), Richard Bissell establ ished an Ad Hoc Requirements
Committee (ARC) on I December 1955. He then named James Q.
Reber to be Intelligence Requ irements Officer for the U-2 project and
chairman of the ARC. Reber was already experienced in coordination
with other intelligence agencies, for he had headed the Directorate of
Intelligence DI Office of Intelligence Coordination for four years.
The first full-scale ARC meeting took place on I February 1956 with
representatives from the Army, Navy, and Air Force present.
Attending for the CIA were representatives from the Office of
Research and Reports (ORR) and the Office of Scienti fic Intell igence
. (QS I). The CIA membership later expanded to include the Office of
Current Intell igence (OCI) and a representative from the Directorate
of Plans. In 1957 the National Security Agency (NSA) also began
sending a representative. The State Department followed suit in 1960.
although it had been receiving reports from the committee all along.'~
A RC's main task was to draw up lists of collection requirements.
primarily for the U-2. but also for other means of collection. These
lists prioritized targets accordi ng to their ability to meet the three major national intelligence objectives concerning the Soviet Union in the
mid- 1950s: long-range bombers, guided missiles, and nuclear energy.
The committee issued its l ist of cargets for the use of the entire intelligence community using all available means of collection, not j ust for
63
the CIA with the U-2.

" OSA History. chap. I. annex I (TS Codeword).

' ' Minu1es of lh<! Ad Hoc Rcquiremc:n1s Commiuc:e of I February 1956. lmclligence
Communi1y (IC) Staff records. COMIREX. job 33 -B -1 21 A. boll I. "ARC Minu1cs.
1956-1957:'" Memorandum for the Joim Study Group from James Q. Reber. "Handling of
Requirements for the U-2:· 15 August 1960. IC Staff records. job 33-T-123A. box 10.
"CHALICE (GeneralJ" (TS Codeword>.
" t,,lemorandum for lhc Joint S1udy Group from James Q. Rc:bcr. "Handling of
Requirements for 1he U-2:· 15 August 1960. IC Staff records. job 33-T-123A. box I 0.
" CHALICE (Gen.:rall" (TS Cod.:worJ>.

James 0. Reber

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ARC gave the top priority target list to the Project Director, and
tlie project staff's operations section then used the list to plarn the
tlightpachs for U-2 missions. Although the requirements committee
was not responsible for developing fl ight plans. it assisted the planners with detailed target information as required. When a flight plan
was ready for submission to the President for approval, the committee
drew up a decailed justi fication for the selection of the targets. This
paper accompanied the flight plan.(J
[n developing and pnontIz1ng lists of targets, the committee
members had to take into account the varying needs and interesIts of
their parent organizations. Thus, the CIA representatives generally
emphasized strategic intelligence: ai rcraft and munitions factories,
power-generating complexes. nuclear establishments. roads. bridlges.
inland waterways. In contrast, the military services usually plac,ed a
heavier emphasis on order-of-baule data. The Air Force. in panicular.
had a strong interest in gathering intelligence on the location of
Soviet and East European airfields and radars.
Arthur C. Lundahl

A lthough the committee members kept the interests of their services or agencies in mind. their awareness of the vital nature of their
mission kept the level of cooperation high. The group always attempted
to reach a consensus before issuing its recommendations, although occasionally this was not possible and one or more agencies would add a
5
dissent to the recommendation o f the committee as a whole."

PREPARATIONS TO HANDLE THE
PRODUCT OF U-2 MISSIONS
On 13 December 1954, DCI Allen Dulles and his assistant. Richard
Bissell, briefed Arthur C. Lundahl. the chief of CIA's PhotoIntelligence Division (PID), on Project AQU ATONE. At !DC[
Dulles's direction, Lundahl immediately set in motion within his division a compartmented effort, known as Project EQUINE, to plan for
the exploication of overhead photography from the U-2 project. With
only 13 members, the PID staff was too small co handle the expe,cted

~

lbi<l.: Jam.:s Q. Reber. interview by Donald E. Wd·l enbach and Gregory W. Pedlow.
Wash ington, DC. 21 May 1987 (S).

"' Reber interview (Sl.

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The Steuart Building, home
of the Photo-lntelligel"lce
Division

flood of photographs that the U-2 would bring back. so in May 1955
. t~~ Directorate of Support (DS) authorized expanding PID to 44 persons. Soon afterward the division moved from its room in M Building
to larger quarters in Que Building.
The Photo-[ntelligence Division continued to expand in anticipation of large quantities of U-2 photography. lts authorized strength
doubled in January 1956 when a new project known as
HTAUTOMAT came into existence to exploit U -2 photography. All of
the products from this project would be placed in the new control system. By the summer of 1956, the PlD had moved to larger quarters in
the Steuart Building at 5th Street and New York Avenue, NW. PID
photointerpreters had already begun to work with U-2 photography
following a series of missions in April 1956. when U-2s photographed a number of US installations that. were considered analogous
to high-priority Soviet installations. As a result of these preparations,
PrD was ready for the mass of photography that began coming when
U-2 operations commenced in the summer of 1956.""

~

For a more detailed history of photointerpretation in the CIA. sec Urban J. Lim:han. The
National Photographic lmerpretation Center. vol. I . Antecedents anti Early Years.
Directorate of Science and Technology Historical Sc:ries NPIC-2. December 1972. pp.
171 -19~ (S).

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84

•
Project GENETRIX balloon
launch

•'

'

it-

THE IMPACT OF THE AIR FOR:CE PROJECT
GENETRIX BALLOONS
W hile the Agency was mak ing its f i nal preparations for U -2 overfli ghts. the Air Force started a reconnaissance proj ect that would
cause considerable protest around the world and threaten the existence o f the U-2 overfl ight program before it even began. Project
GENETRI X involved the use of camera-carrying balloons to obtain
high-altitude photography of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union. and
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the People's Republic of China. This project had its ongms 10 a
RAND Corporation study from 1951. By the end of I 955, the Air
Force had overcome a number of technical problems in camera design
and recovery techniques and had manufactured a large number of balloons for use in the project. President Eisenhower gave his approval
on 27 December 1955, and two weeks later the launches from bases
in Western Europe began. By the end of February 1956, the Air Force
had launched a total of 516 balloons. 67
Project GENETRIX was much less successful than its sponsors
had hoped. Once launched, the balloons were at the mercy of the prevailing winds, and many tended to drift toward southern Europe and
then across the Black Sea and the desert areas of China. These balloons therefore missed the prime target areas, which lay in the higher
latitudes. Large numbers of balloons did not succeed in crossing the
Soviet Union and China, some because they were shot down by hostile aircraft, others because they prematurely expended their ballast
supplies and descended too soon. Only 46 payloads were eventually
recovered (one more than a year later and the last not until 1958)
from the 5 16 balloons that had been launched. In four of these payJoads the camera had malfunctioned, and in another eight _the photography was of no intelligence value. Thus, only 34 balloons succeeded
in obtaining useful photographs.""
The low success rate of the Project GENETRIX balloons was not
the only problem encountered; far more serious was the storm of protest and unfavorable publicity that the balloon overflights provoked.
Although the Air Force had issued a cover story that the balloons
were being used for weather research connected with the International
Geophysical Year, East European nations protested strongly to the
United States and to international aviation authorities, claiming that
the balloons endangered civilian aircraft. The Soviet Union sent
strongly worded protest notes to the United States and the nations
from which the balloons had been launched. The Soviets also collected numerous polyethelene gasbags, camera payloads, and transmitters from GENETRIX balloons and put them on display in
Moscow for the world press. ~9

., P. G. Strong, Attachment to Memorandum for DCI Dulles. "Project GENETRIX
Summary." 15 February 1956 (S).
"' Final Report. Project I 19L. 1st Air Division (Meteorological Survey) Strategic Air
Command. 5 Mar~·h 1956. D-582, Genernl Summary (S. declassitic:d 1979).

"'' New Yr,rk Times, IO February 1956. p. I: Omaha World Herald, 11 February I 956, p. I.

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Photograph of Dodonovo Atomic
Energy complex taken by a
Project GENETRIX balloon

All of this publicity and protest led President Eisenhower to conclude that ··the balloons gave more legiti mate grounds for irritation
than could be matched by the good obtained from them," and h,e ordered the project halted. On 7 February 1956 Secretary of State
Dulles in formed the Soviet Union that no more "weather research"
balloons would be released. but he did not offer an apology for the
. hts. ;n
over ft ,g
Despite the furor caused by GENETRIX. Air Force Chief of
Staff Twining proposed yet another balloon project only fi ve weeks
later, in mid-March 1956. This project would employ even higher flying balloons than GENETRIX and would be ready in 18 rnoinths.
President Eisenhower informed the Air Force. however, that he was
··not interested in any more balloons.·· 1 '

'" Andrew J. Goo<lpastcr. Memorandum for th.: R.:i:ord. •• 10 Fcbrnary 1956 Confonmcc of
Joint Chids of Scaff with thc President... WHOSS. Alpha. DDEL (TS. dcclassiticd 1980):
St.:phcn E. Ambrose. Eiserzhmn:r. The Pri:sid,:111 vol. 2 (Ncw York: Simon and Schuster.
1984). p. J 10.
" Q uoted in Ambrose:, £isenltm,·a: Tiu: Pri:sidi:111. p. J 10.

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Although the photo intelligence gained from Project GENETRIX
was limited in quantity, it was still some of the best and most complete photography obtained of the Soviet Union since World War IL It
was referred to as "pioneer" photography because it provided a baseline for all future overhead photography. Even innocuous photos of
such things as forests and streams proved valuable in later years when
U-2 and satellite photography revealed construction activity.
Of still greater importance to the U-2 program, however, was the
data that US and NATO radars obtained as they tracked the paths of
the balloons-whose average altitude was 45,800 feet-over the
Soviet Bloc. This data provided the most accurate record to date of
high-altitude wind currents, knowledge that meteorologists were later
able to put to use to determine optimum flightpaths for U-2 flights.
One completely fortuitous development from Project
GENETRIX had nothing to do with the cameras but involved a steel
bar. This bar served a dual purpose: the rigging of the huge polyethylene gasbag was secured to the top of the bar and the camera-payload
_and automatic-ballasting equipment was attached to the bottom. By
sheer chance, the length of the bar-91 centimeters-corresponded to
the wavelength of the radio frequency used by a Soviet radar known
by its NATO designator as TOKEN. This was an S-band radar used
by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled intercept.
The bar on the GENETRIX balloons resonated when struck by
TOKEN radar pulses, making it possible for radar operators at US
and NATO installations on the periphery of the Soviet Union to locate
a number of previously unknown TOKEN radars.
These radar findings, coupled with other intercepts made during
the balloon flights, provided extensive data on Warsaw Pact radar networks, radar sets, and ground-controlled interception techniques.
Analysis of these intercepts revealed the altitude capabilities and
tracking accuracy of radars, the methods used by Warsaw Pact nations
to notify each other of the balloons' passage (handing off), and the
altitudes at which Soviet aircraft could intercept the balloons. All of
this information could be directly applied to future U-2 missions.'~

'' Final Report. Project l 19L, 1st Air Division (Meteorological Survey) Strategic Air
Command. 5 March 1956. D-582, General Summary (TS, declassified 1979).

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These positive results from Project GENETRIX did not outweigh
the political liabilities of the international protesLS. CIA officials became concerned that the ill will generated by balloon overflights could
sour the Eisenhower administration on all overflights. including those
by the U-2. which was just about ready for deployment. Therefore.
DDCI Cabell wrote to Air Force Chief of Staff Twining in February
1956 to warn against further balloon flights because of the ..additional
political pressures being generated against all balloon operations and
overflights. thus increasing the di ffi.culties of policy decisions which
73
would permit such operations in the: future."
In addition to its concern for tlhe future of the U-2 program. the
Agency feared that President Eisenhower's anger at balloon overflights might result in the curtailment of the balloon program that the
Free Europe Committee-a covert Agency operation based in West
Germany-used to release propaganda pamphlets over Eastern
Europe.

AQUATONE BRIEFINGS FOR :SELECTED
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Although know ledge of the U-2 project was a closely guarded secret within both the Agency and the Eisenhower administration,
DCI Dulles decided that a few key members of Congress should be
told about the project. On 24 February 1956. Dulles met with
Senators Leverett Saltonstall and Richard B. Russell , the ranking
members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and its subcommittee on the CIA. He shared with them the details of Project
AQUATONE and then asked their opinion on whether some members of the House of Representati ves should also be in formed. As a
resu lt of the senators' recornmendllttion that the senior members of
the House Appropriations Committee shou ld be briefed, Dul les later
met with its ranking members, Representatives John Taber and
Clarence Cannon. Official Congress.ional knowledge of the U-2 project remained confined to this small group for the next four years.
The House Armed Services Committee and its CIA subcomrninee
did not recei\·e a CIA briefing on the U-2 project until after the loss
7
of Francis Gary Powers's U-2 over the Sov iet Union in May 1960. "
" Philip G. Strong. Attachment 10 Mcmoran<l um for DCI Dulks...Projcct GENETRIX
Summary." 15 Fcbruary 1956. OSI records (S)1.
" John S. Warn.:r. Lcgislativc Counsel. McrnoranJum for the Rccord ...AQUATONE
Bri.:tings:· 18 Novc:mbc:r 1957. Office of C,ongressional Affairs rci:onJs. job 61-357.
box 2 (S): Wam.:r interview (S).

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THE U-2 COVER STORY
In February 1956, while the controversy over balloon flights was still
raging and the U-2 was completing its final airworthiness tests,
Richard Bissell and his staff began working on a cover story for overseas operations. It was important to have a plausible reason for deploying such an unusual looking plane, whose glider wings and odd
landing gear were certain to arouse curiosity.
Bissell decided that the best cover for the deployment of the U-2
was an ostensible mission of high-altitude weather research by the
National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA). Such a cover
story, however, needed the approval of all concerned: Air Force intelligence, the Air Weather Service, the Third Air Force, the Seventh Air
Division, the SAC U-2 project officer, the Air Force Headquarters
project officer, and NACA's top official, Dr. Hugh Dryden. Moreover,
the CIA Scientific Advisory Committee was also consulted about the
cover plan.
Senior CIA officials and the other agencies involved in provid• ing cover for the U-2 approved the final version of the overall cover
story at the end of March 1956. The project staff then began working
on contingency plans for the loss of a U-2 over hostile territory.
Bissell advised the project's cover officer to "produce a document
which sets forth all actions to be taken ... not only press releases and
the public Line to be taken, but also the suspension of operations and
at least an indication of the diplomatic action.... We should at least
make the attempt in this case to be prepared for the worst in a really
orderly fashion." The cover officer then prepared emergency procedures based on the overall weather research cover story, and Bissell
approved these plans. There was one final high-level look at the cover
story on 21 June 1956, the day after the first U-2 mission over Eastern
Europe, when Bissell met with General Goodpaster, James Killian,
and Edwin Land to discuss the pending overflights of the Soviet
Union, including the proposed emergency procedures. Killian and
Land disagreed with Bissell's concept and made a much bolder and
more forthright proposal: in the event of the loss of a U-2 over hostile
territory, the United States should not try to deny responsibility but
should state that overflights were being conducted "to guard against
surprise attack." This proposal was put aside for further thought
(which it never received), and Bissell 's weather research cover remained the basis for statements to be made after a loss. The project
staff then went on to prepare a number of different statements to be

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used in various scenarios, including one in which the pilot was captured. Even in such a case, however, the proposed policy was for the
United States to stick to the weather research cover story, a course of
action that would prove disastrous in May 1960. 75

" OSA History, chap. 8, pp. 30-35; chap. 11, annex 73 (TS Codeword).

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QI C0V\L

.~ 7~­

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U-2 Operations in the
Soviet Bloc and Middle East,
1956-1968

By January 1956, everyone working on Project AQUATONE could
see that the U-2 was nearing the time for operational deployment.
During tests the aircraft had met all the criteria established in late
I954. Its range of 2,950 miles was sufficient to overfly continents, its
altitude of 72,000 feet was beyond the reach of all known antiaircraft
weapons and interceptor aircraft, and its camera lenses were the finest
available.
Because the main targets for the U-2 lay behind the Iron Curtain.
Bissell and his staff began looking for operational bases in Europe.
The United Kingdom, America's closest ally, seemed the logical
choice for U-2 bases, and, on 10 January 1956, Bissell flew to
London to discuss the maner with Royal Air Force (RAF) and MI-6
officials. Their initial response was favorable, but they told Bissell
that the proposal needed approval at a much higher level.
Bissell reported his findings to DCI Dulles, who promptly arranged to meet with Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd in Londcin to
explore the possibility of winning the British Government's approval
for the project. Dulles presented his case to Lloyd on 2 February, and,
by early March. Prime Minister Anthony Eden approved the basing of
U-2s in the United Kingdom. The U-2s were to use Lakenheath AFB,
an RAF base also used by the USAF Strategic Air Command (SAC).'

' OSA History. chap. 11. pp. 10-15 (TS Codeword).

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THE DEPLOYMENT OF DETACHMENT A
TO LAKENHEATH
The first Agency U-2 detachment, consisting of four aircraft and
pilots, was known publicly as the 1st Weather Reconnaissance
Squadron, Provisional (WRSP-1). The "provisional" designation
gave the U-2 detachments greater security because provisional Air
Force units did not have to report to higher headquarters. WRSP-1,
known within the Agency as Detachment A, began deploying to the
United Kingdom on 29 April 1956. By 4 May, all of the detachment's
personnel and equipment, including four aircraft, had arrived at
Lakenheath. !
Shortly after deployment, on 7 May, the National Advisory
Committee on Aeronautics (NACA) released an unclassified U-2
cover story stating that a Lockheed-developed aircraft would be flown
by the USAF Air Weather Service to study such high-altitude phenomena as the jet stream, convective clouds, temperature and wind structures at jet-stream levels, and cosmic-ray effects up to 55,000 feet. 3
Before overflights could begin from Lakenheath, however, several incidents occurred that dampened Prime Minister Eden ·s interest
in having the U-2s on British territory. In mid-April 1956, a Soviet
naval squadron brought Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai
Bulganin on an official visit to the United Kingdom. Although the
ships were docked in Portsmouth Harbor, a British counterintelligence operative and underwater expert, retired Royal Navy
Commander Lionel Crabb, apparently undertook a mission to examine the hulls of these vessels but vanished in the process. His headless
body was later found washed up on a beach. This so-called Frogman
Incident caused an uproar in Parliament and a protest from Moscow
that soured relations between the United Kingdom and the Soviet
Union. To avoid further deterioration of Anglo-Soviet relations, the
Prime Minister wrote to President Eisenhower on 16 May asking that
overflights be postponed. Only two days later, a U-2 on a training
flight from Lakenheath inadvertently penetrated the British radar network, causing RAF fighters to scramble. Afterward the Air Ministry
made a public announcement that a special NACA aircraft was conducting high-altitude research in the United Kingdom. At about the
' Ibid.. pp. 17-18 (TS Codeword).
' Press Release of 7 May 1956 (U) in OSA History. chap. 7. annex 60 (TS Codeword).

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same time, Richard Bissell learned that the State Department had told
Prime Minister Eden that only one U-2 was based at Lakenheath,
when in reality there were four.'

THE MOVE TO WIESBADEN
To avoid arousing further reaction in the United Kingdom and to
begin the program of U-2 overflights beyond the Iron Curtain without
further delay, Bissell moved Detachment A on 11 June I 956 to
Wiesbaden, one of the busiest airfields in West Germany, without
notifying West German authorities. The detachment commander, Col.
Frederick McCoy, was disappointed in his hope that the redeployment
of the U-2s could be accomplished without drawing undue attention.
The strange-looking planes, with bicycle-type wheels and wings so
long they touched the ground after landing, aroused considerable interest. Wiesbaden was to be only a temporary home for Detachment
A; the Air Force began preparing Giebelstadt near the East German
border for use by the U-2s. Giebelstadt was an old World War II
airbase that had been one of the launching sites for the GENETRIX
balloons. 5
Soon after the four U-2s arrived in Wiesbaden, they were refitted
with the more powerful J57/P-3 l engines. The new engines were better suited for operations behind the Iron Curtain because they were
less likely to suffer flameouts than the earlier model. Once the new
engines were installed, the aircraft received the designation U-2B. 6
Bissell was anxious to get the overflights started by late June
because SAC weather experts had predicted that the best weather for
photographing the Soviet Union would be between 20 June and 10
July. Bissell, however, had not yet received final authorization from
President Eisenhower to begin overflights of the Soviet Union. On 28
May 1956, when DCI Allen Dulles met with the President to discuss
the U-2's readiness for operations, Eisenhower still made no decision
on overflights. Three days later Dulles and Air Force Chief of Staff
' Christopher Andrew, Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Making of the British
Intelligence Community (New York. 1986). pp. 495-496; Beschloss, Mayday, p. I 16; OSA
History, chap. 11, pp. 18-21 (TS Codeword).
' OSA History, chap. 11, pp. 21-23 (TS Codeword).

• Ibid .. pp. 23, 26 (TS Codeword).

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Nathan Twining prepared a paper for the President outlining
"AQUATONE Operational Plans." In the meantime, President
Eisenhower had entered Walter Reed Hospital for tests for an abdominal ailment that turned out to be ileitis, requiring an operation. During
his recovery from surgery, Eisenhower would make his final decision
on the overflight program. 7

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S ATTITUDE
TOWARD OVERFLIGHTS
The President had mixed feelings about overflights of the Soviet
Union. Aware that they could provide extremely valuable intelligence
about Soviet capabilities, he, nevertheless, remained deeply concerned that such flights brought with them the risk of starting a war.
From the very beginning of the U-2 program, President Eisenhower
had worked to minimize the possibility that overflights could lead to
hostilities. He had always insisted that overflights by military aircraft
were too provocative, and in 1954 he had therefore supported the
Land committee's proposal for an unarmed civilian aircraft instead of
the military reconnaissance planes favored by the Air Force. For the
same reason, Eisenhower had resisted attempts by the Air Force to
take the U-2 program away from the CIA in 1955.
In fact, the President's desire to avoid secret reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union, with all their risks, led him to make his
famous "Open Skies" proposal in the summer of 1955, when the U-2
was still under development but making good progress. At the
Geneva summit conference on 21 July 1955, President Eisenhower
offered to provide airfields and other facilities in the United States for
the Soviet Union to conduct aerial photography of all US military installations if the Soviet Union would provide the United States with
similar facilities in Russia. Not surprisingly, Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev almost immediately rejected Eisenhower's offer.
Although the President had hoped that the Soviet Union would accept
his proposal. he was prepared for rejection. While Open Skies was
still being considered, Eisenhower had stated, 'Tl\ give it one shot.
Then if they don't accept it, we'll fly the U-2."x
' Ibid., pp. 23-25 and anne:( 73. "AQUATONE Operational Plans,.. 31 May 1956 (TS
Codeword).
·' Quoted in Beschloss. Mayday, p. 105.

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Even though President Eisenhower had approved every stage of
the U-2's development, knowing full well that the aircraft was being
built to fly over the Soviet Union, the actual decision to authorize
such flights was very difficult for him. He remained concerned that
overflights could poison relations with the Soviet Union and might
even lead to hostilities. One argument that helped overcome the
President's reluctance was the CIA's longstanding contention that U-2
flights might actually go undetected because Soviet radars would not
be able to track aircraft at such high altitudes. This belief was based
on a 1952 study of Soviet World War II-vintage radars and on 1955
tests using US radars, which-unknown to US officials-were not as
effective as Soviet radars against high-altitude targets. Shortly before
U-2 operations began, however, the CIA's Office of Scientific
Intelligence (OSI) conducted a vulnerability study of the U-2 that was
published on 28 May 1956. The study's conclusion was that "Maximum Soviet radar detection ranges against the Project aircraft at elevation in excess of 55,000 feet would vary from 20 to 150 miles....
In our opinion, detection can therefore be assumed." The OSI study
added, however, "It is doubtful that the Soviets can achieve consis. tent tracking of the Project vehicle." 9 Completed just thr~e weeks before the initation of overflights, this study seems to have had little
impact on the thinking of the top project officials. They continued to
believe that the Soviets would not be able to track the U-2 and might
even fail to detect it, except for possible vague indications. 10
Soviet radars were not President Eisenhower's only concern.
Also fearing that a malfunction might cause a U-2 to crash inside the
Soviet Union, he asked Allen Dulles what the consequences would
be. The President's staff secretary, Col. Andrew J. Goodpaster, who
was present at virtually all White House meetings on the U-2 project
and served as the President's intermediary to the CIA on this issue,
later recalled:
Allen '.s approach was that we were unlikely to lose one. If we did
lose one, the pilot would not survive. . . . We were told-and it
was part of our understanding of the situation-that it was almost certain that the plane would disintegrate and that we could

• OSA Histor;,; chap. 11, p. 31 (TS Codeword). For the belief that the U-2 might go unde­

tected see the Leghorn interview and Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace. 1956-1961
(New York, 1965), p. 41.
"' Richard M. Bissell, Jr., interview by Gregory W. Pedlow, tape recording, Farmington,
Connecticut. 28 October I988 (S).

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Colonel Goodpaster with
President Eisenhower

wke it as a certainty that no pilot would survive .. . and that although they would know where the plane came from, it would be
difficult to prove it in any con vincing way."
CIA assurances that the U-2 would probably not be detected. and
that a crashed U-2 could not be traced back to the United States,
helped overcome the President's worries about overflights. The most
important reason why President Eisenhower decided to send reconnaissance aircraft over the Soviet Union, however, was the urgent
need for accurate intelligence to confirm or disprove claims of Soviet
advances in long-range bombers and missiles. The initial sighting of
the new Soviet Bison bomber in the spring of 1954 had been followed
by reported sightings of more than 30 of these bombers in the spring
and summer of 1955 (in reality these were sightings of the same
group of IO aircraft that circled around out of sight and made several
passes during a Soviet air show). Soon members of Congress were
calling for investigations into the relative strength of the US and

" Quoted in Bc:schloss, Mayday. p. 118.

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Soviet Air Forces. 12 Early in 1956, concern about a possible Soviet
advantage in long-range bombers grew as Air Force Chief of Staff
Twining informed the Senate Armed Services Committee that the
Soviet Union already had more Bisons than the United States had
B-52s and that the Soviets would be able to "maintain this advantage
for some time if they keep on the production curve we are now predicting." 13 By May 1956, reporting on the growing Soviet air
strength was no longer confined to aviation journals; U.S. News and
World Report, for example, featured articles headlined "Can Soviets
Take the Air Lead?" and "Is U.S. Really Losing in the Air?" 1"'
Alongside fear of possible Soviet superiority in long-range
bombers came a new potential threat: Soviet progress in guided missile research. Trevor Gardner, Air Force Assistant Secretary for
Research and Development, warned in September 1955 that "the
most complex and baffling technological mystery today is not the
Russian capability in aircraft and nuclear weapons but rather what the
Soviet progress has been in the field of guided missiles." 15 On 30
January 1956, Time magazine made the guided missile its cover story.
. The article began by describing a hypothetical crisis set in 1962 in
which the United States suffered a humiliating defeat because it had
lagged behind the Soviet Union in guided missile development. 16 Just
two weeks after this story appeared, the Soviets successfully tested a
missile with a range of 900 miles, and President Eisenhower admitted
at a press conference that the Soviet Union might be ahead of the
United States in some areas of the missile field. Administration critic
Senator Stuart Symington then claimed, "The facts are that our missile
development may be ahead in the short-range area, but their missile development is ahead in the area that counts by far the most-the

" Robert Hotz. "Russian Jet Airpower Gains Fast on US," Aviation Week, 23 May 1955,
pp. I 2-15; "Aviation Week Story Spurs Debate on US, Red Airpower Positions," Aviation
Week. 30 May 1955. pp. 13-14.
'' Claude Witze. "Russians Outpacing US in Air Quality, Twining Warns Congress."
Aviation Week, 27 February 1956. pp. 26-28; Robert Hotz, "Russian Air Force Now
Gaining in Quality," Aviation Week. 12 March I956, p. 286.
" "Can Soviets Take the Air Lead? What LeMay, Wilson, Ike Say,"' US News and World
Report. 11 May 1956, pp. 108-114; "ls U.S. Really Losing in the Air?" US News and
World Report. I 8 May I956. pp. 25-27.
" William Coughlin. "Gardner Defends Greater R&D Spending," Aviation Week. 26
September 1955, p. 14.
" "Missiles Away," Time. 30 January 1956, pp. 52-55.
S&&fCt

Seoret NOFOAN
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100

long-range area." 17 Fears of Soviet missile progress increased when
Nikita Khrushchev stated on 23 April 1956, "I am quite sure that we
shall have very soon a guided missile with a hydrogen-bomb warhead
which could hit any point in the world." 18
Faced with growing Congressional and public anxiety over
Soviet offensive capabilties, President Eisenhower approved the proposed overflight program. Colonel Goodpaster relayed this decision
to Bissell, Land, and Killian at a meeting on 21 June. The President
nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized
only 10 days of overflights when operations over the Soviet Union
were ready to start in early July 1956. 19

FIRST OVERFLIGHTS OF EASTERN EUROPE
The CIA initiated U-2 flights over hostile territory even before the
President granted final approval for overflights of the Soviet Union.
After consulting with the Commander of US Air Force Europe,
Richard Bissell used existing Presidential permission for Air Force
overflights of the Soviet Union's East European satellites as his authority to plan a mission over Poland and East Germany. Bissell had
informed the President of his intention to conduct such missions in
the "AQUATONE Operational Plan" submitted on 31 May.
The first operational use of a U-2 took place on Wednesday,
20 June 1956. Carl K. Overstreet flew a U-2 equipped with an
A-2 camera over Poland and East Germany. At the end of the mission, Detachment A immediately rushed the exposed film to the
United States for processing. The developed film arrived at the
Photo-Intelligence Division (PIO) on 22 June 1956. PIO personnel
considered the pictures obtained by mission 2003 to be of good
.
quaI1ty.0()

" Robert Hotz, "Firing of900-Mile Russian Missile Spurs US Changes," Aviation Week,
20 February 1956, p. 27.
" "Is Russia Really Ahead in Missile Race?." US News and World Report, 4 May 1956,
p. 34.
'" OSA History, chap. 11, pp. 27-29 (TS Codeword): A. J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for
the Record, 21 June 1956, WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL (TS).
"' OSA History, chap. 11, p. 27 (TS Codeword); Mission folder 2003 (20 June 1956),
OSA records, job 67-B-328, box 7 (TS Codeword).

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6eeret NOFGRN
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101

Following the success of this first mission, Bissell was eager to
begin overflights of the Soviet Union. But even after the President
granted his approval on 21 June, such missions could not yet take
place for two reasons. First, President Eisenhower had agreed with a
CIA and State Department recommendation that West German
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer be informed in advance of US plans to
overfly the Soviet Union from bases in Germany (in keeping with existing policies Adenauer was not informed about overflights of
Eastern Europe). Second, Soviet party chief Nikita Khrushchev had
invited representatives of the US Air Force to the Moscow Air Show,
which opened on 23 June 1956. Led by Air Force Chief of Staff
Nathan F. Twining, the delegation would be in the Soviet Union for a
week, and General Twining requested that no overflights of the Soviet
Union be staged until the Air Force delegation had left. 11
Both of these restrictions on overflights of the Soviet Union
were cleared up by the end of June. Accompanied by General Cabell
and the Chief of Station for Germany, Tracy Barnes, Bissell briefed
Chancellor Adenauer and his trusted adviser, State Secretary Hans
_ Globke, on 27 June. Adenauer enthusiastically endorsed the project. 11
A few days later the Air Force delegation returned from
Moscow, but now unfavorable weather prevented the start of operations against the Soviet Union.
While waiting for the clouds over the Soviet Union to clear,
Detachment A carried out two more overflights of Eastern Europe on
2 July 1956: mission 2009 over Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Bulgaria; and mission 2010 over East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and
Romania. That afternoon Bissell and DDCI Cabell gave President
Eisenhower a detailed briefing on the first U-2 overflight, which the
President found "very interesting, very positive." Eisenhower was
anxious to know, however, whether radars had tracked the aircraft.
Bissell replied that, although East European radars had picked up the
20 June flight, radar operators had misread the altitude as only 42,000
feet. He added that the Agency was awaiting reports on that morning's flights to see if they, too, had been detected. Noting that the U-2

" Nathan F. Twining, Neither Liberty nor Safety (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston,
1966), pp. 259-260; OSA History, chap. 11, p. 27 (TS Codeword).
"' OSA History, chap. 11. p. 28 (TS Codeword).

~eeret

First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956

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detachment had four aircraft working and could average up to two
flights per day, Bissell told the President that the crews were "ready
and eager to go in beyond the satellites" and overfly the center of the
Soviet Union. 23
Eisenhower replied that he thought it "urgent" to know whether
the recent flights had been tracked by hostile radars. The President
was obviously concerned that CIA estimates that the U-2 could fly
virtually undetected were proving false. One of the reasons why he
had approved the overflight program was the CIA's assurance that the
Soviet Union would remain unaware of the flights or-at the very
worst-receive only occasional, vague indications.

FIRST U-2 FLIGHTS OVER THE SOVIET UNION

The question of how well the Soviets could track U-2 flights had not
yet been settled when the first overflights of the Soviet Union took
place. On Wednesday, 4 July 1956, the U-2 known as Article 347 began the first flight over the Soviet Union. Final authorization for mission 2013 had come shortly before takeoff. Late on the evening of 3
July, Bissell went to project headquarters in the Matomic Building to
give the "Go" or "No go" decision. Although the President had approved the overflight, the final decision to start a mission depended
on a number of factors, especially the weather over the target area and
at the takeoff and landing sites. Bissell made the decision just before
midnight Washington time, which was six o'clock in the morning in
Wiesbaden. This pattern of last-minute approvals continued for the
duration of the U-2 overflight program. 2•
When Wiesbaden received the "Go" signal, a U-2 equipped with
an A-2 camera and flown by pilot Hervey Stockman took off on a
course that took it over Poznan, Poland, where riots had occurred on
28-30 June. After Poznan, Stockman headed for Belorussia, where he
turned north to Leningrad. The last leg of the mission took the U-2
over the Soviet Baltic states before returning to Wiesbaden. The main
target of this mission was the naval shipyards in Leningrad, center of

" Andrew J. Goodpaster·s handwritten notes on 2 July 1956 meeting, WHOSS. Alpha.
DDEL (TS).
,. Bissell interview by Welzenbach (S); Cunningham interview (TS Codeword).

-ieerct

Sec, et NOFOAN
Chapter 3
105

the Soviet Union's submarine construction program. Mission 2013's
route also overflew a number of major military airfields to make an
1
inventory of the new Bison jet-engine heavy bomber. s
The second overflight, on the following day, continued the
search for Bison bombers. Pilot Carmine Vito's route was similar but
somewhat to the south of Stockman's and also flew farther east, more
than 200 kilometers past Moscow. Although the Soviet capital was almost completely hidden by clouds, the A-2 camera with haze filters
took some usable photographs of the city. These turned out to be the
only U-2 photographs of Moscow because no other mission was sent
over the Soviet capital. Among the key targets photographed during
mission 2014 were the Fili airframe plant, where the Bison was being
built; the bomber arsenal at Ramenskoye. where the Bisons weire tested; the Kaliningrad missile plant; and the Khimki rocket-,engine
plant.=0
When Allen Dulles returned to work on Thursday. 5 July 1956.
he asked Bissell if any overflights had taken place during the
Independence Day holiday. One had been made on the fqurth and another just that morning, Bissell replied. (Because of the six-hour time
difference, the 5 July flight was safely back in Wiesbaden by the
time Dulles spoke to Bissell.) When Dulles asked the routes of these
missions. Bissell told him that they had overflown both Moscciw and
Leningrad. "Oh my Lord." Dulles exclaimed, "do you thi1:1k that
was wise the first time?" "Allen." Bissell replied. "the first is the
safest." :,
President Eisenhower also wanted to know the results of the 4
and 5 July flights, but his principal concern was whether there had
been any indication that either flight had been discovered or tracked
by radar. Eisenhower told Colonel Goodpaster "to advise Mr. Allen

" Urban J. Linehan. Na1io11al Phowgraphic /merpretatio11 Center: The Years of Project
HTAUTOMAT. 1956- 1958. Directorate of Science and Technology Historical Series
NPIC-3. December 1974. 6 vols. (hereafter cited as NPIC History). vol. l, p. 20 (S):
Mission folder 2013 (4 July 1956). OSA records. job 67-8-328. bo,c 7 (TS Codeword).
Note on mission numbers: each proposed mission received a number. but not all of these
missions were flown.
'" NP/C History. vol. I. p. 21 (S): Mission folder 2014 (5 July 1956). OSA records. job
67-8-328. box 7 (TS Codeword).

" Bissell interview by Welzenbach (S).

Sect et NOFOffN

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106

Dulles that if we obtain any information or warning that any of the
flights has been discovered or tracked, the operation should be suspended." Goodpaster called both Dulles and Bissell and was told that
reports on tracking or attempted interception of the U-2s would not be
available for another 36 hours. Later that day the two CIA officials
met with Goodpaster to ask if flights could continue in the meantime.
Goodpaster replied that his understanding of the President's directive
was that the operation should continue "at the maximum rate until the
first evidence of tracking was received." 1"
Although President Eisenhower had originally spoken of suspending the overflights if they were ''discovered or tracked," his
main concern was to learn if the Soviets could track U-2 missions,
meaning that they could follow the flight on their radar screens for
most or all of the missions and thus have numerous opportunities to
attempt interception. Certainly the President hoped that U-2 flights
could not even be detected, but reports received on the 20 June overflight of Eastern Europe had already indicated that this goal was unrealistic. The President's emphasis therefore shifted to tracking. If the
Soviets could successfully track U-2 missions. he wanted the overflights halted. ! 9 Reports on Soviet radar coverage of the first two
overflights of the Soviet Union became available on 6 July. These reports showed that. although the Soviets did detect the aircraft and
made several very unsuccessful attempts at interception. they could
not track U-2s consistently. Interestingly, the Soviet radar coverage
was weakest around the most important targets, Moscow and
Leningrad, and the Soviets did not realize that U-2s had overflown
these two cities. 30
Detachment A carried out three more overflights of the Soviet
Union during the 10-day period authorized by the President. Two of
the missions (2020 and 2021) took place on a single day, 9 July 1956.
They covered much of Eastern Europe, and the Ukraine and
Belorussia in the Soviet Union. Unfortunately. a broken camera

" Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum for the Record. 5 July 1956. WHOSS. Alpha.
DDEL (TS).
'" Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster. interview by Donald E. Welzenbach and Gregory W.
Pedlow. Washington. DC. 8 July 1987 (S).
"' Mission fold.:rs 2013 (4 July 1956) and 1014 (5 July 1956). OSA records. job
67-B-328, box 7 (TS Codeword).
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Chapter 3
108

shutter ruined much of the photography of one of the flights. The
third mission (2023), on the following day, included the Crimean
Peinsula. 31
The film from the first overflight (4 July) was flown to the
United States immediately after the U-2 landed at Wiesbaden. Several
members of the Photo Intelligence Division were on hand when the
film was developed to check on the results. Also present was James
Baker, who had accepted an offer by project officials to get a firsthand look at how the new A-2 lenses were working.·' 1
The photos from July overflights were generally good, despite
occasional problems caused by cloud cover. The huge amount of film
taken by these missions provided more information about the Soviet
Union's ability to track and intercept U-2s. Photointerpreters examining the films eventually discovered the tiny images of MiG-15s and
MiG- l 7s beneath the U-2s in various pursuit and attack attitudes:
climbing, flipping over, and falling toward Earth. It was even possible
to determine their approximate altitudes. These photographs showed
that the Soviet air defense system was able to track U-2s well enough
to attempt interception, but they also provided proof that the fighter
aircraft available to the Soviet Union in l 956 could not bring down a
U-2 at operational altitude. )l
One problem with early U-2 photography became apparent only
after the first films were developed. If there was surface water on the
runway at Wiesbaden when the U-2 took off, the camera windows became begrimed. Although the water dried during the flight, the oily
scum it left behind degraded the photographic image. To combat this
problem, AQUATONE ground crews took brooms and spent several
hours before takeoff sweeping puddles of water from the runway to
be used by the U-2. Kelly Johnson eventually designed a jettisonable
cover for the camera windows, which was released at the same time
as the pogos so that it could be recovered and reused. 34

" Mission folders 2020 (9 July 1956), 2021 (9 July 1956), and 2023 ( 10 July 1956), OSA
records. job 67-8-328, box 7 (TS Codeword).
" Cunningham interview (TS Codeword).
'' Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword).
'"' Baker interview (S).

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Sect et NOFORl'1

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109

SOVIET PROTEST NOTE
The 4 and 5 July overflights brought a strong protest from the Soviet
Union on 10 July in the form of a note handed to the US Embassy in
Moscow. The note said that the overflights had been made by a
"twin-engine medium bomber of the United States Air Force" and
gave details of the routes flown by the first two missions. The note
did not mention Moscow or Leningrad, however, because the Soviets
had not been able to track these portions of the overflights. The
Soviet note stated that the flights could only be evaluated as "intentional and conducted for the purposes of intelligence .., As soon as the
note arrived at the White House on the evening of 10 July 1956,
Colonel Goodpaster called Bissell and told him to stop all U-2 overflights until further notice. The next morning Goodpaster met with
Bissell to review the U-2 situation. Bissell said three additional flights
had taken place since the missions mentioned in the Soviet note but
added that no more were planned. 35
__ - Later Eisenhower told Goodpaster that he "didn't like a thing"
about the Soviet note and was going to discuss the matter with
Secretary of State Dulles. With the strong approval of President
Eisenhower, Goodpaster informed DCI Dulles that "there is to be no
mention of the existence of this project or of operations incident to it,
outside the Executive Branch, and no mention within the Executive
Branch to others than those who directly need to know of the operation, as distinguished from output deriving from it." 36
During these initial overflights, the U-2 flew above 69,000 feet
and could be seen only fleetingly by pilots of the Soviet interceptor
aircraft. Thus, it appears that the Soviet claim that the intruder was a
twin-engine bomber was probably based on the assumption that this
was another overflight by a reconnaissance version of the twin-engine
Canberra bomber, similar to the RAF overflight of Kapustin Yar in
1953. The US reply, sent to the Soviets on 19 July, truthfully denied
that any US "military planes" had overflown the Soviet Union on the
days in question. Meanwhile, on 16 July the Polish Ambassador to

" "Alleged Violations of Soviet Territory: Soviet Note of July I0, I 956 with U.S. Reply, ..
US Department of State Bulletin, 30 July I 956, pp. 19 I- I92: Andrew J. Goodpaster.
Memorandum for the Record, 11 July 1956, WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL (TS).
,. Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record, 11 July 1956, WHOSS, Alpha,
DDEL (TS).

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Sec,el NOFORN

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the United States delivered an oral protest concerning overflights of
Poland on 20 June and 2 July. This was followed by a protest note
from the Czechoslovak Government on 21 July. No formal reply was
sent to the two Soviet satellite states. 37
The details of the flightpaths listed in the Soviet and Polish protests, along with the subsequent photographic evidence of Soviet interception attempts, made it clear that U-2s could not fly undetected
over the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe and could even be tracked
for extended periods of time. This news greatly disturbed President
Eisenhower. In a meeting with Allen Dulles on 19 July 1956, the
President recalled how he had been told that "not over a very minor
percentage of these (flights) would be picked up." He went on to
question "how far this should now be pushed, knowing that detection
is not likely to be avoided." After discussing the possibility of basing
U-2s in the Far East, President Eisenhower went on to say that he had
"lost enthusiasm" for the U-2 activity. He noted that, if the United
States were on the receiving end of a Soviet overflight operation, "the
reaction would be drastic." The President was also concerned that the
American public might learn of the overflights and be shocked that
their country had violated international law. He stated, "Soviet protests were one thing, any loss of confidence by our own people would
• ano th er. ,, 38
be quite
The President's rapid disenchantment with the project was not
lost on Richard Bissell. Fearing for the U-2 program's survival, he
met with the Land committee in early August 1956 to urge them to
help make the U-2 less vulnerable to radar pulses. His goal was to
reduce the aircraft's radar cross section so that it would be less susceptible to detection. Edward Purcell had some ideas on this and suggested that he supervise a new project in the Boston area to explore
them. At the direction of the Land committee, Bissell set in motion a
project known as HTNAMABLE to establish a proprietary firm called
the Scientific Engineering Institute (SEI) in Cambridge. Former Air
Force Col. Richard S. Leghorn headed the SEI operation for the
Agency when it began on 26 November 1956. SEI was staffed by several MIT scholars who conducted studies and experiments into
·" .. Alleged Violations of Soviet Territory: Soviet Note of July I0, 1956 with U.S. Reply,"
US Department of State Bulletin. 30 July 1956, pp. 191-192; OSA History, chap. 11, pp.
32-33 (TS Codeword).
" Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record. 19 July 1956, WHOSS, Alpha,
DDEL (TS).

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Sec, et NOFOAP4

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111

radar-absorbing materials and techniques proposed by Purcell. The effort, known as Project RAINBOW, got under way by the end of the
39
year.

THE END OF THE BOMBER GAP
During the three-week period of 20 June to 10 July 1956, U-2s had
made eight overflights beyond the Iron Curtain, including five over
the Soviet Union. PID's photointerpreters were busy until the end of
August with their initial evaluation of the photography obtained by
these flights. Their efforts were complicated by the division's move
on 9 July from Que Building to the Steuart Building, but, when the
photo interpreters were finished, they were able to write "finis" to the
controversy over Soviet bomber strength.
Although the Air Force had claimed that the Soviet Union possessed almost 100 of the new Myasishchev-4 (Bison) heavy bombers,
U-2 photography proved this assertion wrong. There were no Bison
6ombers at any of the nine long-range bomber bases photographed by
the July missions. DCI Allen Dulles was particularly impressed by
the photographs of the Soviet bomber bases, which in later years he
called "million-dollar" photography. The actual value of the U-2
photos was probably even greater because, on the strength of their evidence, the White House was able to deny Air Force requests for additional B-52 bombers to "catch up" to the Soviets."0
Because of the need to protect the source of the information
about Soviet bomber strength, the controversy surrounding this issue
did not immediately die down. In November 1956, when the CIA
began providing new Bison production figures based on U-2 photography without identifying the source, some members of Congressunaware of the existence of the U-2-questioned the motivation behind the reduced estimates. They suggested that either the earlier estimates of Soviet bomber strength had been inflated to increase Air
Force appropriations or the new estimates had been reduced by
White House direction in order to hold down military expenditures.

•• Records of Scientific Engineering Institute (Project HTNAMABLE). OSA records (TS
Codeword).
~• NP!C History, vol. I. p. 23 (S).

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Seeret NOFOAN

Chapter 3
112

No one in the White House, the CIA, or the Air Force could reveal
that U-2 photographs had actually provided the primary evidence for
this change in the estimates."
The need to keep the existence of the U-2 program secret caused
problems even within the CIA itself. The Office of Security sharply
restricted the number of persons who could be cleared for access to
U-2 photography. The special clearance was granted on a "slot" basis, and only the person assigned to a particular position or "slot"
could have the clearance. The U-2 photographs were kept in a secure
room, and only those with special clearances were admitted to the
room. In addition, the Office of Security considered U-2 information
too sensitive to use in CIA publications. As a result, many analysts
did not have access to information that would have greatly aided the
production of intelligence estimates: 1

TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS
Although U-2s had ceased flying over the Soviet Bloc because of
President Eisenhower's standdown order, they could still be used
elsewhere in the world. The Middle East would be the next area for
U-2 operations. On 26 July 1956, Egyptian President Gama! Abdel
Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company in retaliation for the decision by the United States and the United Kingdom to withdraw financial support for the Aswan Dam project. Nasser's action provoked
an international crisis that would have a permanent effect on the U-2
program.
Long before the Suez Crisis developed, the CIA had planned to
deploy U-2s in Turkey for use in the Soviet overflight program. On I
May 1956, US Charge d' Affaires Foy D. Kohler approached Turkish
Prime Minister Adnan Menderes on this matter. He told the Prime
Minister that the effort was a continuation of the GENETRIX program, during which balloons had been released from Turkey, and involved aircraft that could fly 10,000 feet higher than any Soviet
plane. Menderes gave his approval immediately. At the time of the
" John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military
Strength (New York: Dial Press. 1982), pp. 45-47.
'' Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword).

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Bases for U-2 Operations in the Middle East, 1956

NORTH

ATLANTIC

OCellN

~·

;;·,,.

&eeret f'40FOAP◄

Suez takeover, however, the second contingent of U-2 aircraft and pilots was still being trained in Nevada. This unit would not be ready
for redeployment before the end of August and would not become established at Incirlik airbase near Adana, Turkey, until early September
1956. The Agency referred to the AQUATONE detachment at Adana
as Detachment B, cryptonym KWCORK; the Air Force covername
was Weather Reconnaissance Squadron Provisional 2; and the unit's
unofficial name was Tuslog Detachment 10-10. By whatever name,
the Adana detachment became the mainstay of U-2 activity for the
next three and a half years.' 3
The fast-moving events of the Suez Crisis would not wait for
Detachment B pilots to complete their training. With tension growing
between Egypt and the Suez Canal Company's former owners, the
United Kingdom and France, as well as between Egypt and Israel.. US
'·' OSA History. chap. 11. pp. 9. 39-40: chap. 12. pp. 5. 12 (TS Codeword).

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Secret NOFORI\I
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military and foreign policy planners needed immediate information
about developments in the eastern Mediterranean. Detachment A was,
therefore, assigned the first Middle East overflights. On 29 August,
U-2 missions 1104 and 1105 left Wiesbaden and overflew the eastern
Mediterranean littoral, starting with Greece, then Egypt, Israel,
Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey. Because these target areas were beyond
the round trip range of the Wiesbaden-based U-2s, the planes landed
at Adana for refueling. The next day, the same two planes, with different pilots, took off from Adana and overflew the same Middle East
territory, this time including the Gaza Strip, before returning to
Wiesbaden. The film contained evidence of large numbers of British
troops on Malta and Cyprus and more new French-made aircraft in
Israel than had previously been reported."'"'
As the situation around Suez grew more tense, the Eisenhower
administration decided to release some of the U-2 photos to the
British Government. On 7 September, James Reber, chairman of the
Ad Hoc Requirements Committee, and Arthur Lundahl, chief of the
Photo Intelligence Division, flew to London, taking with them photos
of the eastern
Mediterranean area, including the Suez Canal, taken on
.
30 August. These were the first and the only photos of the Middle
East that the President authorized to be given to the British during the
1956 crisis! 5
.

The Eisenhower administration viewed the developments in the
eastern Mediterranean with great concern. To keep the President and
Secretary of State abreast of developments in the area, Deputy
Director for Intelligence Robert Amory established on 12 September
a multiagency group known as the PARAMOUNT Committee to
monitor the situation on a round-the-clock basis. The PARAMOUNT
Committee worked inside PID headquarters in the Steuart Building.
Composed of members from CIA, State, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air
Force, this committee met daily-frequently several times a day-to
produce reports based on information obtained from U-2 photography, communications and electronic intelligence, and agents. The
photointerpreters working for the PARMOUNT committee also came
from several agencies: the CIA, the Army, and the Navy. 46
.... Mission folders 1104 (29 August 1956) and 1105 (29 August 1956), OSA records, job
67-8-972, box 6 (TS Codeword).
" Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword); NP/C History, vol. I, pp. 56-58 (S).

.. NP/C History, vol. I. pp. 47-49, 54-56 (S).

Secret

~etNOFORN
Chapter 3
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The Suez Crisjs was a major turning point in the use of the U-2
airplane. Before this crisis, the U-2 had been seen solely as a collector
of strategic intelligence, with high-quality results considered more
important than speed. U-2 film had, therefore, been returned to the
manufacturer for optimum development and then interpreted in
Washington using the most up-to-date devices. Now. because of the
Middle East crisis, Project AQUATONE was expected to perform like
a tactical reconnaissance unit, developing film immediately after
landing for instant interpretation or "readout." Photo-Intelligence
Division personnel assigned to Project HTAUTOMAT (U-2 film exploitation), therefore, had to arrange for forward processing of the
U-2 film to avoid unacceptable delays in providing intelligence on
tactical developments around Suez.
PIO acted quickly co carry out its new assignment. Lundahl and
Reber flew from the United Kingdom to US Air Force Europe headquarters in Wiesbaden on 12 September to make arrangements for
processing and inte retin U-2 film in West Gennany. They had
been preceded by:.,;--,r;,.,.-.,...,..-,.-,.,..,....,-..,.1 hief of PIO's Special · Projects
sions with Air Force photoBranch. Following eta1 e
. intelligence personnel, the CIA representatives arranged to use a portion of a nea,by Air F-; photo laboratory for developing U-2 film.
With the assistance ofl
lchi7~TAUTOMAT
photo laboratory, and 1r t-orce personnel,L _ _ J had the lab
ready for processing on the following day, when the next U-2 mission
f m the Middle East. After quickly developing the film,
d his joint staff of CIA and armed forces personnel stud1 d 1t or indications of British and French preparations for hostilities
and sent their first report to Washington on 15 September.

C

Although the Air Force provided considerable assistance in establishing!
[photo laboratory, Air Force officials did not
like the idea of CIA personnel controlling overseas photo processing
and interpretation centers, which were normally under Air Force control. Further negotiations led to a CIA-Air Force agreement at the end
of October. under which the Air Force would name the commanding
officer for such installations and the CIA would designate the deputy,
who was responsible for technical and intelligence matters:'
PIO soon added two photointerpreters and a lab technician to the
West German operation, which continued to develop and interpret
U-2 photography of the Middle East throughout September and
' ' Ibid.. pp. 49-52 (S).

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Secret NOPOAN

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October 1956. This unit's timely and accurate information enabled the
PARAMOUNT Committee to predict the j oint Israeli-Bri tish-French
attack on Egypt three days before it took place.
On I I September, Detachment A pilot Jacob Kratt overflew the
French Mediterranean naval base at Toulon. He brought back imagery
revealing that France was loading troopships at Toulon. During the
rest of the month, Detachment A pilots flew another eight missions
over the Middle East. By this time, the new Detachment B in Turkey
was ready for operations, and it was better positioned to provide coverage of the Middle East. Detachment B began flying missions in
September and soon became the primary detachment for Middle East
overflights, conducting nine out of the IO such missions flown in
October...s
Detachment B's first U-2 flight, on 11 September 1956, made
passes over Turkey, Cyprus, and Rhodes. The next flight, more than
two weeks later, covered much the same ground but flew as far west
as Malta, Sicily, and Crete. Both were "special" missions aimed at
maintaining surveillance of the British and French fleets and forces as
they prepared for the attack on Egypt. Meanwhile, Detachment A pilots flew four missions in the Western Mediterranean.
During this period, the PARAMOUNT Committee's photointerpreters developed the new science of "tent-ology"-counting the
tents of British forces on the islands of Cyprus and Malta to determine the number of troops deployed. The photointerpreters used
changes in the number of tents to determine that the British forces
were beginning to move toward the beaches, where they were eventually lightered to offshore troopships."
Noting the U-2 activity in the Middle East, President Eisenhower
wrote in his diary on 15 October 1956: "Our high-flying reconnaissance planes have shown that Israel has obtained some 60 of the
French Mystere pursuit planes, when there had been reported the
50
transfer of only 24... Other U-2 photographs revealed the presence

"' OSA History. chap. 19. annex 120. "CIA U-2 Missions Flown. 1956-1968." pp. 1-2 (TS

Codeword).
" Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword).
'" Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary. 15 October 1956. DDEL.

Sec. et N6fOFU~
Chapter 3

117

.9f British Canberra bombers at Akrotiri, Cyprus: The Anglo-French
military buildup greatly irritated President Eisenhower, who considered these activities a violation of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration, in
which the United States, the United Kingdom, and France had agreed
to m~ntain the status quo in armaments and borders in the Middle
EastXfo Arthur Lundahl he remarked, "It's a hell of a note when you
have to G-2 your friends." s(

c

U-2 photography continued to keep the President and other key
officials well informed about the progress of the crisis. }lights over
Israel and Rhodes on 21 October and Cyprus on 25 October revealed
heavy military concentrations and an increase in the number of troop
transports and air forces. On the basis of this information,: Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles told the President on 28 October that he
believed an Israeli attack on Jordan was imminent, adding that he
thought the British and French would take advantage of such an attack to occupy the Suez Canal. 51
The 10-day Middle East war began on the afternoon of 29
October 1956 with Israeli paratroop drops in the Sinai peninsula, followed by mobile columns striking deep into Egyptian territory. tfhe
next day, 30 October, Francis Gary Powers conducted mission 1314.
He overflew Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, and finally the Sinai.Jwhere he
photographed black puffs of smoke from the fighting between Israel
and Egypt. Adana-based U-2s were in the air for the next two days
filming the Suez Canal area@fld neighboring countrie£f3
The United Kingdom and France entered the fray on the evening
of 31 October with bombing raids against major Egyptian airfields.
The Anglo-French bombing campaign continued for the next 48
hours. Ear)Y on the morning of 1 November, an Adana-based U-2, piloted by LWilliam Hall, took off to gather intelligence on the
Anglo-French military activity. After photographing Cyprus, Hal]
flew south to the Sinai Desert, where he made several passes to obtain
complete coverage of the Israeli-Egyptian fighting there. [He then
headed west to Cairi passing directly over the main Egyptian airbase

" Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword).
" Telephone calls, 28 October 1956, DOE Diary, DDEL.
'' Powers, Operation Overflight, pp. 308-309; Mission folder 1314 (30 October 1956),
OSA records, job 67-B-972, box I (TS Codeword).

-Secret

Mission 1316, 1 November 1956

Turkey
lncirlik Airbase

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(U.K .)

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Mediterranean Sea

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..........

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44?•

Sec, et NOFOA~
Chapter 3
119

at Almaza, where he filmed neatly arranged rows of Egyptian military .' ============::i
.
. .
.
.
r: ! U-2 photography of Egyptian
aircraft. Contmumg past Cairo to film another a1rfield,U:lal.!Jturned · airbase at Almaza,
southeast and then north to fly along the Nile, again crossing directly i 29 October 1956
,,.... .....
over Almaza. The photography from this leg of the mission rev,eaJed
the burning wreckage of the Egyptian aircraft During the short period
of time that had passed betweenCHall's tw~ passes, a combined
Anglo-French air armada had attacked the airbase. When shown the
before and after photos of Almaza, President Eisenhower told Arthur
Lundahl: "Ten-minute reconnaissance, now that's a goal to shoot
for!" Eisenhower was pleased with the aerial photography but
)4

~

'"' Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword); i3eschloss (Mayday. p. 138) mistakenly identifi~ this quote as coming from the British, but they did not receive copies of
these photos:__i

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Seeret NOFOAN

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angered by what it depicted: an Anglo-French attack on Egypt. He
quickly called for a cease-fire ~and denied the United Kingdom any
further U-2 photographs of the Middle Eaaj
The l November mission over Cyprus and Egypt also photographed Anglo-French preparations to invade Egypt. President
Eisenhower was informed of this impending invasion on Sunday, 4
November. On the following day, British and French paratroopers
dropped near Port Said at the north end of the Suez Canal. This action
prompted Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin to send messages to
France, Britain, and Israel warning that the Soviet Union was ready to
use force to crush the aggressors. 55
Early on the morning of election day, 6 November, the
Anglo-French invasion armada arrived at Port Said and began landing
troops. Back in Washington President Eisenhower met with Allen
Dulles to discuss the deepening international crisis. Worried that the
Soviet Union might be poised to intervene in the war, the President
ordered Dulles to have the Adana-based U-2s fly over Syria to see
whether the Soviets were moving planes to Syrian airbases in
preparation for a strike against the forces attacking Egypt. The answer
to Eisenhower's question came much sooner than expected because
on the previous day a U-2 had already overflown Syria before making
a run across northern Egypt. The film from this flight had reached
Wiesbaden for processing and readout during the night. The results
were in the hands of the PARAMOUNT Committee by midmorning
on 6 November, while the President was motoring to Gettysburg to
cast his ballot. By the time the President returned to the White House
by helicopter at noon, Colonel Goodpaster was waiting for him with
an answer: there were no Soviet aircraft in Syria. Because of the
President's concern about possible Soviet moves, Syria was the target
of 14 additional U-2 flights between 7 November and 18 December
1956. 56
The increasing reliance on Adana-based U-2s for coverage of the
Middle East during the Suez Crisis made it difficult for the
photointerpreters to supply timely information. When Detachment B
aircraft returned to their base at Adana, there were no film-processing
" Donald Neff, Warriors at Sue:-.: Eisenhower Takes America intv the Middle East (New
York: Simon and Schuster. 1981 ), p. 403.
'" Memorandum of Conference. 6 November 1956. Eisenhower Diary, Whitman File,
DDEL (U); OSA History, chap. 19, annex 120, p. 3 (TS Codeword).

iearet

~.,et NOFORP4
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facilities available, and the film had to be flown to Wiesbaden, adding
a 10- to 15-hour delay. During the gradual buildup of the crisis, this
delay had been tolerated, but, once actual hostilities broke out, US
decisionmakers needed a more rapid response. On 29 October,
Richard Bissell ordered Lundahl to establish a fi lm-processing facility
at Adana. Two PlD employees went to Adana on 13 November to set
up the facility, and two photointerpreters moved from Wiesbaden to
Adana to help in the effort. Forward processing was, however, hampered by the location of the Adana facility on a tlat, arid plain in
southern Turkey, 35 miles from the Mediterranean at the very end of a
long supply line.
The PID team obtained and outfitted a trailer for film processing,
but many problems had to be overcome. The first major problem was
obtaining enough clean water. Detachment B personnel, therefore,
purchased large amounts of borax locally for use in purifying water.
In fact, they bought so much borax on the local market that one of
them was arrested by the Turkish police. who believed he was using
the chemical to make drugs. It was also difficult to obtain a constant
source of developers and fixers for processing the U-2 film, si nce the
large Air Force supply facility at Wheelus AFB in Libya refused to
provide the needed photographic chemicals. When PIO personnel accompanied processed film from Turkey to the United States, they returned to Turkey sitting atop cartons of chemicals for the next day's
processing. At first, film was developed in improvised tanks using
flimsy wooden spools and hand-turned cranks to move the film
through the solutions. Later, the Adana facility moved from its trailer
to a building and received more up-to-date processing equipment. As
was the case with the photo lab in Germany, the Adana lab's person57
nel came from the Agency and the armed forces.
The need to produce very timely intelligence diminished after
the British and French agreed to a cease-fire on 7 November 1956. By
the end of the month, foreign troops began evacuating Egyptian territory, and the pressure on the Adana photointerpretation unit eased.
The facility remained in existence, however, and was used twice in
December 1956 and 11 times in the first half of 1957. It was then
placed in caretaker status, for emergency use only.

" NP/C History. vol. I. pp. 53-54 (S): Lun<hhl ~nd Brugioni in terview (TS Codeword).

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RENEWED OVERFLIGHTS OF THE SOVIET UNION
Throughout the fall of 1956, U-2s provided valuable coverage of the
Middle East crisis, but they were not conducting their original mission
of strategic reconnaissance of the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower
had halted all such overflights by his order of 10 July, and, in the
months that followed, he remained unconvinced by CIA arguments in
favor of a resumption of overflights. On 17 September 1956, DDCI
Cabell and Richard Bissell went to the White House to ask President
Eisenhower to authorize more flights over the Soviet Union. Adm.
Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also attended the meeting. Bissell and Defense Department representatives
reviewed the valuable intelligence from the July U-2 flights, and
Bissell then informed Eisenhower that many important intelligence requirements remained unfilled. To fill these requirements, Bissell noted, would require photography of approximately 15 separate areas of
the Soviet Union. Pleading for the authority to resume overflights,
Bissell stressed that conditions for photography were becoming less
favorable as the days grew shorter. While the U-2 was then still safe
from interception, he added, it might not be in the future. 5K
President Eisenhower aclrnowledged the value of the U-2 but
emphasized that the international political aspects of overflights remained his overriding concern. He said he would talk further with
John Foster Dulles about the matter, noting that the Secretary of State
had at first seemed to belittle the political risk but had later found it
increasingly worrisome.
A little more than two weeks later, on 3 October, when the
President again met with Bissell, Cabell, and Radford, John Foster
Dulles was also present. In opening the meeting, Eisenhower said he
had become discouraged regarding Project AQUATONE. Although
he had been assured that "there would be a good chance of not being
discovered on most, if not all, operations, just the opposite had
proved true." The President observed that arguments in favor of resuming U-2 operations did not take world opinion into consideration.
He added that great efforts had been made for many years "to create
an opinion in the world that we are not truculent and do not want
war," and, if knowledge of the U-2 overflights got out, world opinion
would view them as "provocative and unjustified." 59
" Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum of Conference. 17 September 1956, WHOSS,
Alpha, DDEL (TS).
,. Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record, 3 October 1956, WHOSS, Alpha,
DDEL (TS).
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Secretary of State Dulles said that, although he essentially
agreed with the President's comments, he thought that "really important results" might be obtained by a seven to 10-day operation. He,
nevertheless, questioned the long-term value of the results. DDCI
Cabell replied that U-2 photographs would be useful much longer
than the Secretary of State had implied because they would establish
a reference bank of geographic and manmade features. Siding with
Cabell, Admiral Radford pointed out the need for more intelligence to
make estimates better.
President Eisenhower was not convinced by these arguments.
Although willing to consider extensions of the radar-seeking ferret
flights he had authorized along the Soviet borders. he remained opposed to penetration flights over the Soviet Union.
Events in Eastern Europe in the fall of l 956 helped to change the
President's mind. In October the Soviet Union backed away fro m a
confrontation with nationalist Communist leaders in Poland only to
find itself facing a similar situation in Hungary, where mass demonstrations led to the formation of a new government under Imre Nagy
• on· 23 October 1956. Soviet troops and tanks temporarily withdrew
from Budapest while awaiting reinforcements. By early November,
however, the Kremlin leadership decided that events in Hungary were
getting out of hand-particularly when Premier Nagy announced his
nation's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact-and ordered Soviet
troops to suppress the Hungarian uprising. Although President
Eisenhower deplored the Soviet intervention. he turned down CIA requests for permission to airdrop arms and supplies to the Hungarian
rebels. In fact, the President forbid all overflights of that nation, in60
cluding those by U-2 aircraft, and none was made.
Although President Eisenhower had not been willing to allow
overflights during the Hungarian crisis, the Soviet Union's actions in
Hungary convinced him to authorize renewed overflights of the
Soviet Bloc, a decision that was made easier by his reelection by a
large margin in early November. Initially. however, the President only
authorized overflights of Eastern Europe and Soviet border regions,
not the deep penetration overfl ights that had been requested by CIA.
At a 15 November 1956 meeting with Acting Secretary of State
Herbert Hoover, Jr. (John Foster Dulles was recovering from cancer

~• Cunningham interview (TS Codeword).

Sec, et NOf6ftN

Chapter 3
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surgery). JCS Chairman Adm. Arthur Radford. DCI Allen Dulles, and
Richard Bissell, Eisenhower explained why he refused to allow overflights of the Soviet Union: "Everyone in the world says that, in the
last six weeks, the United States has gained a place it hasn't held
since World War fl. To make trips now would cost more than we
would gain in form of solid information." Hoover agreed and rnoted,
"If we lost a plane at this stage, it would be almost catastrophic."
Tom between his desire to maintain a "correct and moral" position
and his wish to know what the Soviet Union was up to. the Pres.idem
finally authorized several overflights of Eastern Europe and the
Soviet border, "but not the deep one," adding that the aircraft should
"stay as close to the border as possible."
(>I

The first of these fl ights, mission 4016 on 20 November 1956,
was the first overflight of Soviet territory since IO July. This mission
left Adana and flew east over Iran, then reversed and flew west along
the Soviet-Iranian border to Soviet Armenia. where it crossed into the
Soviet Union and photographed Yerevan. An electrical malfunction
then forced the pilot, Francis Gary Powers, to return to Adana. Soviet
interceptor aircraft made sev.eral unsuccessful attempts to reach this
U-2, and the Soviet Government sent a secret protest note to
.
6'
Was h ington. On IO December. Bulgaria was the target of two U-2 missions.
one (40 I 8) from Detachment B at Adana and another (2029) from
Detachment A at Giebelstadt. Bulgarian fighter aircraft made lO different attempts to intercept the first mission. but the flight proceeded
without difficulty.6 J
The second flight came close to crashing but not through the efforts of interceptors. The pilot of mission 2029 was Carmine Vito,
who had flown the first U-2 mission over Moscow on 5 July. He was
known co his colleagues as the Lemon-Drop Kid because he always
carried these hard candies in the knee pocket of his flight suit. Despite

•• Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum of Conference with the President. ~ovember IS.
1956. WHOSS. Alpha. DDEL (TS): Ambrose. Eisenhower: The President. p. 374.
•' M ission folder 40 16. 20 November 1956. OSA records. job 67-8 -972. bo)( 7 (TS
Codeword).
• '· Mission folders 1019 (IO December 1956) and 4018 (10 December 1956). OSA records. job 67 -B-328. box 7 and job 67-B-972. box 7 (TS Codeword).

_secret

Sec, et NOFORN

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warnings to all pilots about the danger of opening the helmet faceplate at high altitudes, several pilots were known to do so. Some ate
candy bars; Vito favored lemon drops. On the morning of 10
December, while Vito was undergoing prebreathing, the Air Force enlisted man who oversaw his preflight regimen placed an L-pill in the
righthand knee pocket of Vito's flight suit, unaware that this pocket
also contained Vito's supply of lemon drops. After he took off. Vito
began indulging in his habit of sucking lemon drops. About midway
into the mission, he opened his faceplate and popped into his mouth
what he thought was another lemon drop. After closing the faceplate,
he began sucking on the object and thought it strange that it hard no
flavor and was much smoother than the previous lemon drops.
Although tempted to bite down, Vito decided instead to reopeIn his
faceplate and see what it was he had in his mouth. Spicting the object
into his hand, he saw that he had been sucking on the L-pi ll wi1th its
lethal contents of potassium cyanide. Just a thin layer of glass. had
stood between him and death. The loss of his aircraft over Bulgaria
would have exposed the U-2 program to worldwide publicity and
would probably have resulted in an early end to overflights.""
. . . _ Detachment A's security officer overheard Vito relating: the
L-pill story to a fellow pilot several days later and promptly reported
the conversation to headquarters. When details of Vito's close call
reached Washington. James Cunningham immediately ordered L --pills
placed in boxes so that there wou ld be no chance of mistaking them
for anything else. The L-pill continued to be available for another
three years. Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachmernt B.
Col. William Shelton, raised an important question that had niever
been considered: what would happen if an L -pill with its volati le contents accidentally broke inside the cockpit of a U-2? Realizing that
such an accident would result i n the death of the pilot, James
Cunningham ordered the destruction of all L-pills and then turned to
the Technical Services Division (TSO) for a better idea. By this time
the state of the art in lethal devices was a needle poisoned with cJ1lgal,
an extremely deadly shellfish toxi n. The needle was hidden in a tiny
hole in a silver dollar supplied by Cunningham. Only one poison--needle coin was made because Cunningham decided that, if any pilo1t had
to use it because of capture, there would probably not be any more
overfl .1gh ts.6s
"' Cunningham interview (TS Codeword); Carmine Vito. interview by Donald E.
Welzenbach. Washington, DC. 7 May 1986 (S).
~• Cable from Detachment B to Development Projects Division (DPD). 4 January 1960;
cabk: from DPD to Detachment 8, 7 January 1960. OSA records, job 67-B-972. box 18,
"Operation KNIFE EDGE" (TS Codeword).

Sceret NOFORN
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Although the U-2 overflights of Eastern Europe in late 1956
caused renewed Soviet protests, the sharpest protest came on 15
December 1956, after three specially modified USAF RB-57D bombers photographed the city of Vladivostok in a high-speed dash over
the Far Eastern coast of the Soviet Union (as part of the Air Force's
Operation BLACK KNIGHT). President Eisenhower had approved
the mission after being told by the Air Force that the high-speed
RB-57Ds would probably not be detected. 66
Reacting strongly to the Soviet protest. the President told
Secretary of State Dulles on 18 December that he was going to "order
complete stoppage of this entire business." As for a reply to the
Soviet protest, Dulles said, "I think we will have to admit this was
done and say we are sorry. We cannot deny it." Dulles noted that
"our relations with Russia are pretty tense at the moment."
Eisenhower agreed, noting that this was no time to be provocative. He
then instructed Colonel Goodpaster to call Secretary of Defense
Wilson, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Radford, and DCI Dulles to
order: "Effective immediately, there are to be no flights by US reconnaissance aircraft over Iron Curtain countries." 67
Flights along the borders of Iron Curtain countries continued,
however, and, on 22 December 1956, Detachment B flew the first
mission (4019) by a U-2 equipped for electronic intercept. The electronic-detection equipment known as the System-V unit (see appendix
C) was installed in the bay normally used by the main camera, and the
plane flew along the Soviet border from the Black Sea to the Caspian
Sea and on to Afghanistan. The System-V unit worked well. 68
Early in 1957, a mission along the Soviet border accidentally
turned into an overflight. On 18 March 1957, a U-2 collecting electronic intelligence along the Soviet southern border entered Soviet
•~ Goodpaster interview (S).
'' Telephone calls 18 December 1956. DDE Diary. DDEL. (U); Andrew J. Goodpaster.
Memorandum for the Record, 18 December l956. WHOSS. Alpha. DDEL (TS. downgraded to S); the Soviet protest note of 15 December 1956 and the U.S. reply of I I
January 1957 are contained in .. Alleged Overflight of Soviet Area by American Planes ...
US Department of Stare Bulletin. vol. 36. 28 January l 957. p. 135. Although Dulles"s initial inclination had been to offer an apology. the U.S. reply stated that the "only authorized United States Air Force flights in the general area of the Sea of Japan were normal
training activities."
.. Mission folder 4019 (22 December 1956). OSA records. job 67-B-972, box 7 (TS
Codeword).

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airspace because of compass error compounded by a slight error in
the pilot's dead reckoning. Because of heavy cloud cover, the pilot,
James W. Cherbonneaux, did not realize he was over the Soviet
Union until he saw Soviet fighters attempting to intercept him. These
attempts at interception once again demonstrated the Soviets' ability
to track the U-2 and their inability to harm it. 69
At this point in early 1957, the U-2 program was in limbo.
Although the President would not allow U-2s to fly their primary mission of reconnaissance of the Soviet Union, he did not cancel the program and continued to authorize flights along Soviet borders. The
CIA's overhead reconnaissance program also faced a renewed bid by
the Air Force, which now had its own growing U-2 fleet, to gain control of the overflight program in the spring of 1957. The uncertainty
surrounding the future of the project made planning and budgeting
extremely difficult. In April 1957, Richard Bissell asked the DCI and
DDCI to push for a decision on whether the U-2 program was to continue in civilian hands and what its scope was to be. In briefing papers
prepared for the DCI, Bissell argued for maintaining a nonmilitary
overflight capability, which could "maintain greater security, employ
deeper cover, use civilian pilots, keep the aircraft outside military
control, and, therefore, make possible more plausible denial of US
military responsibility in the face of any Soviet charges." In urging
the resumption of overflights, Bissell stated that four U-2 missions
over border regions of the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe had been
detected by the Soviets without causing any diplomatic protest. He
also noted that the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign
Intelligence Activities had unanimously recommended the resumption
of overflights. 70
All of these issues were discussed on 6 May 1957, when
President Eisenhower met with Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald
Quarles, Air Force Chief of Staff Nathan Twining, Acting Secretary
of State Christian Herter, and three CIA officals-DCI Dulles, DDCI
Cabell, and Richard Bissell. The President expressed concern about
the impact of overflights on US-Soviet relations and about possible
Soviet responses such as closing off access to Berlin. Although

"" Information supplied by James W. Cherbonneaux to Donald E. Welzenbach (S);
Mission folder 4020 ( 18 March 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 7 (TS Codeword).

'" OSA History, chap. 4. pp. 15-16; annex 22 (TS Codeword).

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ieeret NOFORN

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remaining opposed to flights over most of the Soviet Union,
Eisenhower finally agreed to permit some flights over peripheral
areas such as Kamchatka Peninsula and Lake Baikal, as well as the
Soviet Union's atomic testing area at Semipalatinsk. Such overflights
could be staged from Pakistan if the Pakistani Government consented. The President rejected the Air Force's request to take over the
U-2 program, stating that he preferred to have the aircraft manned by
civilians "during operations of this kind." 71
The President had once again agreed to allow overflights of the
Soviet Union, although only over certain areas, because the need to
learn more about the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union
was too compelling. In particular, the President and top administration officials wanted to gather more data on the Soviet Union's missile program, a subject for which considerable Soviet boasting-but
no hard data-was available.
Even after he had authorized the resumption of overflights,
President Eisenhower maintained tight control over the program. He
personally authorized each overflight, which meant that Richard
Bissell would bring maps to the White House with the proposed routes
marked on them for the President to examine. More than once, according to Bissell, Eisenhower spread the map out on his Oval Office desk
for detailed study, usually with his son John (an Army officer serving
as a White House aide) and Colonel Goodpaster looking over his
shoulder. On occasion, the President would pick up a pencil and eliminate a flight leg or make some other correction to the flight plan. 71

RADAR-DECEPTIVE "DIRTY BIRDS"
One additional reason why President Eisenhower had again autho­

rized overflights of the Soviet Union was renewed CIA promises that
Soviet detection or tracking of the U-2 was unlikely. At the 6 May
1957 meeting with the President, Richard Bissell reported on the
progress that had been made in developing radar camouflage and

" Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum of Conft:rence with the President. 6 May 1957
(TS); "Record of Action-Meeting of May 6. 1957," WHOSS, Alpha. DDEL (TS).
'' Bissell interview by Welzenbach (S); Beschloss. Mayday. p. 140.

SeoFat

'"'Sll,tc et NQFQRN

Chapter 3
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Chordwise wire

absorption devices for the U-2. Once these devices_were install,ed on
the operational U-2s, he explained, the "majority of incidents would
73
be undetected."

/Spanwise wire

"Trapeze• antiradar attachments
to the U-2

Work on methods of reducing the U-2's vulnerability to radar detection had begun in the fall of 1956 as the result of President
Eisenhower's disenchantment with the overflight program following
Soviet detection and tracking of the first series of U-2 missions. The
CIA proprietary firm Scientific Engineering Institute was condutcting
this research under a project codenamed RAINBOW. SEI Chief
Engineer Dr. Franklin A. Rodgers, formerly of MIT, converted the
theories of Harvard physicist Edward Purcell into systems that ,could
be used on aircraft. SEI's radar-deception system consisted of a series
of attachments to the U-2 . First bamboo poles and later fiberglass
rods were attached to the wings. where they would not interfere with
the control surfaces. At the ends of these poles, completely circling

" Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum of Conference with the President. 6 Ma:y 1957
(TS); ..Record of Action-Meeting of May 6, 1957," WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL (TS).
SU&Fet

Sec. et NOFetU~
Chapter 3

130

the aircraft, was a small-gauge wire with precisely spaced ferrite
beads. The wire and beads were supposed to capture incoming
70-MHz radar pulses and either trap them in the loop or weaken them
so much that they would not register as a valid radar return. This configuration was called the trapeze and was not very successful.
A second approach, tested in early 1958, involved the use of
plastic material containing a printed circuit designed to absorb radar
pulses in the 65- to 85-MHz range. Nicknamed "wallpaper," this material was glued to parts of the U-2's fuselage, nose, and tail.
Although the "trapeze" and "wallpaper" systems provided protection
against some Soviet radars, the systems proved ineffective against radars operating below 65-MHz or above 85-MHz. Furthermore, both
of these additions degraded the U-2's performance. The weight and
drag of "trapeze" reduced the aircraft's operating ceiling by 1,500
feet, and "wallpaper" sometimes caused engines to overheat. 74
SEI's research results were tested by another firm known as
Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier (EG&G), which was also composed
of MIT faculty members. Under an Air Force contract to evaluate radars, EG&G operated a small testing facility at Indian Springs,
Nevada, not far from Area 51. Although Kelly Johnson had been
closely involved with the radar deception project since its early days,
he cooperated reluctantly because he disliked adding attachments that
made his aircraft less airworthy. (Johnson's dislike of the antiradar attachments was reflected in the unofficial nickname for aircraft that
had been so modified-"dirty birds.") After Lockheed mechanics
had mounted the various RAINBOW devices on the prototype U-2, a
Lockheed test pilot would fly the plane over EG&G's Indian Springs
installation. This was little more than a series of radar sets and a
trailer containing instrumentation. EG&G technicians could thus record and evaluate the U-2's radar returns as it traversed a specified
course over their facility. 75
This method of testing radar-deceptive modifications proved
both time consuming and dangerous. During a test flight on 2 April
1957, the "wallpaper" modification acted as insulation around the

" Records of the Scientific Engineering Institute (Project HTNAMABLE). OSA records
(TS Codeword).
" References to EG&G programs for the U-2 are contained in the later Convair contracts
for Projects FISH and KINGFISH. OSA records. job 67-B-415, box I (TS Codeword).

Seeret

SHret NOFORN
Chapter 3
131

·wallpaper"

engine of the U-2 known as article 341, causing it to overheat and
tlameout. Unable to restart the power plant, Lockheed tesi: pilot
Robert Sieker bailed out but was struck and killed in midair lby the
U-2's tailplane. The aircraft crashed in an area of Nevada so remote
that Area 5 1 search teams needed four days to locate the wreoekage.
The extensive search attracted the attention of the press. and a

Sec,el

Saaret NOF6ftl'II

Chapter 3
132

Wreckage of Article 34 1,
2 April 1957 .

12 April 1957 article in the Chicago Daily Tribune was headliined,
"Secrecy Veils High-Altitude Research Jet; Lockheed U-2 Ca.lied
Super Snooper." 76
•
Because of its large wingspan. an out-of-control U-2 tended to
enter a classical flat spin before ground contact. This slowed descent
and actually lessened the impact. If there was no fire after impact, the
remai ns of crashed U-2s were often salvageable, as was the case with
the wreckage of article 34 1. Kelly Johnson 's crew at the Skunk Works
used the wreckage, along with spares and salvaged parts of other
crashed U-2s, co produce another flyable airframe for about
77
$185,000. The U-2's abi lity to survive a crash in fairly good co1ndition should have been noted by the Development Projects Staff for
consideration in its contingency plans for a loss over hostile terriItory
because the equipment on board the aircraft could easily compromise
the weather research cover story.
The loss of one of Lockheed's best test pilots. as well as the prototype " dirty bird" U-2, led Kelly Johnson to suggest that Lockheed
install a large boom at the Indian Springs radar test facility. Using the

,. Accident folder. cr-ish of 2 April 1957, OSA records (S).
" Lockheed contracts. OSA Records (S).

Seeret NOFORN
Chapter 3
133

boom, which could lift entire airframes 50 feet in the air, technicians
could change the airframe's attitude and run radar tests almost continuously without having to fuel and fly the plane.n
By the summer of 1957, testing of the radar-deception system
was complete, and in July the first "dirty bird" (DB) arrived at
Detachment B. The first operational use of this aircraft occurred on
21 July l 957 in mission 4030 over Iran, Iraq, and Syria. On 31 July,
the same aircraft made a run over the Black Sea. There were a total of
nine DB missions over the USSR. The antiradar system did not prove
very effective, and its use was curtailed in May 1958.79

THE NEW DETACHMENT C
On 8 June 1957, a U-2 took off from Eielson Air Force Base in
Alaska to conduct the first intentional overflight of the Soviet Union
since December 1956. This mission broke new ground in two respects: it was the first overflight conducted from American soil and
• -the first by the new Detachment C.
Detachment C (known officially as Weather Reconnaissance
Squadron, Provisional-3) was composed of the third group of pilots to
complete their training in Nevada. In the autumn of 1956, this third
detachment needed a new base because Area 51 was about to become
the training site for a large number of Air Force pilots who would fly
the 29 U-2s purchased by the Air Force. The Agency decided that the
best location for Detachment C would be the Far East and begao
looking for bases there.
Even without the arrival of the Air Force pilots, Detachment C
could not have stayed in Nevada much longer. In June 1957, the entire facility had to be evacuated because the Atomic Energy
Commission was about to conduct a series of nuclear tests whose fallout was expected to contaminate the Groom Lake facility. All remaining CIA personnel, materiel, and aircraft were transferred to Edwards
AFB, California, and became known as Detachment G.

" Ibid (S).
,., Cunningham interview (TS Codeword}.

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Gee. et NOl'OFUQ

Chapter 3
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The search for a new home for Detachment C led the Agency to
ask the Air Force in the autumn of 1956 for permission to locate the
detachment at Yokota AFB, Japan. Because Yokota was already the
base for one covert project (the very secret Air Force Project BLACK
KNIGHT using RB-57s), Air Force Chief of Staff Twining did not
wish to locate another one there and denied the reques t. The Agency
then turned co the Navy, which granted permission for Detachmernt C
to use the Naval Air Station at Atsugi, Japan. The Japan.ese
Government received no notification of the proposed deployment because at that time it had no control over activities involving US military bases in Japan. Deployment of Detachment C began in early
1957 but was complicated by a recent decision to permit the families
of Project AQUATONE employees to accompany them on overseas
tours. As a result, program managers had to find housing facilities on
the base or in nearby communities, not an easy task in crowded
Japan.""
Detach ment C began conducting m1ss1ons in June 1957 alfter
several aircraft and pilots flew to Eie lson Air Force Base near
Fairbanks, Alaska. Air Force rndar order-of-battle reports and NSA
studies had revealed that the radar network in the Soviet Far East,
wi th antiquated radar sets and personnel of a lower caliber than those
in the western Soviet Union, was relati vely ineffective. To take advantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions
from Alaska into the Soviet Far East. The first. on 7/8 June (the aircraft crossed the international date line during the flight), was unable
to photograph its target, the ICBM impact area near Klyuchi on the
Kamchatka Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never
entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph Klyuchi on
19/20 June was marred by a camera malfunction that ruined ev;ery
third frame of photography. This flight was tracked by Soviet radars.
but there was no attempt at interception. After a pause of almost three
months during which Detachment C received a dirty-bird U-2, the detachment's third mission over Klyuchi on 15/ 16 September 1957
achieved exce llent results. The radar-deception devices proved in1effective, however. as the U-2 was tracked by Soviet radar and trailed
by five fighters.s'

. , OSA History. ch.ip. l5, pp. 2. 16-19: chap. 16. p. I (TS Co<lcword).

" Mission folders 6002 (8 June 1957). 6005 C!0 June 1957). and 6008 (16 September
l 957). OSA records. job 67-8-3'.!8. bo.~ 7 (TS Codeword).

-$ee,Fet NOFORN

Chapter 3
135

DETACHMENT B FLIGHTS FROM PAKISTAN
The most important series of overflights in the summer of l 957 were
those that Detachment B staged to gather intelligence on the Soviet
Union's guided missile and nuclear programs. President Eisenhower
had approved these overflights at the meeting on 6 May 1957, provided that Pakistan allowed the U-2s to operate from its territory (the
•
taroets were too far away from the U-2 base in Turkey).
Richard Bissell 's ersonal assistant, and
met with President
--;l;--: :s-;-:k-:-=-and:.-e:-::r- M.--:.:-i=
rza,
=--=:-•r=--=r:i-:-=--=me' M.--:,,-i s7 =-=
cer:-riruse
--=--:--:y n
-=-=::-l'.-c:-::a~eed Suhra ward y. and
Anny Commander Gen. Ayub Khan between 3 and 7 June 1957 and
received permission to operate from Lahore. The airfield at Peshawar,
a more desirable location, was not available because of repair work.
Detachment B at Ankara ferried four of its U-2s, two of which were
dirty birds, to Lahore. A C-124 brought in eight pilots and ground
crews to prepare for missions over the Soviet Union and the People·s
Republic of China (PRC) beginning on 4 August {Operation SOFf
TOUCH) . During a 23-day period, these aircraft made nine flights:
seven over the USSR and two over the PRC. Although one of the
seven flights over the USSR was a failure because the camera
. malfunctioned after taking only 125 exposures, the remaining missions over Central Asia were a complete success. producing a bonanza of information that kept scores of photointerpreters busy for
more than a year.•~
=
01
-·'"'=

The 5 August flight, a dirty bird piloted by Buster Edens. was
the first to photograph the major Soviet space launch facility east of
the Aral Sea in Kazakhstan. None of the mission planners was certain
just where the range was located, so the U-2 pilot followed the rail
lines in the area. As a result, the plane did not pass directly over the
rangehead and obtained only oblique photography.
Although known in the West today as Tyuratam, this missi le installation had no name when it was first photographed in August
1957. In preparation for a briefing to President Eisenhower on the
SOFf TOUCH photography, Dino Brugioni, an assistant to PIO chief
Arthur Lundahl, examined all the existing maps of the area to see if
he could find a place name for the missile base. Only one map. made
by the Gennans during World War 11, showed a community in the vicinity of the missile facility. The settlement's name was Tyuratam.
which means "arrow burial ground" in the Kazakh language, and this

'' OSA History. chap. 12, pp. 19-20 (TS Codeword): NP/C Hiswry. vol. 1. pp. 159-161

(Sl.

Seccet

Operation SOFT TOUCH Overflights, August 1957

---

Mission 4036 8 August
Mission 4039 12 August
/.r,.,,- - ··- - Mission 4045 21 August
• • •••• Mission 4048 21 August
•••• •• • - Mission 4049 22 August
- - - Mission 4050 22 August
- - - Mission 4051 22 August
- • - Mission 4058 28 August
r-'t

/

-

• -

-

-

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Ila

,
,
I

I
,

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I I Sinkiang

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I I
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~

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Secret NOFORN

....eeret N6f'OPUQ

Chapter 3
137

U-2 photography of 1"yuratam
Missile Testing RangEi

was the name Brugioni gave the missile base. Official Soviet releases
concerning this base have always referred to it as Baykonur, but the
community of Baykonyr is actually more than 200 miles north of
11
Tyuratam.
While PID was still analyzing the SOFT TOUCH photography,
the Soviet Union announced the successfu l launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) from Baykonyr (Tyuratam). On 26
August l 957 , the Soviet news agency TASS stated that a "su per-long-range multistage intercontinental ballistic rocket" had been
successfully tested, adding "it is now possible to send missiles to any

"' Lundahl and Brugioni intcrv i<!w (TS Codeword).

&ecuet

Set1 et N6F8RN

Chapter 3
138

Semipa/atinsk Nuclear
Weapons Proving Ground,
22 August 1957

part of the world." ,s, The Soviet announcement made the intelligence
community want even more information on Tyuratam, and a second
U-2 piloted by Edwin K. Jones flew over the area on 28 August 1957,
just one week after the Soviet ICBM launch. This mission obtained
excellent venical photographs of the main launch complex. and
photointerpreters soon determined that the Soviets had only one
launchpad at Tyuratam. The base was not photographed again until 9
July 1959, at which time it still had only one launch pad, although
two more were under construction." 5
On 20 and 21 August 1957, U-2s conducted the first overflights
of the Soviet nuclear testing grounds al Semipalatinsk, north-northwest of L ake Balkhash. The first mission. pi loted by Sammy V. C.
Snider, passed over part of the provi ng grounds, flew on to
Novokuznetsk, and then proceeded to Tomsk, where it began its return leg that included coverage of a very large uranium-processing facility at the new city of Berezovskiy. In the second mission, James
Cherbonneaux flew directly over the Semipalatinsk proving grounds
only four hours before a half-megaton device was detonated. In fact,
the U-2 unknowingly photographed the ai rcraft that was to drop the

"' .. Is Russia A~ad in Missil.! Raet.'... US News and World Report. 6 September 1957. pp.
30- 3.3.
" Mission fokkrs 4058 (28 August 1957) an<l 4125 (9 July 1959). OSA recor<ls. job
67-8-972. boxes 8 and 11 (TS Codeword).
6e&FOt

Sec, et N6f6filN

Chapter 3
139

On its way to Semipalatinsk. the 21 August m1ss1on tle:w a
search pattern over the western end of Lake Balkash looking for another Soviet missi le-related installation and made the first photographs of what was later determined to be the new missile test center
at Saryshagan. This faci lity was used to test radars against incoming
missiles fired from Kapustin Yar, I .400 miles to the west. Sarysh:agan
later became the center fo r the development of the Soviet Union's advanced antiballistic missile (ABM) weapon system .
On 23 August 1957, DDC I Cabell, Richard Bissell, and Air
Force Chief of Staff Twining met with President Eisenhower to re:port
on the results of Operation SOFT TOUCH. T hey showed the
President some of the photographic results of the earlier missions and
reported on the effects of the antiradar measures. Although the
antiradar measures had not proved successful, the photographic yield
from the missions was extremely valuable. Bissell then informed! the
·President that the SOFT TOUCH operation was just about to conclude with the transfer of the aircraft back to Adana. He asked permission for one of the U-2s to make another overflight of the Soviet
Union on this return trip, but the President denied the request. not
wishing to conduct any more overflights than were necessary.~'

THE DECLINE OF DETACHMENT A
During the summer of 1957, all overflights of the Soviet Union were
conducted by either Detachment B or Detachment C. Detachment A
in Germany was a less desirable starting point for overfl ights of the
Soviet Union because such missions had to cross Eastern Europe first,
increasing the likelihood of detection and diplomatic protests.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union's air defense and radar networks were
strongest along its western borders. so Detachment B missions over
the southern portion of the Soviet Union and Detachment C missions

- Mission folder 4045 (10 August 1957) and 4050 (21 August 1957). OSA records. job
67-B-972. box 3 (TS Codeword).
" Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum for the Record, 23 August 1957. WHOSS. Alpha.

DDEL (TS).

Seu et NOFORP•

Chapter 3

140
in the Far East were less risky than those conducted by Detachment
A. Finally, the main target of U-2 photography after the bomber issue
receded was Soviet missile and nuclear progress. The testing areas for
these weapons were located in the vast open spaces of the south-central and eastern portions of the Soviet Union, which lay beyond the
range of Detachment A's aircraft.
The decline in importance of Detachment A had begun with the
President's standdown order of IO July I 956. During the next three
months, the detachment conducted only 11 missions, all over the
Mediterranean region rather than the original target of the Soviet
Union, and the slow pace of activity and change in mission adversely
affected pilot morale. One of the detachment's aircraft was lost in a
crash on 17 September, killing pilot Howard Carey and garnering unwanted publicity. Conditions improved when the detachment moved
to the newly renovated facility at Giebelstadt in early October 1956,
but security now became a problem there. Detachment A personnel
discovered that a long, black Soviet-Bloc limousine was parked at the
end of the Giebelstadt runway whenever the U-2s took off.:s,s
During the next year, Detachment A mounted on ly four overflights. The first two were over Eastern Europe: one over Bulgaria on
10 December 1956 and the other over Albania on 25 April 1957.
Then a long period of inactivity folllowed, ending with a third mission
on 11 October 1957, which conducted electronic surveillance of
Soviet naval maneuvers in the Barents Sea. The final overflight of
Detachment A , mission 2040 on l 3 October 1957, flew north over
Norway to the Bering Sea, turned southeast to overfly Murmansk, and
89
then exited to the north, returning to Germany via Norway.
A lthough the final missions of Detachment A achieved excellent
results. project headquarters had already decided that Western Europe
was not a satisfactory location for overflights of the Soviet Union and
had notified Detachment A on 20 September 1957 that its operations
would cease in November. By 15 November 1957. all of the detachment's personnel and aircraft had returned to the United States.
During Detachment A's 17-month period of operations, seven pilots

"" OSA History. chap. 11, pp. -U-42 (TS Codeword).

"" Mission folder.; 40 18 (JO December 1956). 2036 (25 April 1957). 2037 ( II October
1957). 2040 ( 13 October 1957). OSA records. job 67-8-972. boll 7, and job 67-8-328, box
6 {TS Codeword).

--sec,et --

Final Overflight by Detachment A, 13 October 1957
0
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Sec, et NOFOAN
Chapter 3
142

had flown a total of 23 missions: six over the Soviet Union, five over
Eastern Europe, and most of the remaining 12 missions over the
Mediterranean area.')()

COOPERATION WITH NORWAY
The final missions of Detachment A had one unforeseen result: the
beginning of cooperation between CIA and the Norwegian
Intelligence Service on the U-2 program. Norwegian radars tracked
the overflights of the Barents Sea and Murmansk in October 1957,
and Col. Vilhelm Evan° Chief of the Norweoian Defense Staff
Intelli 0 ence Service

In March 1958, Colonel
Evang came to Washington and received a briefing from Arthur
Lundahl together with sanitized photos that did not reveal the altitude
of the aircraft or the focal length of the camera. The Agency provided
additional photos to Norway during a visit by a PIO staff member in
July.~'
Later that year Norway agreed to provide an airfield for the
United States to conduct U-2 flights that did not violate Soviet airspace. On 15 September l
a Detachment B staging party arrived
at Bodo Air Force Base
·~~~-----c~~~~~\this
was followed by an ELINT collection flight over international waters
(the Kara Sea) on 25 October. On 6 November, the U-2 returned to
Adana by conducting a lengthy ELINT collection flight along the borders of the Soviet Union and East Germany. During the initial portion
of the mission, when the U-2 flew along the Soviet-Finnish border
and then turned east over the Gulf of Finland to come within 60 miles
of Leningrad (while remaining over international waters), the aircraft
was the target of 23 unsuccessful Soviet intercept attempts. 92

•., OSA History, chap. I [. p. 44: chap. I 9. annex 120 (TS Codeword).
"' Ibid., chap. 11, pp. 44-45 (TS Codeword); NPIC History. vol. 3. pp. 447-8 (S) .
•,, Mission folders !482 (9 October !958), 4092 (25 October !958). and 4093 (6
November 1958). OSA records. job 67-B-972. boxes 3 and 10.

.Saeret

Sewet NOFOHN

Chapter 3
143

DECLINING OVERFLIGHT ACTIVITY

U-2 at Bodo, Norway

·operation SOFf TOUCH (4-27 August 1957) proved to be the high
water mark of U-2 operations against the Soviet Union. Detachment
B staged one more overflight on IO September 1957. when a U-2 piloted by Wi lliam Hall flew from Adana to photograph the Kapustin
Yar M issile Test Range for the first time since the RAF's overflight in
1953, obtaining photographs of a large medium-range ball istic missile
(MRBM) on the launchpad. Six days later Detachment C conducted
its successful overflight of the lCBM impact site at Kl yuchi, and
October saw the final two overfl ights of Detachment A . After these
missions, penetrat ion overflights became a rarity. There would be
only six more during the next 32 months: one, in 1958; two. in 1959;
and three, in 1960 (one of which was unsuccessful). During this
period, President Eisenhower did authorize a number of fl ights along
Soviet border areas that occasionally penetrated shon distances inside
the border. but the Chief Executive had become extremely wary of
authorizing ' 'deep penetration·• overflights. which invariably brought
protests from Moscow.
The border flights took place under tight controls. Begi nning in
the fall of 1957, all messages from Washington to Adana giving coordinates for flights along the Soviet border contained the statement:
" This is not a penetration overflight'' and warned about flying too
close to Soviet borders. The Soviets even attempted to shoot down
Secret

Sec1 et NOFOAN

Chapter 3
144

U-2s flying well within international airspace above the Black Sea, as
was the case on 27 October I957, when electronic intelligence equipment on a U-2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet
airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception by Soviet fighters.'n
The sole U-2 overflight of 1958 was conducted by a dirty bird
from Detachment C. On I March 1958, mission 6011 overflew the
Soviet Far East and photographed the Trans-Siberian Railroad,
Sovetskaya Gavan', the Tatar Strait, and a strange installation at
Malaya Sazanka, which was eventually determined to be a structure
for mating nuclear devices with their detonators. This was the first
and only U-2 overflight of the Soviet Union staged from Japan. 94
On 5 March 1958, the Soviet Union delivered a vigorous protest
concerning this mission, prompting President Eisenhower to tell
Colonel Goodpaster on 7 March to inform the CIA that U-2 flights
were to be "discontinued, effective at once." 95 This standdown was
to last more than 16 months, until July 1959. The Soviets had not
been fooled by the antiradar devices carried by mission 601 l, as was
demonstrated by the detailed information about the mission contained
in a Soviet aide-memoire delivered on 21 April I958. It was clear that
dirty bird aircraft were not effective and that Soviet radar operators
had little difficulty in tracking them. At this point, the Agency abandoned the use of the antiradar devices on the U-2. As a substitute,
Lockheed began working to develop a paint with radar-suppressant
qualities, but this project also proved unsuccessful.
The U-2s were not the only cause for the Soviet protests that so
vexed the President. On 27 June 1958, an Agency C-118 on a courier
flight from Adana to Teheran strayed into Soviet Armenia and was
shot down; the Soviets captured two survivors, including one Agency
employee. Ten days later the Air Force began launching balloons designed to fly across the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This new
balloon project (known as WS-461 L) had been authorized by
President Eisenhower on 25 June after Deputy Secretary of Defense
Donald Quarles argued that a small number of balloons should be
'" Mission folder 4061 (27 October 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, bol\ 8 (TS
Codeword).
•• Mission folder 6011 (1 March 1958), OSA records. job 67-B-972, box 13 (TS
Codeword).
'" Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record, 7 March 1958, WHOSS, Alpha,
DDEL (TS, declassified).
G8GF8t

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launched to take advantage of a newly discovered change in the
west-to-east jet stream. Normally, this fast-moving air current stayed
at an altitude of 55,000 feet, but, during June and July, it turned
abruptly upward over the Bering Sea just west of Alaska, climbed to
110,000 feet, and then reversed direction. One of the key arguments
that convinced the President to approve the project was Quarles 's
claim that the balloons' "chance of being detected is rather small and
their identification or shootdown practically nil." 96
Release of the balloons took place from an aircraft carrier in the
Bering Sea on 7 July 1958. Nothing was heard about them until 28
July, when Poland sent a note protesting the overflight of a US-made,
camera-carrying balloon that had fallen to earth in central Poland.
The loss of this balloon was because of human error. Each balloon
was equipped with a timing device that would cause it to drop its
camera and film payload after crossing the target areas. An Air Force
technician aboard the aircraft carrier had calculated that the balloons
should cross the Eurasian landmass in about 16 days. Thus, he adjusted regulators aboard the balloons to cause automatic descent after
. 400 hours aloft. When bad weather delayed the launch for three successive days. however, the technician forgot to reset the timing devices. As a result, one payload fell into Poland. None of the three
WS-461 L balloon payloads was recovered.'n
The Polish protest was quickly followed by a Soviet note protesting the balloons' violation of the Soviet Union's airspace. Several
months later, the Soviets placed the US balloon and photographic
equipment on display in Moscow for the world's press. President
Eisenhower was angry that the Defense Department's assurances that
the balloons would not be detected had proved false. Even worse, one
of the balloons had been recovered by the Poles because the Air Force
had disobeyed his instructions for the balloon project. When the Air
Force had proposed the use of timers to bring down the balloons at
the end of the mission, Eisenhower had said no, fearing that a malfunction could cause the balloons to come down prematurely. Furious
at the Air Force's insubordination, the President ordered General

'"' Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum for the Record. 25 June 1958, WHOSS, Alpha,
DDEL (TS).
'" Donald E. Welzenbach. "Observation Balloons and Weather Satellites," Studies in
Intelligence 30 (Spring 1986): pp. 26-28 (S).

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Equipment from a WS-461L
balloon on display in Moscow,
11 October 1958

Goodpaster on 29 July 1958 10 rell rhe A ir Force that " the project is
to be discontinued at once and every cent thac has been made available as part of any project involving crossing the Iron Curtain is 1to be
impounded and no further expenditures are to be made." "'
Two days later Eisenhower followed up this order with a formal
memorandum co Secretary of Defense Nei l McElroy telling him that
"there is disturbing evidence of a deterioration in the processes of
discipline and responsibility within the armed forces." He cited, in
particular, "unauthorized decisions which have apparently resulted in
certain balloons falling within the territory of the Communist B loc"
99
and overflights over routes "that contravened my standing orders."
On 2 September I 958, there was another violation of Soviet ai rspace when an unarmed Air Force EC-130 on an electronic intelligence
collection mission crossed from Turkey into Soviet Armenia and was
shot down by Soviet fighter aircraft. Six of the men on board were
killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from agai n, despite State
Department attempts to get the Soviet Union to reveal their fate.""'
" Andrew J. Goodpaster, l\lkmorandum for the Record. :!9 July 1958. WHOSS. Alpha,
DDEL (S): Goodpa.~ter interview (S).
•,. Quo1ed in Ambrose. Eiserrhower: The President. pp. 475-476.
"" "US Rc:presen1a1ions to 1he Sovie! Government on C-130 Transport Shoe Down by
Sovie! Fighl<!r Aircr.i.ft." US Departmerrt of State Bulletin. 23 Fd,ruary 1959. pp. 2621-271:
Beschloss, Mayday. p. 159.

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President Eisenhower was disturbed by the increased superpower
tension that had resulted from violations of Soviet airspace by US
balloons and aircraft because he still hoped to enter into arms I imitation negotiations with the Soviets. On 8 September 1958, the United
States sent a note to the Soviet Union calling for a Soviet answer to
US proposals for a " study of the technical aspects of safeguards
against the possibility of surprise attack... One week later the S,oviets
agreed to participate and suggested that the talks begin in Geneva on
IO November I 958. President Eisenhower was also attempting tt:> persuade the Soviet Union to begin talks aimed at eliminating the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. These efforts began with a 22
A ugust 1958 offer to suspend US nuclear tests for one year on the
condition that the Soviet Union al so refrain from further tests and join
in negotiations. On 30 August, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev accepted the proposal and agreed to start talks on 3 I October 1958 in
Geneva. When the talks began, however, the Soviets refused to agree
to a test ban and carried out nuclear tests at Semipalatinsk on I and 3
November. Nevertheless, during the late summer and early autumn of
1958, President Eisenhower. detennined to reduce to a minimum any
aggravation of the Soviets. kept the U-2 overflight program in
. b 10 1
_ [ 1_ro o.
In November 1958, relations with the Soviet Union worsened after Khrushchev prec ipitated a new crisis over West Berlin by announcing plans to sign a peace treaty with East Germany by May
1959. He stated that such a treaty would terminate Allied rights in
West Berlin. Four days later, Soviet troops began harassing US Anny
truck convoys on the highways leading from West Germany to West
Berlin. Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threat,ening
as the blockade of l 948-49, President Eisenhower wished to :avoid
any actions that would provoke the Soviets. Tension over West Berlin
was, therefore, an additional reason for continuing to keep the U-2
away from the Soviet Bloc. oo:

CONCERNS ABOUT SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES
AGAINST THE U-2
Another reason for President Eisenhower's gro~ ing rel!J.~ ance to authorize flights over the Soviet Union may have ~ en c~ ;rn , hat the
Soviets were developing countenneasures that would enable them to

" " Ambrose. Eisenhower: The President. pp. 489-J9 I.

"'' Ibid.. pp. 502-504.

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shoot down a U-2. Before the program started, Richard Bissell had
estimated that the U-2 would be able to fly over the Soviet Union
with impunity for only about two years. This period was already over,
and the Soviets were working frantically to devise a means to stop
U-2 overflights. From the very beginning, Soviet air defense units had
not only tracked U-2s with radars, but had also made repeated efforts
to shoot them down with antiaircraft weapons and interceptor aircraft.
In 1956 such attempted interceptions had involved primarily MiG-15s
and MiG- l 7s, which could barely reach 55,000 feet. The advent of
MiG- l 9s and MiG-21 s, which could climb even higher, provided a
greater threat for U-2 pilots.
Realistic training for pilots learning to intercept the U-2 became
possible after the Soviets developed a new high-altitude aircraft, the
Mandrake, which was actually an improved version of the
Yakovlev-25 all-weather interceptor. The Mandrake used a high-lift,
low-drag wing design similar to that employed by the U-2, but its
twin engines made it heavier. The Mandrake's operating altitude was
55,000 to 65,000 feet, and its maximum altitude was 69,000, far less
than the 75,000 feet reached by the U-2. Like the U-2, the
Mandrake's wings would not tolerate great stresses, so it could not be
used as an attack aircraft at the high altitudes at which both planes
operated. Between 1957 and 1959, Yakovlev built 15 to 20 of these
aircraft in two versions: the Mandrake-R or YAK-25RM and the
Mandrake-T, sometimes called the YAK-26. These high-altitude aircraft were used to overfly the Middle East, India, China, and
Pakistan, as well as border regions of NATO nations in Europe during
the late 1950s and early I 960s. It is not believed that Mandrakes ever
attempted to overfly the continental United States."'-'
Beginning in late 1957, the Mandrake served as a practice target
for pilots of high-performance Soviet MiG-19 and MiG-21 interceptors. The Soviet technique that most concerned U-2 pilots was the
"snap up" or power dive and zoom climb. In this maneuver,
ground-based radar operators would direct the interceptor aircraft
along the same flight path as the U-2. When the MiG pilot achieved
the same compass heading as the U-2 flying more than 10,000 feet
above him, he would put his aircraft into a shallow dive to pick up

'

01

"Yakovlev Yak-25RM Mandrake," Jane's Defence Weekly, vol. 3, no. 7, 16 February

1985.

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speed, apply full throttle to the engine, then pull back on the stick and
zoom as high as he could. In this manner the Soviet pilot hoped to
come up directly beneath the U-2 so he could use his guns and missiles against the shiny U-2 etched in silver against the dark blue-black
of space. Using this maneuver, some MiGs were able to climb as high
as the U-2 but seldom got very close. At this height the MiGs were
completely out of control; their small, swept-back wings provided insufficient lift; and their control surfaces were too small to maintain
aircraft stability. U-2 pilots often spotted MiGs that reached the apex
of their zoom climbs and then fell away toward the earth. The US pilots' greatest fear was that one of the MiGs would actually collide
with a U-2 during a zoom climb.
1().1

U-2 pilots complained that they felt like ducks in a shooting gallery under these circumstances and suggested that the underside of the
silvery aircraft be camouflaged in some manner. Kelly Johnson had
originally believed the U-2 would fly so high that it would be invisible, thus eliminating the need to paint the aircraft and thereby avoiding the added weight and drag that paint produced. The paint penalty
was calculated to be a foot of altitude for every pound of paint. A full
_ c_O;J.t of paint cost the U-2 250 feet of altitude, substantially less than
the L,500-foot penalty paid for the addition of dirty bird-devices.
By late 1957, Johnson agreed that something had to be done.
After a series of tests over Edwards AFB, Lockheed began coating
the U-2s with a standard blue-black military specification paint on top
and a lighter cloud-blue paint below. Subsequent tests over Nevada
revealed that the U-2s were less conspicuous when painted all over
with a matte-finish blue-black color, which helped them blend with
105
the dark canopy o f space.

MORE POWERFUL ENGINES FOR THE U-2
Less conspicuous paints were not the only answer to the growing
threat of Soviet interceptors. A more powerful engine would increase
the U-2's maximum altitude, which was the surest way to protect the
aircraft from all Soviet threats. During late 1958 and early 1959,
Lockheed began refitting the Agency's 13 remaining U-2soriginally the Agency had taken delivery of 20 planes and the Air
"u
Information supplied by Jacob Kratt and James Cherbonneaux to Donald E.
Wt:lz.:nbach, May 1986.

"" Lockheed contracts, OSA r.:cords (S).

Seeret

1Su

Soviet MiG-21 interceptor (top),
Soviet MiG- 19 interceptor
(middle), Soviet MiG-19
photographed by a U-2,
13 October 1957 (bottom)

Sec.et NOFORN

--

.a.

..

·--·- - ... -- ----::::::

YAK-25RD Mandrake on
display at the Gagarin
Military Academy Museum
(top and middle)
U-2 in the new black
paint scheme (left)

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Force of 31-with the more powerful Pratt & Whitney 175-Pl3 jet
engine. This new power plant generated 4,200 pounds more thrust
while adding only 2,050 pounds more weight. With its greater power,
the engine permitted the U-2 to reach operational altitude more quickly, thereby reducing the telltale contrails that the U-2 produced as it
passed through the tropopause at 45,000 to 55,000 feet. With the new
engine, U-2 passed through this portion of the atmosphere faster and
did so before entering hostile airspace, thus reducing the chance of
visual detection. The 175 power plant also made it possible for the
U-2 to carry a larger payload and gain another 2,500 feet in altitude,
permitting it to cruise at 74,600 feet. The new engines were in very
short supply because of the needs of the Air Force's F-105 construction program, but Colonel Geary used his Air Force contacts to obtain
an initial supply of 12 engines. The Air Force never equipped its original U-2s with the 175 engines. 10"
Detachment C in Japan received the first of these re-engined aircraft, known as U-2Cs, in July 1959, and two more arrived in Turkey
for Detachment B in August. All Agency U-2s had the new engines
by the summer of 1962, but by then only seven CIA U-2s remained in
service.

INTERVENTION IN LEBANON, 1958
Although the U-2 was used less and less for its original role of gathering strategic intelligence on the Soviet Bloc, it had acquired the new
mission of providing US decisionmakers with up-to-date information
on crisis situations all around the world. The first use of the U-2 to
gather tactical intelligence occurred during the 1956 Suez Crisis.
Afterward, U-2s from the Turkish-based Detachment B conducted periodic overflights to monitor the situation in the troubled Middle East,
and they became especially active during the summer of 1958.
On 15 July 1958, President Eisenhower ordered US troops to
land in Lebanon in response to a request for assistance by Lebanese
President Camille Chamoun. Three months earlier, Eisenhower had
turned down a similar request because the rioting that had led
President Chamoun to ask for American aid had died down before intervention became necessary. In July, however, President Eisenhower
saw the overall situation in the Middle East as much more threatening. On 14 July forces aligned toward Egyptian President Gama[
""' OSA History, chap. 16, p. 8 (TS Codeword); Geary interview (S).

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Abdel Nasser overthrew the Government of Iraq and assassinated the
royal family. Long concerned by the growing influence of Nasser,
who had close ties to the Soviet Union and now headed both Egypt
and Syria in the new United Arab Republic. President Eisenhower decided that US intervention was necessary to stabilize the situation in
Lebanon and to show Nasser that the United States was willing to use
force to defend its vital interests in the region. Before intervening in
Lebanon, the United States consulted with the United Kingdom,
which also decided to intervene in the Middle East by sending paratroopers to assist the Government of Jordan on 17 July.
With US Marines and Army troops deployed in a potentially
hostile situation in Lebanon, US military commanders and intelligence community analysts immediately requested tactical reconnaissance flights to look for threats to the US units and evidence that
other Middle Eastern countries or the Soviet Union might be preparing to intervene. The U-2s of Detachment B in Turkey carried out
these missions.
Because tactical reconnaissance required an immediate readout
of-the films taken, the Photographic Intelligence Center (the new
name for the Photo-Intelligence Division from August 1958) quickly
reopened the film-developing unit at Adana and staffed it with lab
technicians and photointerpreters. Throughout the summer of 1958.
Detachment B U-2s brought back photography of military camps. airfields, and ports of those Mediterranean countries receiving Soviet
arms. The detachment also kept a close watch on Egyptian-based
Soviet submarines, which posed a threat to US 6th Fleet ships in the
Mediterranean. In addition, U-2s flew occasional electronic intelligence collection missions along the Soviet border and over the Black
Sea without entering Soviet airspace. In late August, as the crisis in
the Middle East eased, the United States began withdrawing its
14,300 troops. It was not until 25 October, however, that the last
American soldier left Lebanon. 101

BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE U-2 PROJECT
Shortly after the withdrawal of US troops from Lebanon, a new group
of pilots joined the U-2 project. In November 1958, four RAF officers
arrived at Detachment B at Adana. thus beginning the United
Kingdom's participation in U-2 operations. The British had first
"" Ambrose, Eisenhower: Tlte President. pp. 462--473.

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become involved in the U-2 project in September 1956, when the
United States supplied them with photography from U-2 missions. To
handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which
later merged with the US control system. By 1957 cooperation between the United Kingdom and the United States had expanded to
include frequent consultation between the requirements and photointerpretation organizations of both countries. James Reber and
Arthur Lundahl made periodic trips to the United Kingdom for
discussions with Alan Crick's UK Requirements Committee (generally known as the Crick Committee, later as the Joint Priorities
Committee), the Joint Intelligence Committee, the Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Center, and MI-6. 108
The idea of using British pilots in the U-2 program first arose in
the spring of 1957, when Richard Bissell-upset that his aircraft had
not been allowed to fly over the Soviet Union since the December
1956 standdown-was searching for ways to reduce the political risks
of overflights and thus obtain more frequent authorization for missions over the Soviet Union. One of his proposals was to use non-US
pilots-possibly British-to increase the possibility of plausible denial in the event of a loss. At a meeting with key CIA, Defense
Department, and State Department officials on 6 May 1957, President
Eisenhower approved the concept of British participation in the U-2
•
IC>'J
proJect.
During the next six months, Dulles and Bissell met with Sir Dick
White, head of MI-6, and Air Vice Marshal William M. L.
MacDonald, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Intelligence, on several occasions to discuss the proposal in general terms. At first the
CIA did not push the proposal too hard because at the same meeting
in which he approved British participation, President Eisenhower had
consented to the resumption of U-2 missions over the Soviet Union,
resulting in 10 overflights during the summer and early fall of 1957.
But when flights ceased in October, the thought of British participation became more attractive. By early 1958, Bissell was pressing the
British to begin training pilots in the U-2 even though no final political decision on their participation had been made. On 7 February
1958, Bis sell instructed the Chief of Station in Londonj
to ask Air Vice Marshal MacDonald if the RAF was prepared to

~---~__J

'"" See, for ex:ample, the trip reports of the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee in the
COMIREX records, IC Staff (TS Codeword).
'"' Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum of Conference with the President, 6 May 1957
(TS); idem, "Record of Action-Meeting of May 6, 1957," WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL (TS).

Scere4i

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select a group of pilots for the U-2 project. MacDonald agreed to
Bissell's proposal and began recruiting RAF pilots to fly the U-2. 110
In June 1958, representatives from the British Air Ministry came
to project headquarters for an orientation and then sat down with CIA
officials to work out an agreement on plans and procedures for the
joint project. The two sides decided to establish a small RAF contingent that would be integrated into and supported by Detachment B at
Adana. The British missions would be operationally controlled by
CIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots began
training in Texas. One of these pilots, Squadron Leader Christopher
H. Walker, died in a training accident in July 1958. Because of the
addition of RAF officers to the program, Project AQUATONE received a new codename, CHALICE. By the end of November 1958,
three RAF pilots and a flight surgeon joined Detachment B at Adana
with Turkish approval.
Formal approval by the political leaders of the United Kingdom
and the United States had come several months earlier. On 27 August
-1958, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan gave his approval to British
participation in the project as long as he had the right to approve or
disapprove all operational flights by RAF pilots. On the same day,
President Eisenhower gave his approval in principle for the joint pro.
Ill
Ject.
Both sides stood to gain from the joint nature of the U-2 project.
For Richard Bissell, British participation was a means to gain an additional source of authorization for overflights of the Soviet Union. Six
months earlier, Bissell had cabled to the London Chief of Station that
he wanted British participation because it would "facilitate operations
by them at times or under circumstances beyond the scope of authority accorded by US political authorities." 112
President Eisenhower viewed British participation as a way to
confuse the Soviets as to the sponsorship of particular overflights and
also to spread the risk in the event of a loss. Furthermore, he was used

"" OSA History, chap. 13, pp. 1-2 (TS Codeword).

'" Ibid.. pp. 5-6 (TS Codeword).
"' Ibid., p. I (TS Codeword).

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to working closely with the British from his wartime experience and
believed that their involvement in the U-2 program was a natural as113
pect of their alliance with the United States.
On the British side, participation in U-2 flights was a logical extension of the close cooperation that already existed between the two
countries on the U-2 program . T he direct involvement of the British
also enabled them to conduct additional flights in areas such as the
Middle East that were of more intelligence interest to the United
Kingdom than to the United States. T he British also may have reasoned that direct participation in the program was the best way to ensure that they had a right to share in the U-2 's take. Otherwise, the
United States might decide at some: point to cut off the flow of U-2
photography, as it had done during the 1956 Suez Crisis.
By November 1958, British pi lots had joined Detachment B, and
arrangements had been made for the: title to the aircr.ift they would be
using to be transferred on paper to the British Government. In a final
exchange of letters between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister
Macmillan in December, the President summarized the lines of authority for the joint program: "Br iitish missions are carried out on
your authority and are your responsibility just as our activities are authorized and controlled here in accordance with the procedures I have
established. In this sense, it could be: said that we are carrying out two
complementary programs rather than a joint one.·· IIJ
Richard Bissell had achieved his goal of gaining another source
of approval for overflights of the Soviet Union. In late 1959 and early
1960 , this arrangement proved its value when British pilots conducted
two highly successful missions over Soviet missile testing facilities at
a time when President Eisenhower had not authorized an overflight
for almost six months (see chapter 4). Most flights by the RAF pilots
in Detachment B, however, took place in the Middle East. where the
United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pilots took part in overflights.
In Britain, the cover story for the RAF participation in the U-2
program was that British fliers were being trained to fly high-altitude
weather-sampling missions for the !RAF weather service. To support
this cover, a U-2 was ferried to Watton RAF Base, England, in early
'" Goodpaster interv iew (S).
,,. OSA History. ch:ip. 13. pp. I 0-11 (TS Cod,:word).

£ee.ot

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157

May 1959, and used to fly weather missions on 7 and 8 May before
returning to Adana. Two more weather-sampling flights took place
over England on 5 and 6 October 1959.

THE U-2 PROJECT AT THE BEGINNING OF 1959
Early 1959 saw Detachment B aircraft active primarily over Middle
Eastern countries, with occasional overflights of Albania to check for
reported Soviet missile installations. Detachment C mainly collected
high-altitude weather data, although it also flew two missions over
Tibet and Southwest China (see chapter 5). The overflight program
against the Soviet Union seemed to be at a standstill, but pressures
within the government were building to resume deep-penetration
flights to resolve the growing "missile-gap" controversy.
Organizationally, the U-2 project underwent a major change after
Richard Bissell became CIA's Deputy Director for Plans on I January
1959. At first glance, Bissell's selection seems unusual because he
• liad spent most of his Agency career heading the U-2 project, but his
first major assignment had been coordinating support for the operation that overthrew the leftist Government of Guatemala in 1954.
Furthermore, Bissell's U-2 project was the major covert collector 0f
intelligence against the CIA's primary target, the Soviet Union.
During his years as head of the Development Projects Staff
(DPS), Bissell had opposed proposals to bring all Agency air activities together into a single office, fearing that he would lose control of
the U-2 project. Once he became Deputy Director for Plans, his viewpoint changed; he was now in a position to consolidate all air activities under his own control. On 16 February 1959, the DPS became the
Development Projects Division (DPD) of the Directorate of Plans (at
the time known as the Deputy Directorate/Plans or DDP). Despite the
tremendous increase in the scope of his duties after assuming control
of the DDP, Bissell retained personal control of his previous
Development Projects Staff projects: the U-2 program, another project to develop a photosatellite, and a third project to design a follow-on aircraft for the U-2 (OXCART). Although the amalgamation
of all Agency air operations and the transfer of the U-2 project to the
DDP made sense, the question remained as to whether one individual
could effectively control all these different activities.

iearet

- 158 - --

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Geern·t NOf'OHN

Chapter 4
159

_The Final Overflights of
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960

THE U-2 AND THE "MISSILE-GAP" DEBATE
Despite President Eisenhower's reluctance to send U-2s over the
Soviet Bloc, he once again authorized overflights in the summer of
1959, after a pause of more than a year. The overriding factor in his
decision was the growing '• missile-gap" controversy. which had its
•roots in a series of dramatic Soviet announcements during the second
half of 1957. The first announcement revealed the successful test of
an intercontinental ballistic missile in August. Then in October, the
Soviets announced the successful orbiting of the world's first artificial
earth satellite, Sputnik. One month later the Soviets orbited a second
satellite containing a dog and a television camera. To many
Americans, including some influential members of Congress, the
Soviet Union's space successes seemed to indicate that its missile
program was ahead of that of the United States. By the spring of
1958, after the United States had successfully launched several satellites, fears of a space technology gap between the two superpowers
had eased. By the end of the year, however, new concerns arose that
the Soviet Union was producing a missile arsenal that would be much
larger than that of the United States. This was the famous missile gap
1
that received widespread publicity beginning in early 1959.
The missile-gap controversy was fueled by Soviet boasts about
the success of their missile program. On 4 December 1958. a Soviet
delegate to the Geneva Conference on Surprise Attack stated: "Soviet
ICBMs are at present in mass production." Five days later, Soviet

' For an overview of tht: controversy. see Roy E. Licklider. "The Missile Gap
Controversy." Political SL'ience Quanerly 85 ( I 970):600-6 l 5.

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Launch of Sputnik,
4 October 1957

Premier Nikita Khrushchev asserted that the Soviet Union had an
ICBM capable of carrying a 5-megaton nuclear warhead 8,000 miles.
These statements seemed all the more ominous because, during this
same month of December, the firs:t attempt to launch the new US
Titan ICBM failed. In reality, all of the Soviet statements were sheer
propaganda; they had encountered difficulties with the SS-6 ICBM,
and the program was at a standstill. As a result, there were no ICBM
launches from Tyuratam between 29 May 1958 and 17 February
1959, a space of almost nine months.:
To conceal the difficulties in their missile program. Soviet leaders continued to praise its alleged successes. At the beginning of
February 1959, Khrushchev opened the Soviet Communist Party
Congress in Moscow by claiming that "serial production of intercontinental ballistic rockets has been organized." Several months later
Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Ma linovsky stated that these missiles
were capable of hitting "precisely ainy point" and added, "Our army
is equipped with a whole series of intercontinental, continental and
other rockets of long, medium and short range." When asked at a
press conference to comment on Malinovsky's statement, President
Eisenhower replied, "They also said that they invented the fly ing machine and the automobile and the tellephone and other things .... Why
should you be so respectful of this statement this morning, if you are
not so respectful of the other three?'" 3 Nevertheless, the Soviet statements were taken at face value by most Americans, including many
members of the intelligence community.

' Lawrence Freedman. US lntell(~ttnce and the Soviet Strategic Threat. 2nd. ed.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1936). pp. 69-70.
' Ford Eastman. .. Defense Officials Concede Missile Lag:· Aviation Week, 9 Febru.:lf)'
1959, pp. 26-27.

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As concern about Soviet missile progress increased, even the interruption in Soviet ICBM testing was seen as evidence of a Soviet
advantage. Although the CIA correctly reasoned that the Soviets were
experiencing difficulties in deve lop ing an operational ICB M. the Air
Force assumed that the Soviets had halted testing because the missile
was ready for deployment.'
The controversy intensified early in February 1959, when
Secretary o f Defense Neil H. McElroy testified before the Senate
Preparedness Investigating Committee on Soviet missile capabilities
for the next few years. McElroy told the Senators that in the early
1960s the Soviet Union might have a 3 to I advantage over the United
States in operational ICBMs. McElroy stressed that the gap would be
temporary and that at its end the Un ited States would enjoy a technological advantage because it was concentrating on developing the
more advanced solid-fueled missiles rather than increasing the number of obsolescent liquid-fue led missiles, but it was his mention of a 3
to l missile gap that made the headlines. Administration critics such
as Senator Stuart Symington quickly charged that the actual gap
would eventually be even larger.s
Faced with rising publ ic and Congressional concern about the
missile gap. Defense Department officials pressed President
Eisenhower to authorize renewed overflights to gather up-to-date infonnation about the status of the Soviet missile program. Following a
National Security Council meeting on 12 February. Chainnan of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Twining. Secretary of Defense McElroy, and
Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles stayed behi nd to talk to the
President about overflights. They hoped that the need to refute criticism of the missile gap fro m Symington and other Democratic
Senators would persuade the President to loosen his policy on the use
of the U-2. McElroy pointed out that no matter how often Allen
Dulles briefed these critics, they would not believe his reassurances
about the absence of a missile gap without positive proof such as photographs. More overflights would be needed to obtain the kinds of
photographs required.
The President was not swayed by these arguments. Noting that
the reconnaissance satellite project was ··coming along nicely,,. he
stated that U-2 flights should be " held to a minimum pending the

• Freedman. US Intelligence. p. iO.
' .. What About the Missile Gap'1.. 1irne. 9 Febru:iry 1959. pp. 11-13.

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availability of this new equipment." Quarles objected that the satellites would not be ready for up to two years, but the President replied
that this did not matter because the Soviets would not be able to build
a first-strike force of ICBMs in the near future. President Eisenhower
finally conceded that "one or two flights might possibly be permissible," but he ruled out "an extensive program." In light of the "crisis
which is impending over Berlin" he did not want to be provocative. 6
As the missile-gap controversy raged, President Eisenhower
stuck to his refusal to permit overflights of the Soviet Union, although the Soviet Union's resumption of ICBM testing almost persuaded him to change his mind. On lO April 1959, the President
tentatively approved several overflights, but, on the following day, he
called in McE!roy and Bissell to inform them that he was withdrawing his authorization, explaining that "there seems no hope for the future unless we can make some progress in negotiation." Eisenhower
remained worried by "the terrible propaganda impact that would be
occasioned if a reconnaissance plane were to fail." Although he
agreed that new information was necessary, especially in light of the
"distortions several senators are making of our military position relative to the Soviets," Eisenhower believed that such information
would not be worth "the political costs." 7
The President remained willing to consider flights that did not
overfly Soviet territory, and in June he authorized two electronic intelligence collection missions along the Soviet-Iranian border. The
two missions of Operation HOT SHOP took place on 9 and 18 June
1959. The first of these missions was noteworthy because it involved
both an Agency U-2 and an Air Force RB-57D Canberra. The two aircraft cruised along the Soviet border and made the first telemetry intercept ever from a Soviet ICBM during first-stage flight, 80 seconds
after launch. 8
Efforts to persuade the President to authorize penetration missions continued. On 7 July 1959, Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell
met with Eisenhower to discuss the possibility of a penetration flight

• Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record. 12 February 1959, WHOSS Alpha.
DDEL (TS); Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, pp. 513-514; Beschloss, Mayday, p.
173.
' Quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, pp. 514-515: Beschloss. Mayday,
p.176.
• Mission folders 4120 (9 June 1959) and 4121 ( 18 June I 959), OSA records, job
67-8-972, boxes 10 and 11 (TS Codeword).

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to gather intelligence on the Soviet missile program. Discussions continued the following day with the addition of Secretary of State
Herter, who stated in support of the CIA proposal that "the intelligence objective outweighs the danger of getting trapped." The strong
backing of the proposed overflight by both CIA and the State
Department finally convinced President Eisenhower to approve the
•
•
9
mIss10n.
On 9 July 1959, more than 16 months after the previous overflight of the Soviet Union, a U -2 equipped with a B camera left
Peshawar, Pakistan, flew over the Urals, and then crossed the missile
test range at Tyuratam. This mission, known as Operation
TOUCHDOWN, produced excellent results. Its photography revealed
that the Soviets were expanding the launch facilities at Tyuratam.
Whi le this overflight was under way, another U-2 flew a diversionary
mission along the Soviet-Iranian border.'0
Despite its success, this overflight remained an isolated incident.
President Eisenhower was unwilling to authorize additional over• flights of I.he Soviet Union. in part because he did not wish to increase
tension before Premier Khrushchev's visit to the United States scheduled for 15-27 September 1959. Nevertheless, the President still
wanted as much intelligence on the Soviet missile program as possible. Because the Soviets were conducting an extensive program of
missile tests in mid- I 959, Eisenhower authorized a steady stream of
I.he less provocative electronic intelligence (ELINT)-gathering missions (14 in all) along the Soviet border during the remainder of the
II
year.
Within the United States, concern about the Soviet missile program continued to grow. On 12 September 1959 the Soviets scored
another space success when their Luna 2 rocket reached the moon,
and Khrushchev stressed this success when he arrived in the United
States three days later. He also boasted of Soviet missile progress in
private conversations with President Eisenhower. while making no

• Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum for the Record. 7 July 1959 (TS): iJem,
Memorandum of Conference with the President. 8 July !959. WHOSS. Alpha. DDEL
(TS).
"' Mission folder 4 115 (9 July 1959). OSA records (TS Codeword).
" OSA Hisrorv. chap. 19. annex 120. pp. 12- 14 (TS Codeword).

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mention of overflights by the United States. After the trip was over,
Khrushchev and other leading Soviet officials continued to make exaggerated claims about the extent of their missile force, adding to the
confusion and concern within the US intelligence community. Thus in
November 1959, Soviet Premier Khrushchev told a conference of
journalists, "Now we have such a stock of rockets, such an amount of
atomic and hydrogen weapons, that if they attack us, we could wipe
our potential enemies off the face of the earth." He then added that
"in one year, 250 rockets with hydrogen warheads came off the assembly line in the factory we visited." 11 Because the Soviet Union
had been launching at least one missile per week since early fall, US
policymakers placed great weight on his remarks.
Despite the intelligence community's intense interest in the
Soviet Union's nuclear and missile programs, President Eisenhower
did not authorize any more overflights of the Soviet Union during the
remainder of the year. On the other hand, he raised no objections to
(and probably welcomed) the first British overflight of the Soviet
Union in December 1959. For almost a year, the RAF pilots of
Detachment B had been ready to fly over the Soviet Union, but Prime
Minister Harold Macmillan had not previously authorized any such
missions because of his own visit to the Soviet Union, several international meetings, and other state visits. As a result, British U-2 missions had been confined to the Middle East. Now that the Prime
Minister's approval had been obtained, Detachment B conducted
Operation HIGH WIRE with an RAF pilot. Squadron leader Robert
Robinson left Peshawar on 6 December and overflew Kuybyshev,
Saratov Engels Airfield, and the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range
before landing at Adana. The mission photography was excellent, but
it did not provide intelligence on Soviet ICBMs, which were tested at
Tyuratam, not Kapustin Yar. 13
Because there had been so few overflights in 1958 and 1959,
many questions about the Soviet missile program remained unan­

swered. Within the intelligence community there was still considerable disagreement over the size of the Soviet missile force. Thus,
during testimony before the US Senate in January 1960, DCI Allen
Dulles, Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, and Air Force Chief of

" William E. Burrows, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (New York:
Random House, 1987), p. 10 I.

" OSA History, chap. 11, p. 33 (TS Codeword); Mission folder 8005 (6 December 1959),
OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 13 (TS Codeword).

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Chapter 4

165

-

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Staff Nathan Twining each gave different figures for the number of
deployed Soviet missiles. Although the CIA figures were based on
evidence gained from overflights, Dulles could not reveal this fact to
14
the Senate and, therefore, faced very sharp questioning.
As a result of these Senate hearings, Dulles was determinced to
obtain permission for more overflights in order to settle the missile-gap question once and for all and end the debate within the intelligence community. To accomplish this, Dulles proposed photographing
the most likely areas for the deployment of Soviet missiles. Alt this
time there was still no evidence of SS-6 ICBM deployment outside the
Tyuratam missile test range. Because the SS-6 was e:<tremely large
and liquid fueled, analysts believed these missiles could only bie deployed near railroads. Existing U-2 photography showed rai!lroad
tracks going right to the launching pad at the test site. Dulles. tlherefore argued that SS-6 installations could easily be located by flying
along railroad lines. Dulles was supported by members of the

" Licklider. " Missile Gap Controversy." pp. 608-609.

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President"s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities.
At a meeting of the board on 2 February 1960, Gen. James Doolittle
urged President Eisenhower to use overflights of the Soviet Union to
the maximum degree possible. The President's response, as
summarized in General Goodpaster's notes of the meeting, showed
that the upcoming summit meeting was already an important factor in
his attitude toward U-2 flights: "The President said that he has one
tremendous asset in a summit meeting, as regards effect in the free
world. That is his reputation for honesty. If one of these aircraft were
lost when we are engaged in apparently sincere deliberations, it could
15
be put on display in Moscow and ruin the President's effectiveness."
A few days later, another U-2 took to the sky on a mission over
the Soviet Union. As in December, the pilot was British, and the mission had been ordered by Prime Minister Macmillan. On 5 Felbruary
1960, a Detachment B U-2C with squadron leader John MacAnthur at
the controls left Peshawar, Pakistan, to conduct Operation KNIFE
EDGE. The plane overflew the Tyuratarn Missile Test Range, headed
northwest to Kazan', and then turned south, photographing long
stretches of the Soviet rail network. The excellent photography from
tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid dis16
cover a new Soviet bomber. dubbed the BACKFIN, at Kazan'.
Despite the outcome of this mission, the missile-gap debate continued. The Air Force still insisted that the Soviets had deployed as
many as 100 missiles . The Army, Navy, and C IA, however, doubted
that any had been deployed, because none could be found . Add itional
U-2 photography was needed to settle the debate. In mid-February,
President Eisenhower reviewed plans for four additional U-2 missions. The success of the two British missions, along with the absence
of Soviet protests, made the President more willing to consideir a resumption of US overflights, and he agreed to allow one missiorn to be
flown during the month of March. The President's continued riestrictions upon the use of the U-2 disturbed DCI Dulles, who sent a memorandum to the National Security Council on I March 1960 ass,erting
that the cardinal objective of obtaining information on Soviet missile
deployment could be better achieved if the U-2 were given freer rein."

'' Ambrose. Eisenhower: The President. p. 568; Beschloss. Mayday, p. 233.
" Mission folder 8009 (5 February 1960). OSA records. job 67-8-972, box 13 (TS
Codeword): OSA Chronology. p. 25 (TS Codeword).

" OSA Chronolog_v. p. 25 (TS Codeword): Philip K. Edwards. "The President's Board:
1956-60." Studies in Intelligence 13 (Summer 1969):l 18 (S).

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Sec, et N6f6IU4
Chapter 4
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In authorizing another overflight of the Soviet Union, President
Eisenhower directed that it be conducted before 30 March. Because of
complications in getting permission from Pakistan to use the airfield
at Peshawar, however, the mission could not be staged in March, and
the President agreed to extend his dleadline until l 0 April 1960. One
day before the expiration of this cle.adline, a U-2 equipped with a
B-camera took off from Peshawar on the last successful overflight of
the Soviet Union, Operation SQUARE DEAL. As had been the case
during the previous two overflights, a second U-2 flew a diversionary
mission along the Soviet-Iranian border. After leaving Peshawar, mission 4155 headed first for Saryshagan, where it obtained the first pictures of two new Soviet radars, the HEN HOUSE and HEN ROOST
installations. The U-2 then flew to the nuclear testing site at
Semipalatinsk. Returning to the Saryshagan area, it crisscrossed the
railroad network there and then proceeded to Tyuratam. where it photographed a new two-pad, road-served launch area that suggested a
18
new Soviet missile was in the offing.
In his memoirs Nikita Khrushchev remarked that this U-2 should
have been shot down. "but our antiaircraft batteries were caught napping and didn ' t open fire soon enough." Khrushchev explained that
Soviet missile designers had developed a high-altitude antiaircraft
missile and batteries of this missile had been deployed near known
19
targets of the U-2.
The CIA already had strong indications of improvements in the
Soviet air defense system, and early in 1960 the Development
Projects Division had asked Air force experts at the Air Technical
Intelligence Center (ATIC) for a frank assessment of Soviet capabilities against the U-2. On 14 March ll960, Col. William Burke, acting
chief of the DPD, relayed the ATIC assessment to Richard Bissell:

The sreatest threat to the U-2 is the Soviet SAM. Although the
AT!C analysis concedes a remote possibility thac the SAM may
be less effective than estimatea~ their present evaluation is that
the SAM (Guideline) has a high probability of successful intercept at 70,000 feet providing th.at detection is made in sufficient
time lO alert the site. 10

,. Mission folder 4155. 9 April 1960. OSA records. job 67-8 -328. box 6 (TS Codeword).
•• Nikita S. Khrushchev. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston: Little.
Brown. & Co.. 1974). pp. 443-444.
"' Memorandum for Richard M. Bissell. Deputy· Director (Plans). from Col. William Burke.
Acting Chief, DPD ...Evaluation of Proposed CHALICE Operations:· 14 March 1960, IC
Staff, COMIREX records.job 33-T-123A. box I0 . ..CHALICE (General).. (TS Codeword).

Operation SQUARE DEAL, 9 April 1960

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~eeFet J.\IOFOAN

Chapter 4

170

One of the reasons why Operation SQUARE DEAL had been selected for the 9 April flight was that mission planners believed that
penetration from the Pakistan/Afghanistan area offered the greatest
chance of escaping detection by the Soviet air defense system.
Colonel Burke's 14 March letter recommending SQUARE DEAL as
the preferred route for the next overflight had stated, "There is a reasonable chance of completing this operation without detection."
Escaping detection had become important because, if the Soviet
SAMs received sufficient advanced warning, they posed a major
threat to the U-2.
CIA hopes that flights from Pakistan or Afghanistan might go
undetected proved false. On the 9 April overflight, the U-2 's
ELINT-collection unit (System VI) indicated Soviet tracking at a very
early stage of the mission. Although the Soviets failed to intercept the
U-2, their success at tracking it should have served as a warning
against future overflights from Pakistan (or anywhere else, for that
matter). On 26 April 1960, Colonel Burke informed Richard Bissell
that "experience gained as a result of Operation SQUARE DEAL
indicates that penetration without detection from the Pakistan/
Afghanistan area may not be as easy in the future as heretofor." 11
Unfortunately, neither Colonel Burke nor Richard Bissell took the
logical step of recommending the cessation of overflights now that
the risks had increased substantially. The lure of the prospective intelligence gain from each mission was too strong, and the Soviets' lack
of success at interception to date had probably made the project staff
overconfident. Furthermore, both DCI Allen Dulles and the
President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
were pressing for more photos of the Soviet Union in order to settle
the missile-gap debate raging in the intelligence community and
Congress.

THE LAST OVERFLIGHT: OPERATION GRAND SLAM
Even before the 9 April overflight took place, President Eisenhower
had consented on 28 March to an additional overflight during the
month of April. His willingness to allow yet another overflight was
" Memorandum for Richard M. Bissell, Deputy Director (Plans), from Colonel Burke,
Acting Chief, DPD. "Operational Priority of Proposed CHALICE Missions," 26 April
1960, IC Staff, COMIREX records.job 33-T-123A, box 10. "CHALICE (General)" (TS
Codeword).

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SA-2 surface-to-air missile

strengthened when the Soviet Union did not protest the 9 April mission. As Presidential science adviser George Kistiakowsky later remarked about the lack of protest, ''This was virtually inviting us to
repeat the sortie ... ~=
Although President Eisenhower had authorized another overflight for April, he left the designation of its targets up to the experts
at the C lA. Of the three missions that remained under consideration.
one-Operation SUN SPOT-would overfly southern targets,
Tyuratam and Vladimirovka, while the other two would cover railroad networks in the north-central portion of the Soviet Union. The
intelligence community had been interested in this area ever since late
1959, when there were indications that the Soviets were building an
SS-6 launch facility there. This was the first indication that :SS-6s
might be located anywhere other than Tyuratam testing facility. where
the missi les were launched from a general purpose launching pad.
T he intelligence community was anxious to obtain photography o f a

" George B. Kistiakowsky. A Scientist lll rlie \¥/,ire House (CamhriJg.:: l·t.1rvarJ
Univ.:rsity Press. 1976). p. 3::8.
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172

deployed SS-6 site because it could provide exemplars for
photointerpreters to use in searching subsequent overhead photography for similar installations. 13
The two proposed overflights that would cover the northern railroad lines received the strongest consideration. Both plans contained
new features. Operation TIME STEP called for a U-2 to take off from
the USAF base at Thule, Greenland, which would be the first overflight staged from this base. The aircraft would then fly over Novaya
Zemlya on its way to cover the railroad lines from the Polyamyy Ural
Mountains to Kotlas. The return flight would be over Murmansk with
the landing to take place at either Bodo or Andoya on Norway's
northeast coast. The other proposed overflight, Operation GRAND
SLAM, was the first U-2 mission planned to transit the Soviet Union;
all previous missions had penetrated not more than halfway and then
left in the general direction from which they came. GRAND SLAM
proposed to fly across the Soviet Union from south to north, departing
from Peshawar, Pakistan, and landing at Bodo, Norway. The mission
would overfly Tyuratam, Sverdlovsk, Kirov, Kotlas, Severodvinsk,
and Murmansk.
The two preferred missions both required the use of the airfield
at Bodo, which had been authorized by senior Norwegian intelligence
and military officers. Because the Bodo airfield was involved in
NATO maneuvers taking place in the Barents Sea area, Bissell informed the White House that neither mission could be flown before
19 April. Once the maneuvers ended, bad weather over the Soviet
Union kept the mission from taking place when it was originally
scheduled. Richard Bissell, therefore, asked President Eisenhower for
more time. and, on 25 April, General Goodpaster relayed the
President's instructions to Bissell that "one additional operation may
be undertaken, provided it is carried out prior to May 1. No operation
is to be carried out after May l. " 14 The President did not want to fly
missions any later than that because the Paris Summit was scheduled
to begin on 16 May 1960.
By this time, CIA planners were concentrating on Operation
GRAND SLAM as the most likely route for the proposed mission because it offered the best chance of photographing suspected locations
'·' OSA Hi.1·tory, chap. 12. pp. 35-36 (TS Codeword).
" Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, p. 569; Beschloss, Mayday, p. 10.

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Chapter 4
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of Soviet ICBM sites. The other proposed overflight, Operation TIME
STEP out of Greenland, was more likely to run into bad weather
(which would affect both navigation and photography) because the
flightpath would remain above 60° north latitude during the entire
mission. Furthermore, mission planners opposed this route because of
its greater risk. In his letter to Richard Bis sell on 14 March 1960,
Colonel Burke stated:

Operation "TIME STEP" is our last choice because we can assume, with a 90 percent probability of being correct, that we will
be detected on entr_,; tracked accurately throughout the period in
denied territory (approximately four hours), and will evoke a
strong PVO [Soviet Air Defense} reaction. This flight plan would
permit alerting of SAM sites, and pre-positioning of missile
equipped fighters in the Murmansk area (point of exit) thus
enhancing the possibility of successful intercept. In addition, we
must assume that even were the Soviets unable to physically interfere with such an incursion, sufficient evidence will be available to permit them to document a diplomatic protest should they
desire to do so. 15
The concerns raised by Colonel Burke about TIME STEP should
also have been raised about Operation GRAND SLAM, which would
be the most adventuresome overflight to date because it proposed
covering so much of the Soviet Union. If the Soviets could track the
U-2 early in the mission, they would have plenty of time to prepare to
intercept the aircraft.
The pilot selected for Operation GRAND SLAM was Francis
Gary Powers, the most experienced U-2 pilot in the program. Powers
had joined the project in May 1956 and had flown 27 operational missions in the U-2. including one each over the Soviet Union and China
as well as six along the Soviet border.
To prevent the U-2 from being seen at Peshawar, project managers decided to ferry the aircraft from Adana to Pakistan the night before the scheduled flight. Once the plane was refueled and its camera
was loaded, it would take off at daybreak, with little if any exposure
to local residents because of darkness and its short stay-less than six

" Memorandum for Richard M. Bissell. Deputy Director (Plans). from Col. William
Burke. Acting Chic:f. DPD, "Evaluation of Proposed CHALICE Operations," 14 March
1960, IC Staff, COMIREX records, job 33-T-123A. box 10, "CHALICE (General)" (TS
Codeword).

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hours on the ground. Originally scheduled for Thursday, 28 April,
GRAND SLAM was canceled because of bad weather over the northern Soviet Union. This had been the case for the past several weeks.
When this flight was canceled, the U-2 returned to Adana before sunrise. That evening the U-2 flew back to Peshawar for another attempt
to stage the mission early on the 29th, but bad weather again forced
cancellation of the mission, and the U-2 returned to Adana. Because
of continued bad weather over the target areas, no mission was
planned for Saturday, 30 April. 20
Meanwhile, the plane ferried to Peshawar on 27 and 28 April
had accumulated so many hours of flight time that it had to be
removed from service for periodic maintenance. A different aircraft
was, therefore, ferried to Peshawar on Saturday night, 30 April. This
aircraft, article 360, had made a crash landing in Japan during the previous September (see chapter 5). Although it had been refurbished by
Lockheed and now had the more powerful 175 engine that would give
it greater altitude, pilots did not completely trust this aircraft and considered it a "hangar queen." As Powers noted in his memoirs, .. Its
current idiosyncrasy was one of the fuel tanks, which wouldn't feed
all its fuel." 27 The aircraft was equipped with a B-model camera. a
System-YI electronic intelligence unit, and a System-lXB device,
which generated false-angle information in response to the radar
pulses used by some Soviet airborne-missile fire-control systems.
Operation GRAND SLAM, mission 4154 and the 24th deep-penetration overflight of the Soviet Union, began almost 30 minutes late
on Sunday, I May 1960, a delay due to difficulty in getting takeoff
approval from Washington. This delay was caused by
communications problems that are typical at sunrise and sunset
during spring and autumn, when the ionosphere will not support reliable communications. In attempting to relay the authorization message, the radio operator in Adana was unable to reach the base in
Peshawar, whose codename was HBJARGON. Realizing that neither
the prearranged nighttime nor daytime frequencies were working, the
operator began sending a message in the clear, using one of the guard
frequencies in the transition area between the daytime and nighttime
frequencies. The radio operators at Peshawar kept hearing the Morse

'' Mission folder -115-1 ( I May 1960). OSA records (TS Codeword).
" Powers. Operation Overflight, p. 76.

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code letters JGOHB, JGOHB as they tuned from one prearranged frequency to the other. Then one of the Peshawar operators decided to
tune in the guard frequency where the Morse transmission was strongest. He was able to discern a break in the letters, making the message read "HBJGO HBJGO." The Peshawar operators realized this
stood for "HBJARGON Go." The detachment chief, Col. William
Shelton, who had been waiting anxiously inside the radio van for a
"Go" or "No Go" message, leaped from the van and ran across the
field to give the signal for takeoff to Powers, who was sitting in the
U-2C at the end of the runway. 28
Powers started his takeoff roll at Ol 59Z on l May 1960. Once
airborne, Powers guided his aircraft toward Afghanistan. Following
standard operating procedure, Powers clicked his radio switch when
he reached penetration altitude of 66,000 feet, which signaled the operations unit at Peshawar that everything aboard the aircraft was
working and the mission would proceed as planned. Aside from this
simple signal, Powers and all U-2 pilots maintained strict radio silence during penetration missions.
Powers' first target was- the Tyuratam Missile Test Range after
which he headed for Chelyabinsk, just south of Sverdlovsk. The
planned route would take him over Kyshtym, Sverdlovsk, northwest
to Kirov. north over Yur'ya and Plesetsk, then to Severodvinsk. northwest to Kandalaksha, north to Murmansk, and, finally, west to Bodo,
Norway.
May Day turned out to be a bad time to overfly the Soviet
Union. On this major holiday, there was much less Soviet military air
traffic than usual, so Soviet radars could easily identify and track
Powers' U-2. In addition, the Soviets responded to the intrusion by
ordering a ban on civilian air traffic in a large portion of the Soviet
Union. Soviet radar began tracking the U-2 when it was still 15 miles
south of the Soviet-Afghan border and continued to do so as the aircraft flew across the Central Asian republics. When Powers reached
the Tashkent area, as many as 13 Soviet interceptor aircraft scrambled
in an unsuccessful attempt to intercept his plane.
Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into
the mission, an SA-2 surface-to-air missile detonated close to and just
behind his aircraft and disabled it 70,500 feet above the Sverdlovsk
'·' Richard K. Pero, "Message Received-Unfortunately," Studies in Intelligence 27
(Winter 1983 ):29 (S).

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area. The plane began spiraling down toward the ground and Powers
looked for a way out. Unable to use the ejection seat because centrifugal force had thrown him against the canopy, he released the canopy
and prepared to bail out, waiting to arm the destruction device at the
last minute, so that it would not go off while he was still in the plane.
When he released his seatbelt, however, he was immediately sucked
out of the aircraft and found himself dangling by his oxygen hose, unable to reach the destruction switches. Finally, the hose broke and he
tlew away from the falling aircraft. After he fell several thousand
feet, his parachute opened automatically, and he drifted to earth where
he was quickly surrounded by farmers and then by Soviet officials. 29
His aircraft had not been destroyed by the crash, and the Soviets were
able to identify much of its equipment when they put it on display 10
days later. Even if Powers had been able to activate the destruction
device, however, it would not have destroyed the aircraft. The small
explosive charge was only designed to wreck the camera.
How had the Soviets succeeded in downing the U-2? Although
some CIA project officials initially wondered if Powers had been flyi_ng too low through an error or mechanical malfunction, he maintained that he had been flying at his assigned altitude and had been
brought down by a near miss of a Soviet surface-to-air missile. This
turned out to be the case, for in March 1963, the US air attache in
Moscow learned that the Sverdlovsk SA-2 battery had fired a
three-missile salvo that, in addition to disabling Powers' plane, also
scored a direct hit on a Soviet fighter aircraft sent aloft to intercept
the U-2.'0 Mission planners had not known about this SAM site before the mission because they always laid out flight plans to avoid
known SAM sites.

THE AFTERMATH OF THE U-2 DOWNING
The first indication that something was wrong with Powers' m1ss1on
came even before he was overdue at Bodo, Norway. The CIA
Operations Center learned on l May at 0330 hours Washington time
'' Powers, Operation Overjliglzt. pp. 82-84; Beschloss. Mayday, pp. 26-28: Transcript of
Debriefing Tapes of Francis Gary Powers, 13 February 1962. Board of Inquiry on the
Conduct of Francis Gary Powers, Operations MUDLARK tiles, OSA records. job
74-8-605, box 6 (S).
"' Cunningham interview, 4 October 1983 (TS Codeword); OSA History, chap. 14, p. 55
(TS Codeword).

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that the Soviets had discontinued radar tracking of the flight 's progress two hours earlier (0529Z), southwest of Sverdlovsk. Although
there was no word from the Soviet Union concerning the mi:ssing
U-2. key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center
that morning (with the exception of Bissell. who was out of town and
did not arrive until 1530) to analyze the latest information and discuss
courses of action. They quickly established a new project. known as
Operation MUDLARK. co gather and evaluate all available information about the downed U-2."
Bissell and the other project officials did not know wh,ether
Powers was dead or if the plane and camera had been destroyed', but
they believed chat there was no way that a pilot could survive a crash
from an altitude above 70,000 feet. They. therefore, decided to stick
with the standard cover story for U-2 fl ights: that they were we:acher
flights staged by the National Aeronautics and Space Administr:ation
(NASA)-originally the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics. renamed in 1958. This cover story had been approve:d by
the President in 1956.
By the end of the day, the Operation MUDLARK officials had
prepared a statement based on the standard cover story but modified
to fie the available information on Powers· flight and to show Adana
as the aircraft's base in order to conceal Pakistan's role in the mission.
This revised cover story, along with a mission flight plan consistent
with it, was sent to the field commander at Adana, co Air Force
Europe headquarters. and co the Chief of Station at Ankara to replace
the cover story that had been prepared and distributed in advance of
the mission. The first announcement of the new cover story came, late
on 2 May by the Adana base commander, but it did not appear in print
until the following day. On Tuesday, 3 May, NASA released a statement about a high-altitude weather plane that was missing on a flight
inside Turkey. The statement had been designed to provide an e>eplanation for the presence of wreckage inside the Soviet Union by noting
that "the pilot reported over the emergency frequency that he was experiencing oxygen difficulties.,. .,: Thus. if the Soviets protested and
pointed to wreckage inside their borders, NASA could claim that the
pilot had lost consciousness and the aircraft had then flown into the
Soviet Union before crashing.
'' Geary incerview (S).
'' Beschloss. Mayday. p. 39.

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This statement had been prepared for a "best case·· scenario, that
is to say, one in which neither the pilot nor the plane and film survived. However, pilots had bailed out from extremely high altitudes
and survived, and there was even evidence from previous U-2 crashes
that much of the aircraft itself could be salvaged. The small destructive charge aboard the U-2 was not sufficient to destroy much more
than the camera. The tightly rolled film, which could reveal the exact
purpose of the mission even if the pilot and aircraft did not survive,
was very hard to destroy. Kelly Johnson later conducted an experiment that revealed film taken out of a completely burned-out aircraft
could still provide usable imagery. 33 After almost four years of successful U-2 missions, Richard Bissell and the rest of the Development
Projects Division had become overconfident and were not prepared
for the ··worst case" scenario that actually occurred in May I 960.
This failure played directly into the hands of Soviet Premier Nikita
Khrushchev, who shrewdly decided to release information about the
downed U-2 a little at a time, thereby encouraging the United States
to stick with its vulnerable cover story too long. As he later wrote,
"Our intention here was to confuse the government circles of the
United States. As long as the Americans thought the pilot was dead,
they would keep putting out the story that perhaps the plane had accidentally strayed off course and been shot down in the mountains on
the Soviet side of the border."'" The first word from the Soviet Union
came on Thursday, 5 May, when Premier Khrushchev announced to a
meeting of the Supreme Soviet that a US "spyplane" had been
downed near Sverdlovsk. He made no mention of the fate of its pilot.
Khrushchev's announcement aroused considerable interest in the
media in the United States, and that same day the State Department
and NASA issued another statement that continued the "weather
plane" cover story, adding that the pilot became lost during a routine
mission near the Caucasus Mountains. Soon afterward. the US
Ambassador to Moscow cabled a report to the State Department indicating that the pilot might be alive after all. Two days later, on 7 May
1960. Khrushchev confirmed this report by revealing that the U-2 pilot was alive and had admitted his mission of spying on the Soviet
Union.

" Geary intt!rview.
'" Khrushcht!v. Khrushchev Remembers: The Lase Teswmem. p. 507.

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•.. ~--~

-===-------· -,-

'

Khrushchev and the U-2
wreckage

• ')

This revelation completely demolished the US cover story., and
senior administration officials then debated what the appropriate
course of action should be . Allen Dulles offered to take responsibility
for the overflight and resign. but President Eisenhower did not want
to give the world the impression that he was not in control of his administration. On Wednesday, 11 May, the President read a statement
to the press in which he assumed full responsibility for the U-2 mission but left open the question of future overflights, even though four
days earlier he had approved the recommendation of his key foireign
policy advisers to terminate all provocative intelligence operations
against the Soviet Union:'~
The U-2 affair had its greatest consequences when the
long-awaited summit meeting in Paris began less than a week latc:r on
16 May. Soviet Premier Khrushchev insisted on being the firs t
speaker and read a long protest about the overflight, ending with :a demand for an apology from President Eisenhower. In his reply
" OSA H istorv. chap. I ➔ , pp. 14-16 (TS CocJ,:worcJJ: Bcschloss. Mayday. pp. 43-66.

243-J58.

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Eisenhower stated that overflights had been suspended and would not
be resumed, but he refused to make a formal apology. At that point
the summit ended, as did all hopes for a visit to the Soviet Union by
President Eisenhower.

THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE
OVERSEAS DETACHMENTS
The loss of Powers' U-2 ultimately resulted in the end of Detachment
B in Turkey. As soon as the Development Projects Division learned
that Powers was alive in Soviet hands, it immediately evacuated the
British pilots from Adana to protect the secret of their involvement in
the project. Project officials hoped that tlights might eventually resume from Adana, but President Eisenhower's order ending overflights of the Soviet Union made this very unlikely. Less than four
weeks later. a coup ousted the government of Turkish Premier Adnan
Menderes on the night of 27 May 1960. Because the new government
had not been briefed on the U-2, Project Headquarters refused to all_Qw any U-2 tlights from Adana, even those necessary for maintaining the aircraft's airworthiness. As a result, no more U-2s flew out of
Adana. Instead of being ferried home, three of the four remaining
U-2s were disassembled and loaded aboard C-124 cargo planes for
the return trip to the United States."'
The fourth U-2 remained inside a hangar at Incirlik airbase for
several years, looked after by a skeleton crew, in case the Adana installation needed to be reactivated. Finally the decision was made to
close down the Adana U-2 facility. During Detachment B's 44 months
of active existence, 21 pilots had flown its aircraft, including four
RAF pilots and three pilots transferred from the deactivated
Detachment A. Fourteen Detachment B pilots were later assigned to
other U-2 detachments, but the closing down of Detachment B marked
the end of Britain's direct involvement in U-2 operational overflights.
A four-man unit of RAF U-2 pilots was stationed at Detachment G,
Edwards AFB, until the end of the CIA U-2 program in I 974, but
RAF pilots never again conducted an overt1ight in an Agency U-2.
The loss of Powers' U-2, the resultant failure of the Paris
Summit, and the end of U-2 operations in Turkey were just the first in
a series of setbacks for the U-2 program. On 8 July 1960, the
'• OSA History. chap. 12. pp. 46-47 (TS Codeword).

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Japanese Government, faced with growing anti-American sentiment
and complaints in the press about the presence of "spyplanes" on
Japanese territory, asked the United States to remove the U-2s. The
very next day the CIA closed Detachment C; its U-2s were dismantled and returned to the United States aboard C-124s. 37
[n the midst of the furor in Japan. on l July 1960, just six weeks
after the Paris Summit, Soviet fighter aircraft shot down an Air Force
RB-47 on an electronic intelligence collection mission over international waters near the Soviet Union's Kola Peninsula. Two survivors
were captured. The Soviet Union claimed that the aircraft had violated its airspace, while the United States denounced the Soviets for
downing the plane over international waters. The acrimony exacerbated an already tense international atmosphere. 3"
One additional blow to the U-2 program came in the summer of

I960. NASA, concerned about the damage to its reputation from its
involvement in the U-2 affair and hoping to obtain international cooperation for its space program. decided to end its support of the cover
story that U-2s were conducting weather research under its auspices.'''
These developments resulted in a complete halt to all U-2 operations from overseas bases for more than six months. Pilots and aircraft from Detachments B and C were consolidated into Detachment
G at Edwards Air Force Base, California. the unit formed after the
C[A had vacated the Nevada testing site in 1957 as a result of AEC
nuclear testing. Detachment G now comprised eight pilots from
Detachment B and three pilots from Detachment C. Because Powers'
capture had compromised Project CHALICE, the Agency assigned a
new cryptonym to the U-2 effort; henceforth, it was called Project
IDEALIST.""

" OSA Chronology. p. 28 (TS Codeword).
" "Mystery of the RB--+7," Newsweek. 25 July 1960. pp. 36-37: .. Nikita and the RB--+7."'
Time. 25 July I960. pp. 30-31.
,., At a meeting of high-levt:1 CIA. NASA. and State Department ofticials on 31 May 1960,
NASA was willing to continue its association with U-2 flights for the time being. but the
Administrator of NASA. Dr. Keith Glennan. believed that his agency "would be well advised to disengage from the U-2 program as rapidly as possible." James A. Cunningham.
Memorandum for the Record. ··Tdephont: Conversation with Dr. Hugh Dryden, Deputy
Director, NASA," I June 1960. DPD chrono tile #.+553-60. OSA records (S).
"' OSA Hisrorv, chap. !2. pp. -H--+9; chap. 16. p. 10 (TS Codeword).

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THE FATE OF FRANCIS GARY POWERS
Downed U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers underwent extensive interrogation at the hands of the Soviets. His instructions from the CIA on
what to do in the event of capture were meager, and he had been told
that he might as well tell the Soviets whatever they wanted to know
because they could get the information from his aircraft anyway.
Nevertheless, Powers tried to conceal as much classified information
as possible while giving the appearance of cooperating with his captors. To extract the maximum propaganda value from the U-2 Affair,
the Soviets prepared an elaborate show trial for Powers, which began
on 17 August 1960. Powers continued to conceal as much information
as possible, but, on the advice of his Soviet defense counsel, he stated
that he was sorry for his actions. The Soviet court sentenced him to
IO years' "deprivation of liberty," with the first three to be spent in
•
01
pnson.
During the next 18 months, confidential negotiations to obtain
the release of Powers took place as the United States explored the
possibility of trading convicted Soviet master spy Rudolf Abel for
_Powers. These negotiations were conducted by Abel ·s court-appointed defense counsel, former OSS lawyer James Donovan. in correspondence with Abel's "wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East
Germany. In November 1961, Acting DCI Pearre Cabell wrote to
Secretary of State Dean Rusk supporting such a trade, and on l 0
February 1962 the actual exchange took place in the middle of the
Glienecke Bridge connecting East and West Berlin. As part of the
deal, American graduate student Frederick Pryor, who had been jailed
in East Germany for espionage, was released at another location.
After Powers returned to the United States, he underwent extensive debriefing, for many questions about his mission remained unanswered. To conduct the debriefing, the Agency immediately
reconvened the Damage Assessment Team that had met for two
months in the summer of 1960 to estimate what Powers knew about
the overflight program and could have told Soviet interrogators.
Given Powers' long involvement with the U-2 program, the team had
concluded in 1960 that his knowledge was extensive and he had probably revealed most of it to the Soviets. After two weeks of debriefing
Powers in February 1962, however, the team found that the damage
was much less than had been estimated, and they were quite satisfied

" Powers. Operation Overjlight, pp. 160-192; Beschloss. Mayday, pp. 33 1-335.
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.......
'

·'

-::-"

""'

"' --~ ,,

Trial of Francis Gary Powers

with Powers· behavior.'J After reading the debriefing reports. Allen
Dulles expressed support of Powers· actions and told Powers. ·--we
are proud of what you have done." but Dulles had already resigne:d as
DCI in November 1961.'' The new DCI, Joh n A. McCone. demanded
a closer look at Powers· actions and set up a Board of Inquiry headed
by retired Federal Judge E. Barrett Prettyman. After eight days of
hearings and deliberation. the board reported on 27 February that
Powers had acted in accordance with his instructions and had "c:ornplied with his obligations as an American citizen during this period. "
The board, therefore, recommended that he receive his back pay.

'' James J. Whit.:. ..Franci$ Gary Powcr.;- Th.: Unmaking of a Hero. 1960-1965," (drafti.
CIA History Staff. 1974. p. 19 ISL
" Powas. Or,acuion O verjfigfrt. p. .307.

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Secret NOfiotUd

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The Prettyman Board's finding was based on a large body of evidence indicating that Powers was telling the truth about the events of
I May 1960: the testimony of the experts who had debriefed Powers
after his return; a thorough investigation of Powers' background with
testimony by doctors, psychiatrists, former Air Force colleagues, and
his commander at Adana; Powers' own testimony before the board;
the results of a polygraph examination that he had volunteered to undergo; and the evidence provided by photographs of the wreckage of
his aircraft, which Kelly Johnson had analyzed and found consistent
with Powers' story. Nevertheless, DCI McCone remained skeptical.
He asked the Air Force to convene its own panel of experts to check
Johnson's assessment of the photographs of the U-2. The Air Force
quickly complied, and the panel supported Johnson's findings.
McCone then seized upon the one piece of evidence that contradicted
Powers' testimony-a report by the National Security Agency (NSA)
that suggested that Powers may have descended to a lower altitude
and turned back in a broad curve toward Sverdlovsk before being
downed-and ordered the Prettyman Board to reconvene on I March
for another look at this evidence. The board remained unconvinced by
NSA's thin evidence and stuck to its original findings. A few days later, on 6 March 1962, Powers appeared before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, which commended his actions. The Senate
Foreign Relations Committee also held brief hearings on the U-2
Affair, with DCI McCone representing the CIA.-'-'
Although all of these inquiries found Powers to have acted properly, they did not release many of their favorable findings to the public, which had received a very negative image of Powers' behavior
from sensational press reports and statements by public figures who
were not aware of (or chose to ignore) the truth about Powers· actions
while in captivity. One member of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Senator John J. Williams, expressed concern about the
impact of this silence on Powers' reputation in a question to DCI
McCone on 6 March 1962: "Don't you think he is being left with just
a little bit of a cloud hanging over him? If he did everything he is
supposed to do, why leave it hanging?" ,s Doubts about Powers did
remain in the public mind because he received no public recognition
for his efforts to withhold information from the Soviets. He was also
"' Beschloss. Mayday. p. 352-35-k Thomas Powers. Man Wlzo Kept the Secrets. p. 328;
Prettyman Board. DCI records (S).
" United States Congress. Senate. Foreign Relations Committee. £recutive Sessions of tlze
Sencae Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series). vol. 12. 86th Congre.~s. Second
Session ... Report on the U-2 Incident." 6 March 1962. p. 265 (declassified 1982).

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snubbed by President Kennedy, who one year earlier had warmly welcomed two Air Force RB-47 fliers released by the Soviet Union.
McCone remained hostile to Powers. and in April 1963 he awarded
the Intelligence Star to all of the U-2 pilots except Powers. Finally on
25 April 1965, just two days before McCone's resignation became effective, Powers received the Star (which was dated 1963 on the back)
6
from DDCI Marshall S. Carter:
Powers' return from captivity raised the question of what his future employment should be. This issue had already been discussed
one year earlier by John N. McMahon, executive officer of the DPD.
who noted that he and Col. Leo P. Geary (the Air Force project officer) were concerned about a major dilemma for the CIA and the US
Government: " On the one hand we have gone to considerable lengths
to prove that the U-2 program was a civilian undertaking and not military aggression; on the other hand there is on fi le a document that
assures Francis Gary Powers that if he so desires he may be reinstated
into the USAF.'' On 21 March 1961 McMahon wrote:

If we grant him [Powers/ the right that is now his, namely reinstatement in the Air Force, then we would be subjecting ourselves to probable adverse propaganda by the USSR. Admitting
little appreciation for the finer points of political and psychological warfare, should Francis Gary Powers return to the USAF I
suspect that the Soviets would have a "PP" field day illustrating
our big lie. The question then. since we cannot permit Powers to
return to the USAF. is what do we do with him."
Despite this negative recommendation, the Air Force agreed on
4 April I 962 to reinstate Powers effective I July, a decision that was
approved by the Agency, State Dep•artment, and White House. Then
Powers· divorce proceedings began. and the Air Force, concerned
about adverse publicity, postponed reinstatement until the end of the
proceedings. In the meantime Pow1ers began working for Lockheed
as a U-2 pilot. In March 1963, he met with Colonel Geary to discuss
his future plans and decided to stay with Loc kheed."11 Powers remained at Lockheed until U-2 testing ceased in September 1969.
Earlier in the year, he had published an account of his experiences on

"' OSA Hiswry, chap. 14. p. 54 (TS Codeword): Beschloss. Mayday. p. 397.
" John N. McMahon to Chief. Cover Staff. DPD. 21 March I 961. Operation MUDLARK
files. OSA records. job 74-B-605. box 6 (S).

" OSA History. chap. 14, p. 52 (TS Codeword).

See, el NGfiOAN

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the U-2 project under the title Operation Overflight. Later he flew a
light plane as a traffic reporter for a Los Angeles radio station and
then a helicopter for a television station. On l August 1977, he and a
cameraman from the station died when his helicopter crashed on the
•
-19
way to an assignment.

CHANGES IN OVERFLIGHT PROCEDURES
AFTER MAY 1960
One of the most important changes in the overflight program after the
loss of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 was the institution of more formal
procedures for the approval of U-2 missions. During the first four
years of U-2 activity, very few members of the Eisenhower administration had been involved in making decisions concerning the overflight program. The President personally authorized all flights over
the Soviet Union and was consulted by Richard Bissell and either the
DCI or the DDCI about each such proposed mission. In addition to
CIA officials, the President's discussions of individual U-2 missions
or of the program as a whole generally included the Secretary of State
or his Under Secretary, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs_of Staff, the
Secretary of Defense or his deputy. and the President's secretary.
Colonel (later General) Goodpaster.
The approval process under President Eisenhower was thus very
unstructured. There was no formal approval body charged with reviewing overflight proposals; the President kept this authority in his
hands and simply consulted with selected cabinet officials and advisers before reaching a decision. In 1959 the U-2 program had gained a
second approval authority when British Prime Minister Harold
Macmillan became the approval authority for missions conducted by
the RAF pilots in Detachment 8.
The loss of Powers' U-2 in May 1960 led to major changes in
the approval process. For all practical purposes, Prime Minister
Macmillan ceased to be a source of approval because the RAF pilots
who remained in the U-2 program did not conduct any more
operational missions (although the use of British pilots was considered on several occasions). In the United States the approval process
•• Beschloss. Mayday, pp. 396-401. Beschloss claims that Powers was tired by Lockheed
for criticizing the Agency in his memoirs (which he had shown to the Agency in draft
form). but Kelly Johnson's "U-2R Log" records on 25 September 1969: "We havt: no
Right test activity at all. I must let Gary Powers go. Have protected him for about seven
years. but he doesn't have an ATR (Air Transport Rating), so we have no other job for
him-not even flying the Beechcraft."

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became more formal as the National Security Council became
involved. Henceforth, proposed missions had to be submitted to the
National Security Council (NSC) Special Group for approval. In the
early 1960s, the Sptcial Group consisted of the DCI, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of State, and the Military
Adviser to the President. After the Military Adviser, Gen. Maxwell
Taylor, became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1962, his
place on the Special Group was taken by McGeorge Bundy, the
President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. 50
Before requesting permission from the Special Group for a U-2
mission over denied territory, the CIA prepared a detailed submission
giving justification for the proposed mission and maps showing the
targets to be photographed. flight times, and emergency landing sites.
Such submissions came to be known as "black books" because they
were placed in black. looseleaf binders. The decision of the Special
Group was generally final, although on occasion controversial issues
were presented to the President for his decision.
This approval process did not come into play immediately after
May 1960 because there was a long pause in U-2 operations as the
detachments returned from overseas. It was not until late October
1960 that the next U-2 operation occurred. this time over Cuba. By
this time the full approval procedure had been established, and the
Special Group approved the mission (sec chapter 5).
The approval process was not the only part of the U-2 program
that changed after May l 960. The process for establishing requirements for overhead reconnaissance missions also became more formal. In August 1960 the US Intelligence Board took over the Ad Hoc
Requirements Committee and merged it with the Satellite Intelligence
Requirements Committee to form the Committee on Overhead
Reconnaissance. DCI Directive 2/7 tasked COMOR with the '·coordinated development of foreign intelligence requirements for
overhead-reconnaissance projects over denied areas." The DCID
defined "overhead reconnaissance'' to include "all reconnaissance
for foreign-intelligence purposes by satellite. or by any vehicle over

'" The Special Group. which had becn creatcd by NSC lntcl!igen,e Documt:nt 54 l 211 in
1955 to ovcrsc.: covert a,tivitics. was originally known as the 54 l 2 Committ.:e. Later the
Sp,xial Group bccame known as the: 303 Committce and then thc 40 Committee. Unitcd
States Congress. Senate. Sckct Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
Rcspcct to lntt:lligcnce Activities. Foreign and .Wiliwry l111elligence. book l. (Washington.
DC: US Government Printing Office. 1976). pp. 4S-53.

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denied areas, whether by pho1ographic, EUNT. COMfNT, infrared,
RADINT, or ocher means... The only exception to COMOR 's area of
responsibil ity was "reconnaissance and aerial surveillance in direct
support of actively combatant forces ." s,
By this lime the Air Force had developed a large overhead reconnaissance program of its own, including a fleet of U-2s, and, occasionally, there were conflicts between the areas of responsibili1y of
COM OR and the military services for colleccion requiremencs. The
Air Force had already won a major victory in 1958. when it claimed
that the While House had given responsibility for peripheral reconnaissance of the Soviet Union 10 the military. DCI Dulles, who was
always reluctan1 to become involved in matters that seemed to lie in
the military's area of responsibility, did not resist this clai m. and the
Ad Hoc Requirements Committee stopped preparing requirements for
peripheral flights. This ended a major requirements comm ittee study.
which sought to estimate what could be gained from U-2 oblique photography along the entire border of the Soviet Union.5! The last CIA
U-2 miss ion along the Soviet Union's coasts occurred on 22 June
. 1958; thereafter, the only peripheral missions conducted by the CIA
were those along the Soviet Union·s southern border with Iran and
Afghanistan from bases in Pakistan and Turkey under covert arrangements with the host governments .
Until the spri ng of 1961 , there was virtually no coordination of
military reconnaissance activities, even within the individual services.
Each commander of a Theater or a Unified and Specified Command
conducted his own independent reconnaissance activities. To meet the
growing need for overall coordination of these activities at the national level, the Joi nt Chiefs of Staff (JCS) established the Joint
Reconnaissance Center (JRC) under the J-3 (Operations) of the Joint
Staff. The JRC immed iately began to coordinate and obtain approval
for approximately 500 missions per month, assigning each a risk factor of Critical. Sensitive, Unique, or Routi ne. The JRC then prepared
a monthly Activities Book giving details of the proposed missions
and briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the more risky missions. The
C[A received a copy of the Activities Book.

" DCID '217. cffo::1.:tive 9 August 1960 (S ).

·' ' Memorandum for DCI McCon.: from James Q. Reber. Chai rman. COMOR. "Proposo::<l
Procedure~ for Approval of Critical Reconnaissance. " 2 1 March 1962. COMIREX r~cor<ls
(TS Co<kwor<l).

Seerct

Sec, et NOfiO~N
Chapter 4
190

Most military reconnaissance missions were approved or disapproved at the JCS level, but the most sensitive missions were submitted through the Secretary of Defense to the Special Group for
approval. In addition to this Department of Defense approval path, the
military services could also submit requirements through the DCI using their representatives on COMOR. As a result, the military services had two channels for submitting reconnaissance missions to the
Special Group. The Agency had only one-COMOR. 51
The main conflicts between the requirements committee and the
military services arose over missions in the Far East. In the early
I 960s, North Vietnam had not been designated a denied area by the
US Intelligence Board (USIB), so the military services could plan
missions there without consulting COMOR. Such missions. however,
came very close to China. which was a denied area and, therefore,
came under COMOR ·s area of responsibility. Once the war in
Southeast Asia escalated in 1964, the military services received responsibility for the entire area (see chapter 5).
To reduce the number of disputes between the competing CIA
and Air Force reconnaissance programs and to manage the growing
satellite program, the two agencies worked out an agreement to provide overall coordination for reconnaissance activities at the national
level. The first such interagency agreement came in the fall of 1961,
and it was followed by three additional agreements during the next
four years. 50
Interest in coordinating the reconnaissance efforts of the military
services and the CIA also affected the field of photographic interpretation. In the wake of the loss of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 on I May
1960, the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence
Activities (PFIAB) had urged the establishment of an interagency
group to study ways to improve the entire US intelligence community.
Formed on 6 May 1960, the Joint Study Group on Foreign
Intelligence Activities met for the next seven months under the leadership of Lyman Kirkpatrick, CIA Inspector General. One of the
study group's key recommendations in the report it issued in
December 1960 was the creation of a national photointerpretation
'' Ibid (TS Codeword).
" Problems of classitication prevent a more detailc:d discussion of this aspect of the reconnaissance program. which will be covered in a future history of satellite reconnaissance at
a higher level of classification.

Seeret

Sec, et NOF'ORl<J

Chapter 4
191

center that would bring together photointerpreters from the Agency
and the military services. The report further recommended that the
CIA be placed in charge of the new center. Ignoring Air Force claims
that it should head such a center, President Eisenhower approved the
report's recommendation, and, on 18 January 1961, National Security
Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 8 established the
National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC). Henceforth, the
director of NPIC would be designated by the DCI and approved by
the Secretary of Defense, and the deputy director would come from
one of the military services. The first director of NPIC was Arthur S.
Lundahl, head of the CIA's Photo-Intelligence Division. 55
One additional major change in the U-2 program in the years immediately following the May Day incident-although not directly related to the loss of Powers' U-2-was the departure of Richard
Bissell from the CIA and the subsequent reorganization of the
Agency's reconnaissance and scientific activities. The roots of
Bissell's downfall went back to 1 January 1959, when he became
Deputy Director for Plans and decided to place all Agency air assets
in .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnaissance projects (the U-2 and its two proposed successors, the
OXCART aircraft and the reconnaissance satellite). The previously
independent Development Projects Staff became the Development
Projects Division (DPD) of the DDP and now controlled all Agency
air operations, including air support for covert operations. As a result,
U-2s were occasionally employed for gathering intelligence to support DDP operations in addition to their primary mission of gathering
strategic and tactical intelligence.
Although the reorganization made sense in terms of increasing
the efficiency of Agency air operations, the use of the U-2 to support
covert action disturbed Bissell's backers among the scientists advising
Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, especially James Killian and
Edwin Land. They were concerned that Bissell was becoming too involved in covert action and was not able to devote sufficient time to
the overhead reconnaissance program. Then came the disastrous Bay
of Pigs invasion in April 1961, which discredited Bissell with the
Kennedy administration in general and the two scientists in particular.
Later that year, Bissell lost another important source of support when
Allen Dulles resigned as DCI in November 1961. During his final
" Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword).

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Sec, et NOFORl'd

Chapter 4
192

months as the Deputy Director for Plans, Bissell found himself involved in a major struggle with Killian and Land, who were serving
on President Kennedy's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (successor to the Eisenhower administration's President's Board of
Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities). These two influential
Presidential advisers strongly advocated removing the Agency's overhead reconnaissance programs from the DDP and placing them in a
new, science-oriented directorate. but Bissell resisted this proposal.
With his position in the Agency becoming increasingly untenable,
Bissell resigned on 17 February 1962, after turning down an offer
from the new DCI, John A. McCone, to become the CIA's first
Deputy Director for Research. 56
Two days after Bissell's departure, the new Directorate came
into existence, and it absorbed all of the Development Projects
Division's special reconnaissance projects. Only conventional air support for the Clandestine Services remained with the DDP in the new
Special Operations Division. The U-2 program was no longer connected with covert operations.
The first half of 1962 was a confusing period for the
Development Projects Division. After losing the individual who had
created and supervised it for seven years, the DPD also lost its feeling
of autonomy when it was transferred from its own building to the new
CIA Headquarters at Langley. Soon afterward. Col. Stanley W. Beerli,
who had headed the DPD since 1960, returned to the Air Force. Then
on 30 July 1962, the overhead reconnaissance projects underwent a
major reorganization with the formation of the new Office of Special
Activities (OSA) to replace the DPD. The original organization of
OSA with IO division or staff heads reporting directly to the director
of the office (at that time known as the Assistant Director for Special
Activities) proved too cumbersome, and, on 30 September 1962, a reorganization divided most of these offices between two major

subordinates, the Deputy for Technology and the Deputy for Field
Activities (see chart, page 193). The Office of Special Activities
(OSA) continued to control reconnaissance activities and related research and development after the Directorate of Research was enlarged and renamed the Deputy Directorate for Science and
Technology (DDS&T) on 5 August 1963 (along with the other

'" Killian interview (S); Land interview (TS Codeword); Richard M. Bissell to John A.
McCone, 7 February 1962. DCI records, job 80-B-1676R, box 18. folder 10 (S).

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Secret NOF'OAN
Chapter 4

193

Office of Special Activities
Assistant Director for Special
Activities
Special Assistant
for Liaison

Deputy Assistant Director
Executive Officer

Programs Staff

Security Staff

I

I

Deputy for Field Ac tivities

Deputy for Technology
I

I

Advanced
Projects
Division

Engineering
Analysis
Division

Development
Division

Contracts
Division

Support
Division

Intelligence
Division

Communications
Division

Operations
Division

Materiel
Division

Directorates, DDS&T dropped the "Deputy" from its title in 1965
and became known as the Directorate of Science and Technology). In
1965 the head of OSA received a new title, Director of Special
Activities. The Office of Special Activities remained in control of the
CIA's overhead reconnaissance activities until 1974, when the
Agency ended its involvement with manned reconnaissance aircraft. 57

" OSA Chronology, pp. 34-35 (TS Codeword).

..Soe,er

.....

•· :··

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. r.

Sec, et N6f8AN

J•.·
l

_,.

.

•

· ..

Chapter 5
195

U-2 Operatiqns After
May 1960

The loss of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 over the Soviet Union on l
May 1960 marked the end of the aircraft's use over the Soviet Bloc.
Soon after the May Day incident. President Eisenhower ordlered an
end to overflights. Similarly, his successor, John F. Kennedy, told a 25
January 1961 press conference, " I have ordered that the flights not be
resumed, which is a conti nuation of the order gi ven by President
.. ..Eisenhower in May of last year." T his was not a bind_ing pledge, as
John A. McCone (who became DCI in November 196 1) poi nted out
to President K ennedy's successor. Lyndon 8 . Johnson, on 15 January
1964 in response to the new President's request for information on
U-2 overflight policies:

Contrary to popular assumption, President Kennedy did not
make any pledge or give an assurance, at least publicly. that
there would be no further overflights. He limited his response to
a statement that he had ordered that the flights not be r,':?sumed.
An order, obviously, is valid only until countermanded.'
Technically, McCone was correct, but no President was l ikely to
order a resumption of overflights of the Soviet Union without very
good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because
satellite photography gradually began to fill the gap left by the end of
U-2 coverage.
A lthough there were several proposals to resume overflights of
the Soviet Union in the years that followed, none reached the mission
planning stage. T he Kennedy administration came closest to resuming

' Memorandum for President Johnson from DCI McCone... Response to Query
Concerning U-2 Overflight Policy:· 15 January 1964. DCI records. job 80-8-1676R. box
17. folder 14 (TS Codeword).

Seerec

Sec1et NOFOAN
Chapter 5
196

overflights of the Soviet Union during the Berlin Crisis in the summer
and fall of 1961. On 14 September 1961, Kelly Johnson noted in his
project log:

Have had request from Mr. Bissell to propose ways and means
for increasing safety of the U-2 on probable overflights . ... It
seems that President Kennedy, who publicly stated that no U-2 '.s
would ever be over Russia while he was president, has requested
additional flights. Some poetic justice in this. 2
One week later Colonel Geary called to order Lockheed to upgrade six older U-2s into U-2Cs with the more powerful engines on a
priority basis, even if it meant taking people off the work on the successor aircraft in order to speed up the conversions.
Shortly thereafter, the resumption of overflights became a major
topic of discussion within the intelligence community. On 25
September 1961, the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance prepared a detailed "Justification for U-2 Photography over the USSR,"
which argued in favor of U-2 missions over selected, high-priority
targets such as ICBM complexes. The COMOR paper stated that satellite photography did not provide sufficient detail to answer many
critical questions about the Soviet ICBM program. To back up this
contention, the report placed U-2 and satellite photography of the
same Soviet targets side by side, clearly demonstrating the far superior resolution of the U-2's cameras. Not all members of COMOR
supported the resumption of overflights, however. When COMOR
formally recommended this course of action to the USIB on 1
October 1961, the State Department and CIA members dissented,
having found "insufficient justification for resuming U-2 overflights
of the USSR at this time." 3

' Johnson. "Log for Project X," 14 September 1961. In preparation for the possible resumption of overflights. Kelly Johnson began thinking about what to do in a worst case
scenario like that of I May 1960. He noted in the project log on 21 September 1961:
One ofthe greatest technical problems and. ofcourse. a great moral one, is how we insure
destroying the aircraft and the pilot should the mission fail. I have proposed a rime-altitude fusing setup for multitude bombs, that looks like it should do the trick. Beerli [Col.
Stanley Beerli, USAF. Director of the Office of Special Activities/ doesn 'r want anything to
do with this. bur we will go ahead and develop it in case someone decides it is necessary.
·' Memorandum for USIB from COMOR. "Justification for U-2 Photography over the
USSR." 25 September 1961, IC Staff, COMIREX records, job 33-T- l 23A. box 10,
"COMOR (General)" (TS Codeword); Memorandum for USIB from COMOR, "Requirements for Resumption of U-2 Overt1ights of the USSR," 1 October 1961, IC Staff.
COMIREX records, job 33-B- l l 9A, box I (TS Codeword).

-

Seerat

Sec, et NOFOAN

Chapter 5
197

Nothing came of the proposal to resume overflights in the fall of
1961, as both the USIB and the Special Group came out against it,
but, as long as U-2 photography remained clearly superior to satellite
photography, the thought of obtaining U-2 coverage of the Soviet
Union remained tempting. In February 1962, the USIB seriously considered a COMOR proposal to send a U-2 over Kamchatka to photograph Soviet antiballistic-missile facilities but finally decided to wait
for the results of an Air Force peripheral mission. The board later accepted DCI McCone's recommendation to seek satellite rather than
U-2 coverage of the area. 4
With both the CIA and the State Department strongly opposed to
sending the highly vulnerable U-2 over the Soviet Union, prospects
for resuming flights remained slight unless the international situation
worsened to such a degree that overflights would be worth the risks
involved. Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on l
May 1960 proved to be the last CIA overflight of the Soviet Bloc.
Yet, the U-2 remained useful, for it could operate successfully in
other areas with less developed radar and air defense systems. After
May 1960, the main focus of U-2 activity shifted to two new areas:
- Latin America, where U-2s would play an extremely important role
during the early 1960s, and the Far East, where CIA U-2s were active
from 1958 until 1974, when the Agency's involvement in manned reconnaissance finally ended.

U-2 OPERATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA
U-2 Support to the Bay of Pigs Invasion
During late summer 1960, the Directorate of Plans was planning a
counterrevolutionary invasion of Cuba for the following year. To support this effort, the Agency asked the National Security Council's

' Memorandum for the Special Group from COMOR, "Illustrations of Policy Restraints
on the Collection of Information through Overflight of Denied Areas during 1962," 14
December 1962, IC Staff, COMIREX records, job 33-8-1 I9A, box 1 (TS Codeword);
James S. Lay, "The United States Intelligence Board, 1958- I965," (draft) CIA History
Staff MS-2, 1974, p. 385 (TS Codeword). One year later Saryshagan was the topic of US
Intelligence Board deliberations. In October 1963 the board asked COMOR to prepare
recommendations on the need for an electronic intelligence-gathering mission against the
Soviet ABM installations at Saryshagan. The proposed mission would not, however, violate Soviet airspace; instead, the U-2 would fly over the portion of the People's Republic
of China closest to Saryshagan. Lay, "USIB History," pp. 393-94 (TS Codeword).

SHret

Seu et NOFORN
Chapter 5
198

Special Group to approve U-2 overflights of Cuba. Known as
Operation KICK OFF, these flights were designed to obtain intelligence on Cuban air and ground order of battle and to provide geographic data for choosing an invasion site.
To allay fears that mechanical problems could lead to the loss of
a U-2 over Cuba, the submission to the Special Group for overflights
emphasized that, if a U-2 had a flameout anywhere over Cuba, it
could still glide back and make a safe landing in Florida. The Special
Group approved Operation KICK OFF but stipulated that only two
overflights could be made. Detachment G staged the Cuban missions
from Laughlin AFB near Del Rio, Texas, a base used by SAC U-2
aircraft. Agency photointerpreters went to Del Rio to read out the
photography after these missions. The two flights, on 26 and 27
October 1960, were very long missions, covering 3,500 miles and
lasting over nine hours. Because of cloud cover over Cuba, the results
of both missions were poor. The Agency, therefore, asked the Special
Group to approve additional missions. After receiving authorization,
Detachment G conducted three missions (Operation GREEN EYES)
on 27 November and 5 and 11 December 1960 with good results.
Overflights of Cuba continued under the new administration of
President Kennedy. Under the codename Operation LONG GREEN.
two overflights on 19 and 21 March 1961 photographed Cuba extensively to aid the final preparations for the invasion. Two weeks later
Detachment G again deployed from Edwards AFB, California, to
Laughlin AFB. Texas. Beginning on 6 April, Detachment G U-2s
made 15 flights over Cuba to provide photographic coverage of the
ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion and its aftermath. These flights were
known as Operation FLIP TOP. 5

Aerial Refueling Capability for the U-2
Long missions conducted over Cuba in late 1960 and over Southeast
Asia in early 196 l pointed out the need to increase the range of the
U-2. In May 1961, Lockheed began modifying Agency U-2s so that
they could be refueled in flight to extend their operating range. The
six Agency aircraft that were modified to achieve this capability received the designation U-2F. All Agency U-2 pilots then underwent
training in the techniques of in-flight refueling.

' OSA History, chap. 16, pp. I 3-15 (TS Codeword).

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Sec, el NOFORN

Chapter 5

199

Aftermath of the Bay of Pigs
invasion, 20 April 1961

Refueling a U-2 in flight was a very delicate task. When fully
loaded with fuel, KC-135 tankers found it difficult to reduce airspeed
• w-200 knots, the safest speed for refueling a U-2. As for the U-2s,
they were in a very vulnerable position when approaching a tanker at
200 knots because their frai l wings could not stand much stress. As a
result, U-2 pi lots had to approach the KC- 135 tankers very carefully
in order to avoid the vonexes from the wingtips of the tanker and the
turbulence caused by the four large jet engines. During the first few
years of refueling operations, two U-2s crashed after their wings
broke off as they crossed into the turbulent area behind the tai11kers;
one of the pilots was killed."
The in-flight refueling capability was a useful modificati.on to
the U-2, but it could not dramatically extend mission length. The
main limiting factor remained pilot fatigue, which prevented missions
from lasting longer than approximately 10 hours.

U-2 Coverage During the Cuban Missile Crisis
Cuba remained a high-priority target even after the Bay of Pigs invasion failed in April 1961. Soon afterward, Detachment G U-2s ibegan
flying monthly missions over Cuba in a program known as Project

• Ibid .. p. 11 -12 (TS Cod~word).

Secret NOfOflN
Chapter 5
200

In-flight refueling of a U-Z

NIMBUS. Most of the flights were s1taged from Laughl in AFB, Texas,
but three were flown from Edwards AFB, California, using in-flight
refueling to extend the range of the aircraft. By the spring of 1962,
having received reports of increased Soviet activity in Cuba. the CIA
requested permission for additional photographic coverage of the island. The Special Group authorized increasing the number of Cuban
overflights to at least two per month, beginning in May 1962. At the
same time, the National Photographic Interpretation Center began
7
publishing a Photographic Evaluation of Information on Cuba series.
By early August 1962, CIA analysts had noted a substantial increase in Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba during the preceding weeks.
The first U-2 overflight in August, mission 3086 on the 5th, flew too
soon to detect the Soviet construction program j ust getting under way
at various sites in Cuba. A second mission (3088) was originally set
for 8 August, but bad weather forced repeated postponements until 29
August. This mission's photography provided the first hard evidence

' Ibid.. pp. 19-20 (TS Codc:word).

Seeret

Chapter 5
20 1
of the nature of the Soviet buildup in Cuba. Two days after the mission, the CIA reported in the President '.s Intelligence Checklist that
there were at least eight surface-to-air missile (SA-2) sites in the
8
western half of Cuba. (The map on page 202 shows the routes taken
by the two August overflights.)
On 5 September the next U-2 overflight (mission 3089) provided
more evidence of the Soviet buildup. The mission's photography
showed three more SAM sites and also revealed a MiG-2 I , one of the
newest Soviet fighter aircraft. at the Santa Clara airfield.
The discovery of SAMs in Cuba had a twofold effect on the US
reconnaissance effort over Cuba. First, it added substance to DCI
McCone·s fears that Cuba might become a base for Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles (he argued that SAM sites would only be
set up to protect high-priority facilities such as missile bases). Al this
time. however. McCone's suspicions were not shared by other officials in the Agency or the administration. The second and most significant effect of the discovery of SAMs in Cuba was to make the
administration far more cautious in its use of U-2s for reconnaissance
. o_f_the island. As the loss of Francis Gary Powers· U-2 in May 1960
had demonstrated, the U-2 was very vulnerabk to the SA-2 missile.
Within the administration. concern mounted about the U-2's vulnerability to SAMs in Cuba and the possibility that a loss could cause
a major diplomatic crisis. Such fears increased as the result of two
incidents in other parts of the world. On 30 August 1962, a SAC U-2
on a peripheral reconnaissance mission overflew Sakhalin Island in
the Far East, prompting a Soviet protest on 4 September. The United
States apologized for the intrusion. Then on 8 September. a U-2 with
a Nationalist Chinese pilot was shot down over the People's Republic
of China (this CIA reconnaissance program is discussed later in this
chapter in the section on Asian operations). Increasing concern about
U-2 vulnerability led to an impromptu meeting on lO September 1962
of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, National Security Adviser
McGeorge Bundy, and DDCI Marshall S. Carter (in place of the DCI ,
who was on his honeymoon in France). The Secretary of State objected to the CIA's plans for two extended overflights covering the remaining areas o f Cuba not covered by the last two missions. Rusk
wanted peripheral flights over international waters kept separate from

• Richard L.:hman. ··CIA Handling of the Soviet Buildup in Cuba. I July-16 October
1962." 14 November 1962 (Hereafter cited as Lehman Report). DCI rc:cords. job
80-B-1676R. bol\ 17. folder I 8 (TS Codeword).

DC/ John A. McCone

U-2 Overflights of Cuba, August - October 1962

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Sec, el NOFORN

Chapter 5
205

overflights of Cuban territory. He argued that the loss of an aircraft on
a mission that combined both types of flights would make it difficult
for the United States to stand on its rights to fly over international waters. Bundy and Carter therefore agreed to split the proposed reconnaissance program into four missions: two overflights and two
peripheral flights, all planned for maximum safety. The overflights
were thus designed to be quick "in-and-out" operations across the
narrow width of the island instead of flights along the entire length of
Cuba, as had been the case previously. (As the map on page 202 illustrates, the 5 September mission was the last one to fly along the
length of the island.) As an additional precaution, flightpaths would
be laid out to avoid known SAM sites. Although these changes
greatly reduced the danger to the U-2, they slowed the gathering of
information on the Soviet buildup by reducing each mission's
9
coverage.
To ensure that the photographs taken by these missions were of
the highest quality, the CIA decided to conduct flights only when the
weather along the flight routes was less than 25 percent overcast.
Weather proved to be a major problem during the month of
Se.ptember. Unfavorable forecasts (along with a brief standdown of
U-2 overflights after the loss of the Nationalist Chinese U-2) prevented the launching of any missions from 6 through 16 September.
Moreover, when mission 3091 finally flew on 17 September, the favorable weather forecast proved inaccurate and heavy clouds prevented the mission from obtaining usable photography. Bad weather
continued to rule out missions until 26 September, when mission
3093 covered eastern Cuba and found three additional SAM sites.
Three days later mission 3095 flew over the Isle of Pines and Bay of
Pigs area, finding one more SAM site and a coastal-defense cruise
missile site. 10
The cautious series of U-2 flights in September had turned up
many more SAM sites but no concrete evidence of the presence of
surface-to-surface missiles. Growing impatient with the restrictions

' Lehman Report, pp. 12-13 (TS Codeword).
'" DCI John A. McCone, Memorandum for the Record, ··U-2 Overflights of Cuba. 29
August through 14 October 1962,"" 27 February 1963, DCI n:cords, job 80-8-1676R. box.
17, folder 18 {S). Although this DCI memo states that ··the delay in completing the photographic coverage was due solely to the unfavorable weather predicted during this period,"
a more contemporary COMOR memo re~orted a standdown of U-2 overtlights until 16
September as a result of the loss of mission No. GRC-127 over China on 8 September.
Memorandum for DOC! Carter from James Q. Reber. Chairman, COMOR. "Historical
Analysis of U-2 Overflights of Cuba,"" 24 October 1962. IC Staff. COMIREX records. job
33-B- I 22A. box I. "Cuba Requirements. 1961-63" (TS Codeword).

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Secret NOFORN
Chapter 5
206

that had been placed on U-2 overflights of Cuba, DCI McCone told
the Special Group on 4 October 1962 that their policy of avoiding
SAM sites had restricted the Agency to using the U-2 only in Cuba's
southeastern quadrant. He questioned "whether this was a reasonable
restriction at this time, particularly since the SAM's were almost certainly not operational." 11 The Special Group then requested the
preparation of an overall program for reconnaissance of Cuba in time
for its next meeting on 9 October.
In the meantime, C[A U-2s continued the reconnaissance program that the Special Group had approved in September. In early
October two peripheral missions-3098 along the southeastern coast
on 5 October and 3100 along the northern coast on 7 October (see
map on page 203)-discovered an additional five SAM sites. This
brought the total to 19, but there was still no evidence of surface-to-surface missiles.
Evidence was mounting that the portion of Cuba that the
September and early October missions had avoided was the most
likely location for Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs).
On 6 October 1962, the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance recommended frequent and regular coverage of Cuba, pointing in particular to the need for renewed coverage of western Cuba:
The absence of coverage of the western end since August 29,
coupled with the rate of construction we have observed, means
that there may well be many more sites now being built of which
we are una;vare. Ground observers have in several recent instances reported sightings of what they believe to be the SS-4
(SHYSTER) MRBM in Cuba. These reports must be confirmed or
denied hy photo coverage.,: Attached to this memorandum was a
list of targets, ~vith the area around San Cristobal at the top.
On 9 October the Special Group met to discuss COMOR's recommendations, the most important of which was a U-2 flight over the
.. suspect MRBM site as soon as weather permits." This mission was
also designed to pass over one of the SA-2 sites that was thought to
be most nearly operational in order to determine the status of SA-2
" Minutes of the Special Group meeting. 4 October 1962. in Memorandum for DC!
:\lcCone from J. S. Earman. Inspector General, ··Handling of Raw Intelligence
Information During the Cuban Arms Buildup." 20 November 1962, DC! records, job
80-B- 1676R. box I 7 (TS Codeword).
" Lehman Report. p. 30 (TS Codc::word).

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defenses of Cuba. If this overflight did not provoke an SA-2 reaction.
the study recommended "maximum coverage of the western end of
the island by multiple U-2s simultaneously." u Because the danger
posed by the SA-2 sites was one of the major topics at the Special
Group meeting, DCI McCone brought along Col. Jack C. Ledford
(USAF), head of the Office of Special Activities, who presented a
vulnerability analysis that estimated the odds of losing a U-2 over
Cuba at I in 6. The Special Group approved the recommended flight
over San Cristobal.
As the Special Group meeting was breaking up, Deputy
Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric and the Air Force representative questioned the adequacy of the Agency's cover story, which
was that its pilots were Lockheed employees on a ferry flight to
Puerto Rico. The Air Force and DOD representatives argued that it
would be better to use Air Force pilots and state in the event of a mishap that the overflight was a routine Air Force peripheral surveillance
mission that had gone off course. McCone then asked Colonel
Ledford"s opinion of the proposed change. Ledford agreed that the
.DOD cover story was better but pointed out that the SAC U-2s were
much more vulnerable than those of the Agency, which had superior
electronic countermeasures and a higher maximum altitude. Ledford
then suggested that Air Force pilots use Agency aircraft after receiving familiarization training. After leaving the Special Group meeting.
McCone and Gilpatric met with President Kennedy, who approved the
San Cristobal mission and the use of Air Force pilots.'"
Two days later (11 October), Air Force and CIA representatives
met to discuss the change in cover stories. Herbert Scoville, CIA
Deputy Director for Research, agreed that in the long run the Air
Force cover story was best but emphasized that an Air Force pilot
should not be used until he had received adequate training. The conversation then turned to the issue of who would run the next mission,
the CIA or the Air Force. Strongly favoring Air Force control of the
U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called DCI
McCone and obtained his consent. Shortly thereafter, McCone left
'·' Ibid., p. 31 (TS Codeword).
" Brig. Gen. Jack C. Ledford, USAF Ret., interview by Gregory W. Pedlow. Washington.
DC. 20 February I 987 (S); Memorandum for DCI McCone from Herbert Scoville. Jr..
Deputy Director (Research). "The Chronology of Evt:nts Leading to tht: Trans for of Cuban
Overflight Responsibility," 28 February I 963, DC! rt:cords, job 80-B-1676R. bo~ 17.
folder 18 (S).

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Washington for California and did not return until 14 October. Air
Force control of the Cuban overflights became official on l 2 October,
when President Kennedy transferred "responsi bility, to include command and control and operational decisions. with regard to U-2 reconnaissance overflights of Cuba" from the CIA to the Department of
05
Defense. The Air Force then aske:d to borrow two of CIA's U-2Cs.

DOC/ Marshall S. Carter

The Acting DCI. Lt. Gen. Mairshall S. Carter. US Army. reacted
strongly to the Air Force takeover of a major CIA operation. At one
point he remarked, " I think it's a hell of a way to run a railroad. It's
16
perfectly obviously a geared operation to get SAC in the act." In a
series of conversations with high-ranking Air Force and administration officials, Carter argued against changing command and control of
the flights at such a crucial cimi::. T he Agency operation, Carter
pointed out, was already in place aind working well, whereas the Air
Force lacked experience in controlling U-2 overflights, particularly
with the U-2C. which was not in the Air Force inventory. Carter also
emphasized that Air Force pilots lacked experience with the more
powerful J75 engines in the U-2C. He told Roswell Gilpatric, "To put
in a brand new green pi lot just because he happens to have on a blue
suit and to completely disrupt the command and control and communication and ground support system on 72 hours· notice to me doesn 't
make a God damn bit of sense. Mr. Secretary." " DDCI Carter admitted that the Air Force's cover story was probably better than the CIA's
but suggested at one point. "Let's take one of my boys and put him in
a blue suit. •· •~ Realizing. however. that the pilot would probably have
to come from the Air Force. Carter concentrated his efforts on trying
to convince DOD and administration of ficials to conduct an orderly
transition by allowing the CIA to continue its operation for a few
weeks using an Air Force pilot, and the Air Force gradually ta.Icing
over command and control. Carter's efforts were i n vain. The Air
Force insisted on immediate control of the operation, and administration officials were unwilling to become involved in what they

" Memorandum for DC C McCone from McGeorge Bundy. "'Reconnaissance Overflights
of Cuba:· 12 October 1962. DCI records. job 80-B-1676R. bo:( I 7. folder I 8 (TSJ.
•· Telephone conversation between DOC I Ca11er and McGeorge Bundy, 13 October 1962.
DCI records. job 80-B-1676R. boll 17. folder 18 (TS Co<leword).
' ' Telephone con versation between DOC I Caner and Roswell Gilpatric, 12 October 1962.
DCI records. job 80-B-1676R. box 17. folder 18 (TS Codeword).
" Telephone conversation between DOC I Carter and G<!n. William McKee. 12 October
I 962. DC I recorti~. job 80-8-1676R. bo.\ 17. folder 13 (TS Cod.:word).

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perceived as a jurisdictional dispute. Presidential Assistant for
National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy told DDCI Carter that
"the whole thing looks to me like two quarreling children." 19
Furthermore, no one wanted to speak out against a decision that the
President had already made.
Once the decision was clearly irrevocable, the Agency gave its
complete support to the Air Force in preparing for the upcoming
overflight. A SAC U-2 pilot had already arrived unannounced at the
CIA's U-2 Detachment at Edwards Air Force Base on 11 October, and
the CIA U-2 detachment put him through a hasty training program to
familiarize him with the U-2C. By Sunday, 14 October 1962, the
weather over Cuba had cleared, and the first SAC overflight of the
island took place.
When the U-2 returned, its film was rushed to the National
Photographic Interpretation Center. By the evening of 15 October,
photointerpreters had found evidence of the presence of MRBMs in
the San Cristobal area. NPIC Director Arthur Lundahl immediately
notified DD[ Ray Cline, who in turn notified DDCI Carter (DCI
McCone had again left town). As the readout progressed and the evidence became firmer, the DOI notified National Security Adviser
Bundy and Roger Hilsman of the Department of State's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, who informed Secretary of State Dean
Rusk. On the following morning, 16 October, DDCI Carter briefed
the President on the results of the 14 October mission."0
Now that the presence of Soviet medium-range surface-to-surface missiles in Cuba had been confirmed, the rules for U-2 mission
approval changed. The Strategic Air Command received blanket approval to fly as many missions as needed to cover Cuba completely,
without again consulting the Special Group. During the week that followed the discovery of the missiles, SAC U-2s conducted multiple
missions each day (see map on page 203). U-2 photography was supplemented by low-level photography taken by high-performance
Navy and Air Force aircraft. Throughout the remainder of the Cuban
Missile Crisis, the Agency's U-2 pilots remained idle, but the
photointerpreters at NPIC did yeoman service in studying the

,., Telephone conversation between DDC I Carter and McGeorge Bundy, 12 October 1962,
DCI records. job 80-B-1676R. bo" 17. folder 18 (TS Codeword).
,. For a more detailed account of NPIC's discovery of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. see
Dino Brugioni. The Cuban Missile Crisis-Phase I. 29 August-16 October 1962, DDS&T
Historical Series. NPIC-1 (CIA: NPIC. 1971) (S).

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Soviet MRBM site in Cuba,
1 October 1962

thousands o f feet of film returned by Air Force and Navy reconnaissance aircraft. President Kennedy used NPIC photographs to i llustrate
his address to the nation on 22 October I 962. when he revealed lhe
Soviet missile buildup in Cuba and declared his " naval quarantine"
to prevent the shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba.
On 27 October, at the height of the crisis, one of the U-2Cs knt
by the Agency to the Air Force was shot down over Cuba. killing rthe
pilot, Maj. Rudolph Anderson. T his loss again illustrated the U-2's
vulnerability to the SA-2 missi le. Nevertheless, SAC U-2 overflights
continued, both during and after the crisis. Responsibility for photographic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pil,ots
never flew another mission over the island.
Although SAC carried out most of the U-2 activity during the
Cuban Missile Crisis, the Agency 's U-2 missions had made vital contributions during the i nitial stages of the crisis. In all. Proj,ect
IDEALIST pi lots had spent 459 hours overflying Cuba during 1916 1
and 1962. They had provided concrete evidence of the Soviet buildlup
on the island, evidence that was simply not available through any

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211
other means. Although by late 1962 photographic satellites had become an integral part of the overhead collection program, only U-2s
could provide the highly detailed photography that photointerpreters
needed to spot the early stages of work on missile sites. Attempts had
been made to photograph Cuba with satellites, but to no avail because
the satellites' normal orbits placed them over Cuba at the wrong time
of day, after clouds had formed.

U-2s Over South America
Agency U-2s again conducted operations in the Western Hemisphere
in December 1963. The Directorate of Plans had requested photographic coverage of Venezuela and neighboring British Guianm because of guerrilla acti vities conducted by a pro-Castro movement
inside Venezuela. Supplies for this movement appeared to be coming
across the border from British Guiana. On 30 November 1963, the
NSC Special Group approved overflights of the British GuianaVenezuela border to determine the scope and rate of buildup of guerrilla forces. The Special Group stipulated that the entire effort w:as to
be conducted without the knowledge of either the British or the
Venezuelans.
Within three days, several Detachment G aircraft and pilots deployed to Ramey AFB. Puerto Rico, from which they made: six
flights over the border areas between 3 and I 9 December 1963 in an
operation known as SEAFOAM . The results of the effort were inconclusive, and the task force returned to Edwards AFB on 22
December. z,

U-2 OPERATIONS IN ASIA
Detachment C and the Indonesian Revolt of 1958
U-2 operations in Asia began even before the end of overflights of the
Soviet Bloc. By 1958 the Eisenhower administration, although very
reluctant to approve U-2 flights over or near Soviet and East
European borders, was not averse to using the spyplanes in the Third
World, where radar detection was unlikely. Thus. in the spring of
1958, Agency U-2s from Detachment C conducted a major reconnaissance effort over Indonesia. Operation ROBIN HOOD.
'' OSA History. chap. 16. pp. 35-36 (TS Codeword).

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Long unhappy with President Achmed Sukarno's perceived sympathy to Communism and his institution of "guided democracy" in
Indonesia, the CIA, after consultation with the State Department, began in early l 957 to supply financial assistance to a group of dissident
Indonesian Army officers on the island of Sumatra. By 25 September
1957, the National Security Council had become concerned with the
course of events in Indonesia and on its recommendation President
Eisenhower authorized the Agency to "employ all feasible covert
means" to support the dissidents. Planning for increased aid of all
types began immediately, and in January 1958 a US arms shipment
for the dissidents arrived in Sumatra. Then on 10 February, the situation came to a head. While Sukarno was out of the country on a state
visit to Japan, the dissident army colonels, without consulting CIA,
organized a Revolutionary Council in Padang, West Sumatra, and demanded the abolition of President Sukarno's "guided democracy."
Five days later, this council proclaimed itself the new "Revolutionary
Government" of Indonesia. President Sukarno's armed forces responded swiftly to this threat. In late February the Indonesian Air
Force began bombing dissident strongholds, and by mid-March government forces were conducting an all-out air-sea-land drive against
the rebel-held areas in central Sumatra. Although the Sumatran rebels
were falling back, additional unrest broke out over 1,800 miles away
in the islands of Celebes (Sulawesi), and CIA quickly began supplying weapons to these dissidents, too. 11
Increasingly involved in Indonesia, the Agency urgently needed
accurate information on the situation there. As in previous crises,
U-2s flew reconnaissance missions. On 24 March 1958, the
Development Projects Staff moved the entire complement of
Detachment C's pilots and planes from Japan to a base more easily
accessible to Indonesia: Cubi Point Naval Air Station in the
Philippines. Cubi Point was far from any facility that could develop
and interpret the U-2 photographs, so two Photo-Intelligence Division
employees went to Clark Airfield, just 30 minutes by air from Cubi
Point, to establish a forward processing center. They arrived on 28
March and had the photo lab ready to go on the following day.:?J

"I

Fovert Support to Indonesian Revolutionary Government. /957-1958.
2 vols., Clandestine Service Historical Series, CSHP-53 (CIA: History Staff, 1970) (S):
John Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World
War I/ (New York. William Morrow: 1986). pp. 133-144.
0'

Sec,et

OSA History, chap. 15, pp. 25-26 (TS Codeword).

Philippine
Sea

f.
.·'

IND/AN

0

300
0

- 300

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The first U-2 mission over Indonesia took place on 28 March
1958. By 12 June, when the operation was phased out, Detachment C
U-2s had flown 30 missions over the major islands of Indonesia.
Sanitized photos from these missions were used to brief members of
the DDP's Covert Action Staff (CAS), who were in charge of a small
force of World War II-vintage aircraft such as P-5 ls and B-26s used
to support the rebel troops. The CIA's proprietary, Civil Air
Transport, supplied the aircraft, which were based on the Indonesian
island of Morotai and flown by mercenary pilots. Desperately short of
pilots, the CAS asked if some of the U-2 pilots with experience in
World War II aircraft could be detailed to the Morotai effort.
Although such a request represented an improper use of the highly
trained U-2 pilots and posed a potential threat to the entire U-2 program if one of them were captured, Richard Bissell agreed to send pilots James Cherbonneaux and Carmine Vito to help. Both were experienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the
rebels' fighter aircraft, the P-51 Mustang. After arriving on Morotai,
Cherbonneaux explained to Vito how to fly the fast and powerful
Mustang while the two were sitting at a makeshift bar on the edge of
the airfield.
Several days later, when Cherbonneaux was off the island on another mission, a flight of Indonesian twin-engine bombers of
Czechoslovak manufacture was spotted making its way toward the island. Exclaiming, "I'm not going to sit around and wait to be
bombed," Vito had a Filipino mechanic start up a P-51 sitting on the
tarmac. In his first and only flight in a P-51, Vito managed to get the
plane off the ground. Once he was airborne and turned in the direction
of the lumbering bombers, they all took flight in as many directions
as there were aircraft. After firing a few . SO-caliber rounds in the direction of the closest bomber, Vito circled the field and landed the aircraft safely. 1"
Agency efforts in support of the rebel government proved fruitless. By early May, Central Government forces had taken most of the
remaining rebel strongholds, and the Sumatran rebellion was deteriorating into small-scale guerrilla activity. Then on 18 May, an
American mercenary pilot, Allen Lawrence Pope, was shot down on a
bombing mission over Ambon Island. Pope's capture ended Allen
Dulles's enthusiasm for the effort, and President Eisenhower also
" Information supplied by Carmine Vito and James Cherbonneaux to Donald E.
Welienbach, May 1986.

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Sec, et NOFOAN
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wanted no more part of it. The US Government rapidly withdrew its
support, and the remaining remnants of the rebellion collapsed. Four
years later, the Indonesians freed Pope after Attorney General Robert
Kennedy personally appealed to President Sukarno.
When the revolt ended, the U-2s returned to Atsugi. On the way
back, one of the planes, which was equipped with a System-Y electronic intelligence unit, flew along the coast of China to gather data
on Communist Chinese radars. ' 5

China Offshore Islands Dispute of 1958
During the summer of l 958, tension between the People's Republic of
China and Nationalist China (Taiwan) increased to such an extent that
on 18 June Detachment C mounted a U-2 mission to film the Chinese
mainland coast and adjacent island areas. On 11 August, People's
Liberation Army (PLA) artillery began bombarding the offshore
islands of Quemoy and Little Quemoy, where the Nationalists had
stationed large numbers of troops to ward off any invasion. On 23
~!,!gust the Communists increased the shelling. After five days of
intense bombardment, which made resupply of the islands from
Taiwan impossible, the PLA commander ordered the Nationalist
garrisons to surrender, intimating that an invasion was imminent.
The Nationalists refused to surrender and received support from
the United States in the form of warships from the 7th Fleet, which
began escorting Nationalist ships carrying supplies to the beleaguered
garrisons.
During this period, Detachment C U-2s flew four missions over
the mainland, searching for troop movements that would indicate that
the PRC was planning to invade the islands. Photos from these missions showed no evidence of a PRC buildup, but the atmosphere in
the region remained tense. Detachment C U-2s flew two more missions (9 September and 22 October) to monitor PRC troop movements and again found no indications of preparations for an invasion.
The Offshore Islands Crisis receded in late October 1958 after the
PRC learned that it would not receive support from the Soviet Union
if the crisis escalated into a confrontation with the United States. "6

" Mission folder 1773, (10 June 1958), OSA n:cords, job 67-B-328, box 7 (TS
Codeword): OSA History, chap. 15, pp. 25-26 (TS Codeword).
,. OSA History. chap. 15, p. 27 (TS Codeword).

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While the Offshore Islands Crisis was still in progress,
Detachment C began conducting flights in support of its weather reconnaissance cover story. On 14, 15, and 16 July 1958, U-2s flew
high above Typhoon Winnie, which was causing great damage on
Taiwan. These missions provided the first photography ever obtained
of such a massive storm system. Photographs of the storm were the
subject of articles in the magazine Weatherwise and the 21 July edition of Aviation Week. In September, Detachment C aircraft photographed two more typhoons.

U-2 Support for DDP Operations in Tibet
The consolidation of all Agency air activities under the DDP in l 959
led to increased involvement of the U-2 program with clandestine efforts against Communist governments. One important area of DDP
activity during this period was Tibet. In March l 959, the PLA
suppressed an uprising against the Chinese occupation of Tibet, and
several thousand Tibetans fled the country along with their spiritual
leader, the Dalai Lama. Afterward, Agency operatives from the
DDP's Far East Division began training some of these Tibetan refugees for paramilitary operations inside Tibet. Once the Tibetans completed their training, FE Division planned to parachute them back into
Tibet. Such missions, however, required detailed maps and aerial photographs of the areas of operation. Richard Bissell, therefore, obtained
permission from the President to use Detachment C U-2s to provide
the necessary photography.
Operation MILL TOWN, as the reconnaissance missions over
Tibet were known, consisted of two missions staged from Cubi Point
Naval Air Station on 12 and 14 May 1959. The photography revealed
that Communist China had built new roads with supply and defense
points. Agency photointerpreters also discovered two large new airfields at elevations above 13,000 feet. Later in the year, the Far East
Division needed photographs and maps of another area of Tibet. To
conceal the target of this new operation, which was codenamed
SOUTH GATE, the Development Projects Division planned and flew
a total of six missions coverinf. much of Southeast Asia-Vietnam,
Laos, Cambodia!
as well as the desired area in Tibet.
Only four of the m1ss1ons involved the area of operational interest.
Five of the flights took place between 29 August and 9 September,
and one additional flight (Operation QUICK KICK) followed on 4
November. All of these missions were "Fast Move" operations in
which necessary supplies and personnel flew to a remote staging area
in a C-130, where they rendezvoused with a U-2 that had been ferried
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>·
,, ,,;_
_-e ~ .
......, ....

,-·. .

in. The staging base in this case was Ta Khli, Thailand. These flights
did not go unnoticed; on 13 September 1959, Hong Kong's China
Post published a story headlined "U-2 of USAF Said Reconnoit,ering
Red China at Unreachable Altitude."~

U-2 photography of Typhoon
Winnie, July 1958

U-2Cs for Detachment C
Late in l 958, Lockheed began refitting the Agency's 13 remaining
U-2s with the more powerful Pratt & Whitney J75/P-13 jet engine.
The first of these U-2Cs arrived at Detachment C in the summer of
1959. During a test flight of this aircraft (article 360) on 24
September 1959, the pilot decided to set a new altitude re,:ord.
" Ibid.. chap. 18. pp. 6-7, 12; chap. 15. p. 29 (TS Codeword).

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Lhasa, Tibet, November 1959

A lthough the plane was equipped with a camera. it carried no film
and did not have a full load of fuel, which made it considerably
lighter than an operational U-2C. As a result, the plane reached
76.400 feet-the highest altitude achieved by any of the original U-2
aircraft. In the process. however, the aircraft consumed more fuel
than was called for in the test fligh t plan, causing the engine to flame
out during the return to base. The pilot then made an emergency
wheels-up landing at a glider-club strip near Fujisawa. south of
Atsugi .
The crash did not cause any injuries or serious damage 10 the aircraft, but it did bri ng unwanted publicity to the U-2 program. Much of
the publicity resulted from the actions of Detachment C's security
unit. whose conspicuous Hawaian shirts and large pistols drew the

Seeret NOFOAN

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attention of Japanese reporters. One reporter even flew over the area
in a helicopter, taking pictures of the U-2. These photographs appeared in many Japanese newspapers and magazines. 18

U-2 Crash in Thailand
Flights by Detachment C U-2s over Tibet and western China continued during the first half of 1960 under Operation TOPPER. The first
mission on 30 March was very successful. The second mission on 5
April took good photographs but encountered mechanical problems.
At the start of the mission, the landing-gear doors failed to close completely, resulting in increased drag and higher fuel consumption. With
no fuel gauge to warn the pilot of the critical fuel situation, the aircraft ran out of fuel far short of Ta Khli, forcing the pilot to make a
crash landing in a rice paddy. The area was inaccessible to large vehicles, and the plane, article 349, had to be cut into pieces in order to
remove it. With the help of local villagers, the retrieval team
dissassembled the aircraft for transport to the base, where the pieces
were loaded onto a C-124 under cover of darkness. The crash and
subsequent recovery of the U-2 did not attract the attention of the
p~e.ss; there was only one report in a local Thai newspaper, which
simply referred to the crash of a jet plane. In appreciation for the assistance provided by the villagers, the Agency's Thailand Station
gave the headman funds to build a new school. 19

End of Detachment C Operations
The loss of two aircraft in slightly more than six months left
Detachment C with just two aircraft. Fortunately, the level of mission
activity remained low because Detachment C was no longer conducting overflights of the Soviet Union.
One important remaining mission was high-altitude air sampling
(HASP), in which specially equipped U-2s gathered upper-altitude air
samples to look for evidence of Soviet nuclear testing. The direction
of the prevailing winds made Detachment C ideally situated for this
activity, which began in the fall of 1958 and continued in 1959. In
late April 1960, Detachment C was preparing to stage to the
Philippines to conduct additional air-sampling missions, when the
loss of Powers' U-2 temporarily halted all U-2 activities.

" Ibid.. chap. 15, p. 30 (TS Codeword).
'"' Ibid.. chap. 15. pp. 32-33 (TS Codeword).

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:.·.·,·;-.... .; ..
_·

.._ \..

. . •,...•~..,. •.. ......

. ,. :. > '.';... . . ... . .....-.' -~.:.. . . ~ ..~ ..;,

... ...•

Recovery of Article 349,
April 1960

The publicity generated by the U-2 incident stirred consider.able
controversy in Japan, and there were soon demonstrations against the
continuing presence of U-2s in Japan. On 6 June 1960, project h,eadquarters decided on a phased-out withdrawal of Detachment C
between 15 July and l September, but this timetable had to be ac:celerated when the Japanese Government formally requested the re3
moval of the U-2s on 8 July. "

" Ibid.. chap. 15, pp. 33-36 (TS Codeword).

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Detachment G Missions Over Laos and North Vietnam
In the aftermath of the Powers loss, both of the overseas U-2 detachments returned to the United States and their aircraft and personnel
were incorporated into Detachment G at Edwards Air Force Base in
California. This detachment was now responsible for providing coverage in Asia, and its first mission came in Laos. After the neutralist
Laotian Government of Souvanna Phouma collapsed in early
December 1960, reports began circulating that leftist antigovernment
forces were using Soviet arms. Then on 30 December, a new Laotian
Government appealed for UN aid against what it said was an invasion
from North Vietnam and possibly Communist China. Alarmed over
the possibility of the civil war expanding because of the introduction
of foreign troops, the Eisenhower administration ordered Detachment
G to gather more information on the events in Southeast Asia.
Five Detachment G pilots and planes were ferried to Cubi Point
Naval Air Station in the Philippines to conduct an operation known as
POLECAT. During the period 3 to 18 January 1961, these U-2s made
. s~yen flights over Laos and North Vietnam. To search for the reported
foreign troops, these missions concentrated on the lines of communications leading into Laos from North Vietnam and China. In addition,
the U-2s scanned North Vietnamese airfields for Soviet aircraft to
determine the magnitude of the airdrop operation allegedly supporting
the Pathet Lao troops. NPIC sent photointerpreters to Clark Air Force
Base in the Philippines to obtain an immediate readout of the results
of each mission. The photography did not substantiate the Laotian
claims, and on 26 January the Laotian Government retracted its
charges of a foreign invasion. Detachment G's U-2s returned to
California in early February l 96 I. 31
During the final stages of Operation POLECAT, there was a major threat to the security of the mission. The film from the flights
made on 16 and I 8 January had been sent to the United States for duplicate processing. Afterward the film was put aboard an Agency
C-47 on 14 March to ferry it to Washington. During the flight one of
the aircraft's engines failed, forcing the crew to jettison 43 boxes of
highly classified film over mountainous terrain around Williamsport,
Pennsylvania, to keep the craft airborne. After making an emergency

" Ibid., chap. 16. p. 17 (TS Codeword).

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landing at the Scranton-Wilkes-Bame Airport. the pilot reported the
incident to Headquarters. The Office of Security immediately contacted the Pennsylvania State Police, who sealed off the wooded area.
Agency security officers soon arrived to search for the boxes. They
recovered all 43 containers; not one had broken.32
Detachment G's only other activity during the summer of 196 l
was a solitary overflight of North Vietnam, known as Operation
EBONY. In preparation for this mission, a U-2 deployed to Cubi
Point on 13 August l 96 l. Two days later it successfully conducted
the overflight and subsequently returned to the United States.JJ

New Detachment on Taiwan
Long before the Nationalist Chinese became involved in the U-2 program, they were flying covert reconnaissance missions for the CIA . In
1952 the CIA began recruiting Nationalist Chinese crews to replace
US personnel from the proprietary ti.rm Civil Air Transport, who had
_ been flying Agency aircraft to drop leaflets. agents, and supplies over
the Chinese mainland. This •project (BGMARQUE) aJso provided
photographic coverage of the rail li.ne from Shanghai to the border
with French Indochina. CIA-sponsored aerial reconnaissance over the
mainland increased substantially in 1955 with the establishment of
Project STPOLLY. which used Agency aircraft with Nationalist
Chinese crews to gather Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and conduct
psychological warfare against the Pe,ople's Republic of China. At first
the SIGlNT equipment was installed in World War II-vintage aircraft
such as PB-4Ys and B-17s, but in 1958 the project received a new
aircraft procured covertly by the Agency from Lockheed, the P2V7,
with an extremely sophisticated airborne SIGINT system. STPOLLY
added the more advanced Lockheed P3A in 1963. Between 1955 and
1967, when the CIA terminated the project, STPOLLY conducted 399
overflights of the People's Republic of China, losing a total of eight
aircraft and crews.
In addition to CIA-sponsored aerial reconnaissance projects, the
Nationalist Chinese Air Force had ii:s own reconnaissance capability
with US-supplied RB-57 aircraft. ln 1958 the US Air Force proposed

" Ibid.. chap. 7. p. 24 (TS Codeword).
·'·' Ibid.. chap. 16. p. 18 (TS Cod.:word).

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!ec, et NOFORN
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supplying the Nationalist Chinese Government with the most advanced reconnaissance aircraft available, the U-2. The C[A opposed a
Nationalist Chinese U-2 program because such flights would des.troy
the existing unclassified cover for the U-2. In discussions with the, Air
Force, DDCI Cabell only consented to having Nationalist p.ilots
trained to fly U-2s so that they would be ready in case they were
needed in the future; he opposed any Nationalist overflights. The
training of the Nationalist Chinese pilots began in March 1959 . By
the end of the year, there was a group of trained pilots ready for operations, and DCI Dulles met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to dis,cuss
the program's future. Dulles reaffirmed the Agency's opposition to
Nationalist Chinese U-2 missions, and the Air Force, which had

Lockheed P-2V7 and P3A
reconnaissance aircraft

Sec.et NOFORN

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wanted the Nationalists to be allowed to begin operations, reluctantly
agreed to wait until conditions were favorable.'"' The situation
changed radically in May 1960 after the loss of Powers' U-2 destroyed the existing cover story for U-2 operations. Now there was no
longer any reason not to use the Nationalist pilots. In addition, the
Agency soon found itself in need of a base of operations in the Far
East after Detachment C had to leave Japan.
During discussions with Nationalist officials on 6 May 1960, the
CIA's Chief of Station in Taipei, Ray Cline, raised the possibility of
assigning U-2s to the Chinese Air Force. Two weeks later, Gen.
Chiang Ching-kuo, head of the National Security Bureau, approached
Cline informally to propose that the U-2 aircraft based in Japan be
moved to Taiwan. This was followed three days later by an official
offer on behalf of General Chiang's father, Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek. President Eisenhower learned of Nationalist China's proposal on 18 June. Several weeks later, Richard Bissell suggested that
two U-2s be turned over to the Nationalists for use in overflying the
mainland. The project would be conducted along the lines of Project
STPOLLY. 35
On 26 August l 960, President Eisenhower and the State
Department approved Bissell 's proposal to tum U-2s over to the
Nationalist Chinese rather than move an American detachment to
Taiwan. Using Nationalist pilots for overflights had the advantage of
providing complete deniability for the United States, even if an aircraft was lost over hostile territory. The U-2s would belong to
Nationalist China and would have Nationalist pilots, and there was no
overt US involvement with the overflights. In reality, however, the
United States would maintain strict control over the missions to be
flown. 36
On 7 December l 960, two U-2s were officially licensed for export to Nationalist China as part of a new effort codenamed TACKLE.
These planes came from the Agency's U-2 inventory and arrived in

'" Andrew J. Russo, Low-Level Technical Reconnaissance Over Mainland China
( 1955-1966) (draft), Clandestine Services Historical Program, CSHP-2.348 (CIA: History

Staff, 1972) (S).
'' OSA History. chap. 17, pp. 1-7 (TS Codeword).

'• Ibid., chap. 17. pp. 12-13, 44 (TS Codeword).

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Saaret N0FORN
Chapter 5

225

Taiwan on 14 December. Within the Agency the Nationalist pilots and
aircraft were known as Detachment H, and they were based a1t the
Nationalist Chinese Air Force Base at T'ao-yuan. One of the U-2s
was painted with the Nationalist Chinese insignia, and the other was
left unmarked so that it could also be used by Agency pilots as needed. The planes were maintained by Lockheed mechanics under contract to the CIA. The Agency attempted to maintain at least two U-2s
in Detachment H, so lost or damaged aircraft were replaced from the
·Agency's inventory.

Detachment H U-2 at T'ao-yuan
Airfield

During 1961, Detachment H conducted training missions with
both U-2s, and one Nationalist pilot was killed in a crash on 19
March. Although the detachment was ready to begin operations, the
new Kennedy administration was not yet ready to authorize overflights of the PRC. In a 3 March 1961 meeting between S tate
Department and CIA officials to discuss the possibility of such overflights, Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles noted that "the
President was feeling his way on the international scene, and time
was needed to evaluate the new Sino-Soviet posture with relation to
the United States." 37 In July 1961 the USIB considered the possibility
of conducting overflights of the PRC, but the State Department remained opposed.
By the fall of 196 l , interest in overflights of the PRC was growing because of indications that the Chinese were making progress in
nuclear energy and missile development. As a result, on 4 Oc1tober

" James A Cunningham. Jr., Assistant Chief, DPD-DD/P, Memorandum for the Record.
··TACKLE STPOLLY Briefing for State Depanment Officials," 6 March 1961, IC Staff,
COMIREX records, job 33-B-119A. bol( I, " IDEALISTffACKLE. 1961" (S).

Gearet

Seeret NOFO"N
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226

1961 PFIAB recommended the initiation of a limited number of U-2
photographic missions over the Chinese mainland. The President approved the board's recommendation.
Because the US-Nationalist Chinese overflight program (Project
TACKLE) was a joint effort, both countries participated in the approval process and also shared in the results of the missions. The
USlB COMOR established the requirements for Detachment H's
overflights, which had to be approved by the NSC's Special Group
(5412 Committee) and the President. The Nationalist Chinese
Government also approved all missions flown by its pilots. Under the
terms of an agreement reached with the Nationalist Chinese
Government, film from the overflights of the mainland would be processed in the United States, with a duplicate positive copy returned to
Nationalist China within IO days. NPIC was responsible for the initial
reporting on these missions.'"
Project TACKLE overflights began early in 1962. Following a 5
January Special Group decision to approve three missions, a
Detachment H U-2 with a Nationalist Chinese pilot flew its first mission over the PRC's missile-testing range at Shuangchengzi on 12
January 1962. Unfortunately, because of faulty navigation or faulty
maps, the aircraft was poorly positioned and obtained only oblique,
rather than vertical, photography of the range. En route to and from
Shuangchengzi, the U-2 overflew Fukien and Chekiang Provinces
looking for suspected deployed missiles, but none could be found in
the mission photography. 39
The second Project TACKLE mission took place on 23 February
1962, when a U-2 overflew the PRC's nuclear weapons establishment
at Lan-chou. Photography from this mission revealed that the installation was at least two years away from operational capacity. Two more
missions on 13 and 26 March flew over K'un-ming and central China
covering numerous airfields that had been discovered in satellite photography. The U-2 photographs showed more detail than the satellite
pictures, thereby, providing additional intelligence data, particularly

" OSA History, chap. 17, pp. 18-19, annex 107 (TS Codeword).
,., Ibid., chap. 17, p. 45 (TS Codeword); Mission folder GRC I 00 ( 12 January 1962), OSA
records.job 67-B-972, box 19 (TS Codeword). Note: The numbers for missions flown by
Nationalist Chinese pilots began with GRC (Government of the Republic of China).

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Chapter 5
228

Lan-chou, PRC, 23 February 1962

for air order of battle. In addition to the primary targets already described, the initial series of Project TACKLE missions obtained photography of the submarine construction facilities at Shanghai and
Wu-ch'ang, which showed a low levd of activity. Other photographs
revealed tremendous expansion of the industrial complexes at
Nanking and Ch'ang-sha and the pre:sence of a previously unknown
0
industrial area at Chiang-yu.•
Encouraged by the success of the first TACKLE missions,
COMOR recommended in May 1962 that Detachment H cover as
many as possible of the highest priority industrial and airfield targets
in northeast China and the missile! test ranges in north China.
COMOR noted that, with the exception of the areas around Peiping
and the Shuangchengzi missile test range, the chances of a U-2 being
downed were low. The USIB concurred with COMOR's recommendations, and Detachment H therefore conducted three more overflights of the PRC during the month of June:'

~• OSr\ History. chap. 17. p. -l5 (TS Codeword;,: Mission folders GRCI02 (23 February
1962). GRCIO-l ( 13 March 1962). and GRCI06 (26 March 1962). OSA records. j ob
67-8-972. box 19 (TS Codeword).

" Lay, "USIB History." vol. 2. pp. 385-386 (T:S Codeword).

Seeret NOFORN

Chapter 5
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Before the month was over, however, another confrontation between Nationalist China and the PRC over the Formosa Strait erupted.
The Nationalist Government reported a massive buildup of PRC
troops and aircraft in Fukien Province opposite the Nationalist-held
Quemoy and Ma-tsu Islands. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
immediately ordered U-2 coverage of the Strait area to determine the
extent of the PRC buildup. In response, Detachment H flew six missions over the Strait between 25 June and 28 July 1962. To speed up
the readout of this photography, the films were processed at the Asian
Photographic Interpretation Center (ASPIC) at Yokota, Japan, a joint
military-CIA endeavor. The U-2 coverage ended in late July when it
became apparent that the PRC did not intend to mount an invasion of
the offshore islands:~
The pace of Detachment H m1ss10ns slowed considerably in
August 1962; the sole Project TACKLE overflight covered Peiping
and Manchuria. The following month the detachment mounted two
missions. one over south China on the eighth and the second over
Kiangsu Province on the ninth. Unfortunately, mechanical difficulties
led to the loss of the latter aircraft near Lu-shan. A flameout forced
- the U-2 down to an altitude where PRC interceptors were able to hit
the U-2 with an air-to-air rocket. The Nationalist Chinese pilot parachuted and was captured. At this point, President Kennedy ordered a
standdown of overflights of the PRC."'
Following the capture of the Nationalist Chinese U-2 pilot, the
People ·s Republic of China accused the United States of
masterminding the overflights, but the State Department denied any
involvement. Nationalist China then revealed that the United States
had granted it a license to purchase two U-2 aircraft. In a l 3
September 1962 response to the Chinese protest, President Kennedy
denied any responsibility for the sale of the U-2s to Taiwan. noting
that the sale had occurred under the previous administration. He
stated that there were no current plans to sell any more U-2s to

Nationalist China. Eight months later, however, the President approved an export license for the delivery of another U-2 to Taiwan.
Such licenses were needed only for cover purposes. The Agency continued to maintain two U-2s on Taiwan, bringing new ones in to
replace aircraft lost in training or on missions.
'' OSA History, chap. 17, p. 46 (TS Codeword).
'·' Ibid.. pp. 46-47 (TS Codeword); Mission folders GRC 125 ( 11 August 1962). GRC 126
(8 September 1962), and GRC 127 (9 September 1962), OSA records. job 67-B-972. boxes
20 and 21 (TS Codeword).

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Seeret NOFORN

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Detachment H resumed overflights of mainland China in
December 1962, but its missions now concentrated on the southern
portion where there were fewer radars and SAM sites. During
December l 962 and January 1963., the detachment conducted two
successful overflights of Sichuan, but a mission over south China had
to be aborted prematurely. The results of Detachment H's continuing
coverage of the People's Republic of China remained of considerable
interest to the United States. On 17 December 1962, the Special
Group approved plans for fiscal year 1963/64 that included requirements for photo coverage of mainland China and for maintaining at
least two operational U-2 aircraft in Detachment H.....

Use of Detachment H Aircraft by US Pilots
Detachment H's importance did not lie solely in the missions carried
out by its Nationalist Chinese pilots against targets in mainland
China; the detachment also provided! aircraft for use by American pilots flying missions in other parts of Asia. Indochina was an area of
particular interest as American involvement there began growing during the early 1960s. Beginning in February 1962, Detachment G pilots went to Tao-yuan to use the unmarked Project TACKLE U-2 for
overflights of North Vietnam. During the first half of 1962,
Detachment G pilots made seven overflights of North Vietnam from
the Tao Yuan base. Thereafter, Detachment G pilots could use their
own aircraft because the unit began staging teams and aircraft from
Edwards AFB to Ta Khli AFB in Thailand.
Between 1962 and 1964, Agency U-2s staged a total of 36 photographic missions over North and South Vietnam. By April 1964,
however, photographic requirements were changing from strategic reconnaissance to tactical support as the Viet Cong became more active,
taking advantage of the weakness of the South Vietnamese central
government following the coup tha1t overthrew President Ngo Dinh
Diem in 1963 and subsequent coups by disgruntled army officers.
During this period the South Vietnamese "strategic hamlet" concept
began breaking down, and the Viet Cong forces stepped up the pace
of their attacks. As a result of the: increasing level of combat in
Indochina, the USIB gave responsibility for aerial reconnaissance of
the areas where fighting was taking; place to the SAC. Henceforth,
SAC U-2s would be used over South Vietnam. parts of Cambodia
.. OSA History. chap. 17. pp. 48-49 (TS Codeword); Mission folders GRC 134 (25
December 1962). GRC136 (28 December 1962). and GRC138 {20 January 1963). OSA
records. job 67-B-972. bo;,c 21. and job 66-8 -664, bo;,c I (TS Codeword).

Se&reL

Sect et NOFOFll'\I

Chapter 5
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within 30 miles of South Vietnam, all of Laos south of Paksane, and
all of North Vietnam within 30 miles of South Vietnam or the coast.
The remaining portions of Indochina remained the responsibility of
the Agency's U-2s. Then in August 1964, following the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution, the Air Force assumed responsibility for all of
Indochina:5

U-2s in India
In October 1962, the People's Republic of China launched a series of
massive surprise attacks against India's frontier forces in the western
provinces of Jammu and Kashmir and in the North-East Frontier
Agency (NEFA). The Chinese overran all Indian fortifications north
of the Brahmaputra Valley before halting their operations.
The Indian Government appealed to the United States for military aid. In the negotiations that followed, it became apparent that
Indian claims concerning the extent of the Chinese incursions could
not be reliably evaluated. US Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith,
therefore, suggested to the Indian Government that US aerial recon_naissance of the disputed areas would provide both governments with
a more accurate picture of the Communist Chinese incursions. On 11
November 1962, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru consented to the
proposed operation and gave the United States permission to refuel
the reconnaissance aircraft (U-2s) in Indian airspace:6
In late November, Detachment G deployed to Ta Khli, Thailand,
to carry out the overflights of the Sino-Indian border area. Since the
U-2s were not authorized to overfly Burma, they had to reach the target area via the Bay of Bengal and eastern India and, therefore, required midair refueling.
Because of severe winter weather conditions, the first flight did
not take place until 5 December. Poor weather and air turbulence
hampered the mission, and only 40 percent of the target area could be
photographed. A second mission on 10 December was more successful, but the U-2 experienced rough engine performance because of
icing of the fuel lines. 47

" OSA History, chap. I 6, pp. 18- I 9 (TS Codeword).

"' Ibid., chap. 16, pp. 26-27 (TS Codeword).
" Ibid., p. 28 (TS Codeword); Mission folders 320 I (5 December 1962 and 3203 ( I 0
December 1962), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 26 (TS Codeword).

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Sec, et NOFORP~

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Detachment G U-2s made four more overflights of the
Sino-Indian border areas in January 1963, which led to a PRC protest
to India. Photography from these missions was used in January and
again in March 1963 to brief Prime Minister Nehru, who then informed the Indian Parliament about Communist Chinese troop movements along the border. Although Nehru did not reveal the source of
his intelligence, a UPI wire story surmised that the information had
been obtained by U-2s.
The United States had provided photographic coverage of the
border area to India for two reasons. First of all, US policymakers
wanted a clear picture of the area under dispute. In addition, the intelligence community wanted to establish a precedent for overflights
from India, which could lead to obtaining a permanent staging base in
India for electronic reconnaissance missions against the Soviet ABM
site at Saryshagan and photographic missions against those portions
of western China that were out of range of Detachment H. In April
1963, Ambassador Galbraith and the Chief of Station at New Delhi
made the first official request to India for a base. The following
month, President Kennedy agreed to DCI McCone's suggestion to
raise the question of a U-2 base in India when he met with India's
President Savepalli Radhakrishnan on 3 June. This meeting resulted
in an Indian offer of an abandoned World War II base at Charbatia.
south of Calcutta.48
The Charbatia base was in poor condition and needed considerable renovation before it could be used for U-2 operations. Work on
the base by the Indians took much longer than expected, so
Detachment G continued to use Ta Khli when it staged four sorties
over Tibet from 29 September to l O November 1963. In addition to
the coverage of the Sino-Indian border during this series of flights,
the U-2s also photographed all of Thailand to produce a photomap of
the border regions as a quid pro quo for the Thai Government. During
one of these photomapping missions, a U-2 pilot conducted the longest mission ever recorded in this aircraft- I I hours and 45 minutes.
At the end of this flight on IO November 1963, the pilot was in such
poor physical condition that project managers prohibited the scheduling of future missions longer than IO hours.'''
"' OSA History: chap. 16. p. 30 (TS Codeword).

·• Mission folder 3238 (l O November ! 963 ). OSA records. job 67-B-971. bo)( 29 (TS
Codeword).

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Charbatia was still not ready in early 1964, so on 31 March 1964
Detachment G staged another mission from Ta Khli. The first mission
out of Charbatia did not take place until 24 May 1964. Three days
later Prime Minister Nehru died, and further operations were postponed. The pilots and aircraft left Charbatia, but other equipment remained in place to save staging costs. In December 1964, when
Sino-Indian tensions increased along the border, Detachment G returned to Charbatia and conducted three highly successful missions,
satisfying all of COMOR's requirements for the Sino-Indian border
region. By this time, however, Ta Khli had become the main base for
Detachment G's Asian operations, and Charbatia served merely as a
forward staging base. Charbatia was closed out in July 1967. 50

Increasing Responsibilities, Inadequate
Resources in Asia
The main focus of Agency U-2 activity in Asia remained the U-2s of
Detachment H on Taiwan. In March and April 1963, the USIB met to
consider COMOR proposals for aerial reconnaissance of Laos, North
__Vietnam, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China. All of
COMOR's intelligence requirements could best be met by the U-2 because heavy cloud cover made it difficult to obtain satellite photography of the region. At the 28 May 1963 meeting of the Special Group,
DCI McCone requested authorization for a series of overflights to
meet these requirements and stressed the need for additional intelligence on the atomic energy facilities of the PRC. The Special Group
then established a "bank" of four authorizations for overflights of the
PRC, subject to monthly review by the Group. 51
As a result of the increasing intelligence community interest in
the Far East, both Agency U-2 detachments became very active in the
region. Detachment G conducted a number of missions over the border areas of China, North Vietnam, and Laos during April and May of
1963. At the same time, Detachment H became more adventurous,
sending U-2s deeper and deeper into the PRC. These missions included renewed overflights of the missile test range near Baotou and
the Lan-chou nuclear facilities, as well as targets in northern China,
Manchuria, and west-central China (as far as Koko Nor).

" OSA History. chap. 16, pp. 30-3-1 (TS Codeword).

" Lay, "USIB History," vol. 3, pp. 391-392 (TS Codeword).

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Sec,et N6FOfU\1
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The increased level of U-2 activity in the Far East during the
spring of 1963 exposed a serious weakness in Projects IDEALIST and
TACKLE, a shortage of aircraft. The Agency only had seven flyable
U-2s when the TACKLE overflights of the PRC began in January
1962, and one of these aircraft had already been lost during an overflight in September 1962. To deal with this shortage, DCI McCone
asked Defense Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on
IO June 1963 to transfer two U-2s from the Air Force to the CIA. The
Defense Department quickly approved this request. Before the two
Air Force aircraft were placed in service, however, the Agency had
them upgraded with J75/P- l 3A engines and various electronic devices, a process that took more than four months. 52
As overflights over the PRC increased, so did concern about the
growing number of Chinese surface-to-air missile sites. The Office of
Special Activities, therefore, got permission from the Defense
Department to equip Project TACKLE aircraft with System-XII
SAM-warning units. These devices alerted the pilot that his aircraft
was being tracked by the FAN SONG acquisition radar, part of the
SA-2's electronic targeting system. The System-XII units also recorded each radar-tracking sequence. Analysis of these recordings revealed changes in the FAN SONG radar's characteristics, information
that proved useful in designing electronic-countermeasure (ECM) devices for US aircraft operating over Vietnam during the late l 960s. 51
Despite the addition of System-XII in the spring of 1963, the
Nationalist Chinese-piloted U-2s of Project TACKLE had far fewer
ECM devices than other Agency U-2s. Project IDEALIST aircraft
possessed a complete suite of ECM gear in addition to the previously
mentioned System-XII unit. Among this ECM equipment was a device that told the pilot that an SA-2 missile had been launched
(nicknamed the "Oscar-Sierra" unit, which was the acronym for the
expletive U-2 pilots used when they learned that an SA-2 missile was
on the way: "Oh, shit!") and a System-XIII unit that produced
false-angle returns to the homing radar aboard the approaching missile in an effort to steer it away from the aircraft. The Defense
Department opposed installing such devices aboard Detachment H's
U-2s, for fear they could fall into Communist hands.

" OSA History, chap. 16, p. 10 (TS Codeword).
" Ibid., chap. 17, p. 50 (TS Codeword).

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6eeret NOFORN
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235

The danger posed by the growing number of SA-2 sites in the
PRC was clearly demonstrated on 1 November 1963, when a second
Project TACKLE U-2 was lost near the Kiangsi-Chekiang border on
its way back from photographing the PRC's Shuangchengzi missile
test range. As was the case after the first operational loss over China
in September 1961, President Kennedy ordered a standdown of overflights of mainland China. This standdown lasted almost five months.
As a result of this second loss over the PRC, the Office of
Special Activities began installing a new 30-channel telemetry system
aboard Detachment H U-2s to monitor various aircraft functions.
Known as BIRDWATCHER, this unit periodically broadcast a burst
of data to the airbase that launched the U-2. This data burst contained
a status report on all the major systems aboard the plane, such as airspeed, altitude, exhaust temperature, fuel supply, film supply, and oxygen supply. BIRDWATCHER provided project managers with a
benchmark of aircraft performance that could be used to determine if
a lost plane had been shot down at altitude or had suffered mechanical
failure. 54
BIRDWATCHER's first operational use came on 16 March
1964, when overflights resumed with a mission over southern China.
The PRC was now a high-priority target for the U-2 because more
data were needed to prepare National Intelligence Estimates due in
the autumn. Of particular concern was the PRC's nuclear program.
Despite the high priority of its missions, Detachment H's resources
remained scarce. It was short of both pilots and planes and never had
more than three U-2s or six qualified Nationalist Chinese pilots at any
one time. By the spring of 1964, crashes during training and the two
losses over the mainland had reduced Detachment H to only two qualified pilots, one of whom suffered from ulcers and a nervous disorder.
Indeed, this pilot had every reason to be nervous; he flew three of the
next four Detachment H overflights and became the third Nationalist
Chinese pilot to be shot down over the mainland.
This loss came on 7 July 1964. The Nationalist Chinese pilot's
last transmission was that his System-XII unit had alerted him that he
was being tracked by the FAN SONG radar. BIRDWATCHER data
revealed that the aircraft was at penetration altitude and all systems

'" Ibid., p. 51. 53 (TS Codeword).

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6eeFet AJOl=OSN
Chapter 5
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were normal when the pilot made this report. Project managers presumed that the U-2 was downed by a direct hit or near miss by an
SA-2 missile. 55
President Johnson ordered a standdown of overflights of the
PRC. This standdown was welcomed by the Nationalist Chinese
Government, which told the Taiwan Chief of Station that it wanted
··to let some time go by" before more overflights were scheduled.
The Nationalists pointed out that the only remaining qualified U-2 pilot had "disqualified" himself because of nervous tension. No new
pilots could be qualified for U-2 flights before mid-August.
The Nationalists then demanded faster and higher flying aircraft
as well as better antimissile equipment for the planes. This request led
some CIA personnel to suspect that Nationalist China had learned
about Project OXCART, the successor to the U-2 that was still undergoing testing. Despite the Nationalists' request for better ECM equipment, the Defense Department remained reluctant to authorize the use
of the System-XIII false-angle radar jammer on Project TACKLE
U-2s. The Defense Department feared that the loss of this device with
its highly advanced traveling-wave tube (TWT) would enable
Communist Bloc technicians to devise countermeasures and also
learn how to produce the highly efficient TWT themselves. As an incentive for the Nationalist Chinese to agree to more overflights. the
CIA agreed to permit them to process the U-2 film on Taiwan and to
use their own photointerpreters to exploit the film along with US
photointerpreters.
To counter the shortage of pilots in Detachment H, DCI McCone
suggested to the Special Group on 6 August 1964 that civilian CIA
pilots be used to fly missions over mainland China. The group agreed
that the matter should be taken up with President Johnson. On the following day, however, Presidential National Security Assistant
McGeorge Bundy informed McCone that, because Secretary of State
Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara opposed the idea. he
would not take it up with the President. 5~

" OS,\ History. chap. 17, pp. 53-55 (TS Codeword): Mission folder Cl 74C (7 July I 964),
OSA records, job 66-8-664, box 7 (TS Codeword). Note: beginning in 1964 Nationalist
Chinese mission numbers began with "C" instead of "'GRC. ••
'' OSA History. chap. 17, pp. 58-59 (TS Codeword).

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6ee1 el l\16t-OFU'\1
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Advanced ECM Equipment for Detachment H
Demand for overhead photography of the PRC continued to grow,
spurred in part by the results of earlier U-2 missions that revealed the
presence of Soviet-made MiG-2ls in the PRC. In addition, there were
indications that Communist China might be producing its own SAMs.
Furthermore, satellite photography revealed that preparations for the
first Chinese nuclear test were almost complete at the Lop Nor test
site.
The need for photographs of the Lop Nor site was considered so
urgent that the Defense Department finally relented and permitted the
System-XIII false-angle device jammer to be installed in Project
TACKLE aircraft, with the proviso that it not be turned on until after
the pilot had been alerted by System-XII that he was being tracked by
FAN SONG radars. Photographing Lop Nor, however, was not a simple task. Located more than 2,000 miles west-northwest of Taiwan,
Lop Nor lay beyond the round trip range of T'ao-yuan-based U-2s and
in-flight refueling was not possible. Lop Nor was closer to Ta Khli,
Thailand, only 1,650 miles northwest of that base, and much closer to
Charbatia, India, which lay only 1,200 miles south of the testing site.
After refusing DCI McCone's suggestion to stage a Lop Nor
overflight from Charbatia using a CIA civilian pilot, President
Johnson approved a proposal to send a Project TACKLE unit to Ta
Khli for the mission to Lop Nor. A Detachment H U-2 with a
Nationalist Chinese pilot deployed to Ta Khli in mid-October to prepare for the overflight. Before mission preparations could be completed, however, the Chinese detonated their first nuclear weapon on 16
October 1964, and the mission was canceled. 57
The first overflight of Communist China since the 7 July 1964
loss was a 31 October mission over Lan-chou. By mid-November,
three more overflights had taken place, one over North Korea and
northern China and two over southern and central China. An overflight of Manchuria on 9 December 1964 brought back photos of a
G-class ballistic-missile submarine. By this time, the mass of data being provided by Project TACKLE overflights was overwhelming the
analysts of the Office of Research and Reports (ORR). An ORR
memorandum from 11 January 1965 reported that analysis of the
"large backlog of unexploited photography on Chinese Communist
'' Lay, "USIB History," vol. 6, pp. 751. 753-755.

--6ec1er

Setret PdOFQRl)I

Chapter 5
238
ground force installations .. .would require about two man-years
work, backed up by a larger expansion of photointerpretation effort.,, S3

Use of Infrared Scanner Over PRC Nuclear Plants
Photographic missions were not the only method used by the Agency
to gather information on the PRC's progress in developing nuclear
weapons. fn fact, standard overhead photography was of little value in
determining whether or not various nuclear-related facilities were
producing weapon-grade materials. Such information could onl1y be
obtained from agent reports or infrared imaging of the targets. which
would reveal the heat associated with nuclear-refining activity. Early
in 1963 the Agency sought special funds from the Pentagon to develop a high-resolution infrared scanner for the U-2 in order to ascertain the operntional status of Chinese nuclear reactors. After this
request was turned down. the Agency decided to fund the development of such a scanner itself. In the spring of 1963, the Office of
Research and Development (ORD) signed a contract with the Texas
Instruments C'Jmoration for the :roduction of an infrared scanner that
would operat ~----:---,.~-- ~ To conceal the intended
purpose of the scanner, the dev ices were called forest fire dete,ctors
and assigned model numbers su